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1ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the response of The New York Times
international edition to the Algerian revolution from 1956 to 1962.
During the early years the paper took the French official view;
however as the inevitability of independence became apparent, it began
to take a more detached stance towards the Algerian-French conflict.
Attention is also given to the ways in which other news publications
responded to events in Algeria in order to establish some form of
comparison.
Chapter I exposes the strengths and weaknesses of The New York
Times as a leading newspaper. Chapter II briefly traces Algeria's
relationship with France from occupation to the outbreak of the
revolution, and analyses The New York Times earlier response to the
Algerian experience up to 1956. Chapters III to VI provide a detailed
thematic analysis of the way in which The New York Times reported and
presented the Algerian revolution from 1956 to 1962, using other media
and extra-media data. This is to establish a cross-check control of,
and to expose what was missing from, its Algeria-related material.
Chapter VII provides a statistical analysis of the manner in which The
New York Times treated the Algerian revolution, using the "attention
score" measurement system; and traces the evolution of the paper's
stance towards the Algerian-French conflict throughout four major
sub-periods within the overall period of research.
The thesis reveals that The New York Times coverage of Algeria
between 1956 and 1962 was quantitatively plentiful, and that the level
of interest in the subject was high. However, it shows that
qualitatively the coverage was generally weak and that its greatest
flaw was that of "omission". It concludes by outlining some basic
guidelines which should control journalists in their reporting, in
order to provide adequate coverage of world events.
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ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY
A.L.N.	 : Arm(e de Libe'ration Nationale
A.M.L.	 : Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberte'
C.C.E.	 : Comite'de Coordination et d'Exe'cution
colons	 : European settlers or colonists in Algeria
/ /
C.R.U.A.	 : Co,nite Revolutionnaire d'Unite et d'Action
C.S.P.	 : Comite'du Salut Pub7ic (Committee of Public
Safety). This first appeared in France in 1793
during the First Republic as a means to preserve
national security through centralized political
authority. The notion appeared in Algeria in
February 1956 and in May 1958 when committees,
composed of army officers and colon activists,
contributed to the downfall of the Fourth
Republic. Similar committees tried in January
1960 to overthrow General de Gaulle and the
Fifth Republic.
Dawla
fel lagha
f iday I ne
F.L.N.
interlocuteurs
valables
G.P.R.A.
Magh reb
M.N.A.
M.T.L.D.
Arabic word for (Algerian) State
Arabic word for highwaymen used by the French
authorities in reference to the nationalist
fighters.
F.L.N. fighters in urban areas
/
Front de Liberation Nationale
valid representatives (of the Algerian people)
Gouvrnement Provisoire de la Revolution
Algerienne
Arabic word for "the West" referring to the
countries of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.
/
Mouvement Natlona7 Algerien
Movement pour le Triomphe des Liberte's
Democrat iques
N.A.T.O.	 : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
0.A.S.	 : Organisation de L'Armee Secrete
O.S.	 : Organisation Secrete
P.C.A.	 : Parti Communiste Alge'rien
P.P.A.	 : Parti du Peuple Algrien
iv
pieds noirs	 : " black feet", name used in reference to the
colons. One theory refers the origin of this
term to the black polished shoes of the French
troops; another theory refers it to the usually
patronizing attitude of metropolitan French
towards the colons whose feet, it was held,
turned black because of excessive exposure to the
African heat.
ratissage:	 : French word for "scraping" or "raking"; policy
adopted by the French army against Algerian
villages supporting the F.L.N.
U.D.M.A.	 : Union De'niocratique pour le Manifeste Alge'rien
U.G.T.A.	 : Union Ge'ne'rale des Travailleurs Alge'riens
Ulemas	 : Moslem Scholars
U.N.	 : United Nations
ultras	 : diehard colons opposed to political changes
in Algeria
Wilaya	 : One of the six provinces (or military commands)
of the F.L.N. in Algeria.
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1I NTRODtJCT ION
In 1962 Algeria regained its independence after 132 years of
colonial rule and multifaceted resistance to French colonialism. Such
resistance reached its zenith in 1954 when the Algerians declared an
all-out military showdown with France, making their struggle for
independence one of the most articulate symbols of post-1945 Third
World aspirations for self-rule.
The thesis is primarily concerned with the response of one
leading world newspaper to the events in Algeria between 1956 and
1962. The newspaper selected is The New York Times international
edition. This edition, essentially based on the New York city late
edition, is taken because, being aimed at the paper's European and
international readership, it embodied the stance that the New York
proprietors and editors wanted to project about the paper's response
to the Algerian problem. Chapter I discusses the evolution of The New
York Times and its position as a world-class newspaper. What happened
in Algeria from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s represented another
colonial crisis and a war of independence that cost the lives of more
than one million people. It brought hardship to millions more, caused
the downfall of six French governments and the collapse of the Fourth
Republic, jeopardized Western security and the future of the N.A.T.O.
alliance and added more fuel to Cold War rivalry. But, it was also a
full-fledged revolution that transformed the realities in Algeria, in
France and in Africa as a whole and added a significant new dimension
to twentieth century "colonial wars". It promoted those same
universal democratic principles for which Republican France itself has
so often striven, and restored the Algerian State after more than a
2century of colonial obscurity and a tragic abuse of military force by
the imperial power.
Although the Algerian liberation movement, led by the Front de
Liberation Nationale (F.L.N.), was officially declared in 1954, it was
in 1956 that it became a popular revolution conducting a full-scale
war. It was during this year that the F.L.N. geographically expanded
its activities from its original base in eastern and central Algeria
to the whole country. Its fighting ability was strengthened by a
surge of popular support, an increase in the number of its recruits
and by the acquisition of more effective arms, especially after the
independence of Tunisia and Morocco which became both refuges and
supply routes for L'Armee de Liberation Nationale (A.L.N.). It was
also the year in which the F.L.N. strengthened its claim as the only
representative of the Algerian people, a role confirmed by the
rallying of the old parties and nationalist factions en masse to its
cause and their declaration of loyalty to it. The F.L.N. clearly
defined its ideology, outlined its future objectives and set up its
structural institutions during the Soummam Conference. It was also
the year in which the French intensified their war effort by throwing
half a million troops with the latest in military technology into
Algeria; the excesses of the French army, including torture, became
well-publicised facts in the war; N.A.T.O. involvement on France's
side became obvious; and the internationalization of the conflict took
a new turn. This crucial year in the conduct of the Algerian
revolution is therefore taken as the main point of departure in this
analysis.
But, in order to understand the events of 1956-1962, it is
clearly necessary to look back into the earlier histor y of
3Algerian-French relations. This is done in two ways. First, by a
brief historical statement of the French encounter with Algeria before
1945. Second, by consideration of the increasing tensions in the
relationship, as Algerian expectations at the end of the Second World
War were undermined by the French effort to reimpose full colonial
rule. The forms of post-War confrontation between France and the
Algerian nationalists until 1954 and the early revolutionary
activities from 1954 to 1956 form the subject of Chapter II.
Although the Algerian revolution in itself has been the subject
of voluminous research, little effort - if any - has been made to
examine its coverage in the news media. This study is, therefore, an
attempt to investigate the way in which it was reported and presented
by the world press, as represented by The New York Times measured
against a selection of other daily and weekly publications. Chapters
III to VI provide a thematic analysis of the conflict from 1956 to
1962. Chapter III addresses itself to the crucial years 1956 and 1957.
Chapter IV deals with the period 1958-1959. Chapter V is devoted to
the period 1960-1961. The final year of the revolution, 1962, forms
the subject of Chapter VI. This analysis is quality-oriented; it has
adopted the traditional historical approach based on
cross-disciplinary knowledge. Yet, whilst promoting historicism, it
introduces and utilizes some statistical and numerical methods in
order to establish a quantitative model. It is concerned on the one
hand with what the paper purveyed to its readers and how it purveyed
it, and on the other hand with what it did not purvey but chose to
omit. For the sake of thematic, analytical reliability, this analysis
has not relied on samples based on regular intervals of time as other
studies have done. Rather, it has examined all material in the
paper's items that is directly related to Algeria: news reports,
4editorials, commentaries and letters to the editor.
The major part of this thesis analyses the focal thematic points
in The New York Times coverage of Algeria and its attitude towards the
major themes. A "theme", here, can be defined as any statement,
opinion, expression, assertion or implication on any subject related
to the Algerian-French conflict which is repeated in subsequent
issues. Some important questions to answer are whether the paper tried
to investigate, interpret and analyse the subject as opposed to
straightforward reporting of "hot news"; whether it presented facts
with their historical, socio-economic and cultural contexts. Did The
New York Times make the effort to go beyond current events to provide
its readers with background information, and with the causes as well
as the on-going nature and effects of the crisis?
Of major significance is the investigation of the accuracy of the
information printed by The New York Times on the Algerian revolution.
The thesis therefore addresses itself to the difficult question of
facts. What really happened? What was reported and displayed in the
paper? Because cross-disciplinary knowledge is of vital importance to
this type of study, constant reference to established authoritative
works and essential archival material is made throughout the thematic
analysis. Meanwhile, a cross-check control of the paper's data on the
subject has been established through an informal thematic comparison
of its coverage with other selected news media, in the attempt to
determine the extent to which the paper conformed to prevailing
patterns of reportage and interpretation. Hence, Time magazine, The
Economist, The (London) Times, El Moudjahid (the official organ of the
F.L.N.) and Le Monde have been chosen for such cross-check control.
Importance is also given to the official position of the United States
5government and its attitude towards the conflict, and various
alternative views are also examined as they found expression on
Capitol Hill, and among trade unions and private organizations.
The thesis also examines the manner in which the paper displayed
and presented its Algeria material. Both "frequency of occurrence"
and "prominence of display" reflect the paper's position and attitude
towards the subject. A front-page story, for example, bears more
prominence than an inside story; an article with a four-column
headline is more prominent than one with a two-column headline.
Prominent presentation of particular items shows those aspects of the
Algerian "problem" which were deemed to be most important. Such
presentation or display, in addition to items count, help detect the
paper's level of interest and fluctuation in attention in "peak" and
"valley" terms.
To analyse the way in which The New York Times displayed and
presented its Algeria material, the "attention score" system
elaborated by Richard Budd stands as a useful approach.' Here,
however, the slightly modified procedure based on a three-point scale,
seems better suited to measure the degree of prominence of the news
"play" than Budd's two-point scale. Hence, three points are assigned
to any article with a headline covering horizontally four columns (or
more) on the same page. Two points are assigned to any article which
is two-columns (or more) wide, to articles covering three-fourths (or
more) of the length of a complete column. Two points are also
assigned to items printed on the front page, the editorial and opinion
page or in the Sunday section "News of the Week in Review". One point
is assigned to any item which does not meet any of the above-mentioned
criteria.
6All of The New York Times Algeria-related items are identified
here as news reports, editorials, commentaries, letters to the editor
or features. The news reports are classified according to their
origin and source of information. Every item is classified according
to its "valence": pro-French, pro-Algerian, neutral (or balanced). At
the same time it is recognized that the issue of pro/con
(favourable/unfavourable) is not yet totally resolved as the
methodology for this type of research is not yet fully developed. An
attempt Is therefore also made to detect and examine the reporting
errors or technical inaccuracies that are related either to the
source, to the composition of the headline or to the material
phraseology. Attention is also paid to the extent to which such
errors are favourable or unfavourable to one side or the other.
Chapter VII provides a statistical analysis of The New York Times
coverage of the Algerian revolution using the "attention score" system
of measurement.
It is widely accepted that the "information" each news medium
purveys to its audience contributes to the overall shaping of the
images that nations hold of each other. These images, which the media
play an important part in forming, inevitably influence both the
perception and attitudes of nations and, therefore, become an
important variable in the field of international relations. What
happened in Algeria during the period under study affected many
different people, in different parts of the world in different ways.
News of the Algerian-French conflict captured the attention of the
news corps throughout the world. For many people, lay readers and
experts alike, the print media served as the only source of
information on the subject. The New York Times was one of the news
sources relied upon for such information.
7It has been selected for this study mainly because of its widely
accepted reputation as the best, most prestigious and most influential
newspaper in the United States. It was ranked first by an American
panel, consisting mainly of leading international communications
scholars, that was asked to name the top ten American "quality"
papers. 2 It is widely read by top officials, academics and cultural
figures. And it is regarded as an "international" newspaper with a
multinational audience and a world-wide news interest, and as a model
for "serious", "responsible" American journalism.
8Notes
1. See Richard Budd, "Attention Score: A Device for Measuring a News
'Play'", Journalism Quarterly, Vol.41, No.2, 1964, pp.259-262.
2. See John C. Merrill, "U.S. Panel Names World's Ten Leading
'Quality' Dailies", Journalism Quarterly, Vol.41, 1964,
pp.568-572.
9CHAPTER I
REFLECTIONS ON THE NEW YORK TIMES. ITS STRENGTHS
AND WEAKNESSES
"... The New York Times... has always gone in for
quantity rather than quality." [Dwight Macdonald, 19631
"... My beefs about the Times are my beefs about the
American press generally, but the Times could do
something about it. And it does not. .." [George
Kennan]
The New York Times is widely regarded as one of the leading
"prestige" newspapers in the United States and perhaps in the world.
Prestige newspapers are those which hold an "influential" position
either because of their in-depth news analysis or because of their
extensive news coverage.' In the 1950s and 1960s The New York Times
fell under the category of dailies which had acquired their elite or
"prestige" image only through the extensiveness of their news
material. As one American observer remarked, it had the "best coverage
in extent", but for balanced, in-depth reporting the Christian Science
Monitor or the Baltimore Sun might have been better.2
The slogan, "All The News That's Fit To Print", which first
appeared in October 1896 and still figures on the front page of The
New York Times, typifies its traditional claim of antipathy to
sensationalization of the news and its pledge to print all that is
"clear, dignified and trustworthy". 3 Its publisher once defined the
news that is not fit to print as "what's untrue". 4 It has always
sought to display itself as a serious-minded newspaper which prints
all that is straight and unspectacular. In reality, however, it is
10
impossible for it to print "all" the news that is worth printing even
without the fact that at least half its space is traditionally devoted
to advertising. It is impossible for a single paper to cover all
metropolitan news, let alone national and international affairs. In
this context, the slogan "All The News That's Fit To Print" has been
widely described as a "fraud".5
Yet, the founding of The New York Times in 1851 is seen as a
turning point in the history of American journalism. It was launched
as a serious newspaper for an educated audience in reaction to the
growing "sensationalism" of the time, especially by newspapers like
The Sun, The Herald and The Tribune. 6 Its co-founders wanted to make
it "the best and cheapest daily family newspaper" in the United
States. 7
 In its first issue, the paper ran an editorial entitled "A
Word About Us" in which the publisher defined its principles and
direction:
"We do not mean to write as if we were in a passion,
unless that shall really be the case; and we shall make
it a point to get into a passion as rarely as possible.
There are very few things in the world which is worth
while to get angry about; and 8they are just the things
that anger will not improve".
A few decades later it reiterated, perhaps more arrogantly, its
claim of commitment to a morally "higher journalism", proclaiming
itself as the champion of the serious-minded readers against the
"jingoism" and "lavishness" of the yellow papers of the 1890s. Its
article "New Journalism and Vice" of 3 March 1898, typified its
campaign against sensational newspapers such as The World and The
Journal. It quoted a critic who described the "fearful struggle" in
which the American press had become engaged and which involved "two
classes" of journalism: "On the one side staftd the reputable papers
which represent decency and truth, and on the other, is what calls
11
itself the new journalism, but which is in reality as old as sin
itself".9
Similarly, this century, The New York Times has always pledged
commitment to the principle of printing only what is serious and
formal. It enhanced this pledge during the Great War when it was
forced to cut its advertising image to cope with the ever increasing
density and scope of news about an ever widening global crisis.
"Don't spoil the paper for a few columns of advertising", its
publisher had advised the editors. In 1918 the paper received a
Pulitzer Prize for its coverage of the War. 1 ° The Great War
represented a turning point in establishing the reputation of The New
York Times as a newspaper that took responsibility to cover
international news.
The New York Times has always sought to appeal to an elite
audience, elite both in terms of "wealth" and "breadth of interest".'
Reiterating the paper's claim of being representative of serious
thoughtful journalism, the distinguished columnist James Reston once
wrote:
"Our primary responsibility is not.., to the commuter
reading the paper on his way home from Westchester.
Our primary resp1sibility is to the historian of fifty
years from now".
When it was first established, the paper pledged to be a newspaper
"for the masses" to be sold at a popular price and with as diverse a
news diet as possible. 13 It soon, however, became identified with the
commercial and investing middle classes. 14 Because of its appeal to
an "intelligent" and "wealthy" audience, representing only a fraction
of the American population, it was accused of being a tool in the
hands of the richest few, namely the trusts and Wall Street bankers.'5
By the mid-1920s, it began to be seen by many as a "badge of
12
respectability" worn by people at different social and economic
ladders; many read it simply because the elite did.16
Politically, too, by the late 19th century, The New York Times,
had identified itself unequivocally with "Republican journalism" and
with the Republican Party. 17
 However, as it sought to be viewed as a
paper of record it shifted towards non-partisanship and political
independence within the "liberal" tradition. It is, however, hard to
validate its assertion of a liberal orientation, for its support of
Democratic rather than Republican Presidential candidates does not, as
has been suggested, necessarily sustain such a claim.' 8 On the
contrary, it can be shown that the paper has, on many occasions,
adopted a conservative stand on different issues, perhaps indeed more
conservative than that of its readership.' 9 Yet, compared with other
American newspapers, The New York Times looks relatively "liberal"
because of its consistent criticism of the abuse of political power.
As part of the elite press, the paper is widely read by top
officials in the United States. Though it may not influence decision
making directly, it has usually occupied a significant position in the
minds of policy makers. For officials and statesmen, it is both an
important "purveyor of news" and a respected medium through which they
can put their views, both to the public and to the different
governmental institutions. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles was
once asked by a New York Times reporter: "Do you know anything we
don't know?" "Of course not," he replied, "where do you think we get
our information from?'". 2° This may have been humorous, but The New
York Times was and is widely rated as one of the most influential of
the news media, through which American public opinion is informed
about events.2'
13
Through its national and international concerns it has sometimes
played a significant role in the policy-making process of the United
States. For example, not only did it influence public opinion towards
the Cuban revolution at least in its early phases, it also, through
its correspondent in Cuba Herbert Matthews, helped to form the
attitudes of President Eisenhower, particularly towards the
revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro. It later came under fierce
attacks for what was called "... the campaign of propaganda and
misrepresentation which sold Fidel Castro to the people of the United
States as a liberal and a democrat", and was accused of being one of
the different forces in the United States which were working on behalf
of the communists in Cuba. 22 The State Department blamed the press in
general, and The New York Times in particular, for helping Castro to
power. In his testimony before the Senate, the American Ambassador to
Cuba, Andrew Gardner, stated:
"Three front-page articles in the New York Times in
early 1957, written by the editorialist Herbert
Matthews, served to inflate Castro's world stature and
world recognition...
After the Matthews articles.., he [Castro] was able
to get followers and funds in Cuba and in the United
States. From that time on, money and soldiers of
fortune abounded. Much of the American prs began to
picture Castro as a political Robin Hood".
With regard to the Vietnam War the news media, including The New York
Times, are now, by the extent of their factual reporting, viewed as
having had an important effect on both public and official opinion in
the United States. With the acquisition of the highly important 4000
Pentagon Papers, The New York Times was able, in the words of one
critic, ".. to manipulate the history of the Vietnam War for
withdrawal ti 24
The New York Times has also influenced the conduct of domestic
policy; its role in the disclosure of the Watergate scandal is a case
14
in point. Although it was beaten by the Washington Post in breaking
perhaps "the century's biggest and best story", its coverage of the
event was far more extensive than any other newspaper. 25 In 1973 it
devoted three million words to the affair which it branded as
"sinister", "subversive" and a reflection of an "authoritarian"
ambition. Watergate stands as a perfect example of the press acting
as a watchdog for the public interest and the ultimate critic of the
government. 26
 Its domestic political influence harks back to its
earlier days where it played a prominent role amongst the "crusading"
journals; 27
 a classic example of this being its campaign against the
Tweed Ring in 1870.28
Together with a few other daily newspapers, like the Washington
Post, the Baltimore Sun, the Wall Street Journal, the Christian
Science Monitor and the St. Louis Dispatch, The New York Times,
representing the prestige press in the United States, acts both as a
guide and as an opinion leader to the less affluent American
publications. It exerts particular impact on the smaller newspapers,
for which it serves both as a major source of information and as an
important "spring board" which sets the standard. 29 These newspapers
often turn to its material as an alternative to the expensive services
of the news agencies and wire services.30
Statistically, The New York Times has traditionally led the field
of foreign news coverage in the United States. According to a survey
conducted by the International Press Institute in 1953, for example,
it rated first in terms of the extent of foreign news reporting, with
an average of 32 columns on foreign events a day, as opposed to only
four columns for each of the other 105 American daily newspapers
examined in the survey. 31 In the 1960s it had a daily circulation of
15
700,000, a Sunday circulation of about one million and a half and a
staff of 5,000 people. It also had forty full-time correspondents
abroad compared with only ten for the New York Hera7d Tribune and
twelve for its closest rival, the Christian Science Monitor. Its
foreign news payroll was estimated at $750,000 and the expenses of its
foreign news services stood at an average of $4,000,000 a year.32
Today, The New York Times still statistically leads the field
with about fifty full-time correspondents throughout the world. It
has in recent years become self-reliant in terms of collection of
foreign news. Of the million words or so it receives daily, it is
claimed, only about 200,000 come from wire services and news agencies.
The remaining 800,000 words come from its own correspondents. 33 Whilst
three decades ago, except attinie of crisis or revolution, the origins
of "news" were often known beforehand - London, Paris, Rome and Moscow
- today literally every region or spot in the world is a potential
centre for big news. As a "collector of news", The New York Times has
to a large extent been without rival in the United States.34
Nevertheless, a "good" newspaper should not be judged according
to statistics alone, such as the amount of its revenues or the number
of its advertising lines or the yards of material it prints everyday,
or by the multitude of its readership. Rather, it should be judged
primarily according to the quality of its news reportage. Despite its
quantitative supremacy, The New York Times coverage of foreign news
has often been criticised for being qualitatively weak and for lacking
"professional competence in the reporting and interpreting of events,
especially outside the United States". Its news columns have been
described as superficial, descriptive and intellectually mediocre.35
It has even been suggested that the paper's editors and correspondents
16
are preoccupied only with what is dramatic and exciting: "Analytical
coverage is no part of their training... If there is no 'crisis'...
they feel there is nothing to report. The exceptions are provided by
a few privileged correspondents who are allowed to roam further afield
and to file 'background material'". 36 Many complain that its position
amongst the leading newspapers in the world is overrated, arguing that
although it has achieved pre-eminence in terms of the "quantity" of
news reporting, its analytical interpretive standards badly need
elevating. The New York Times, and the American press in general,
have often been accused of failing to "explain the world to the people
who live in it", by relying on superficial "hot" news at the expense
of interpretation and analysis. However, it can also be argued that
the reportorial element, namely the sheer weight of reporting and the
repetition of factual information can be more effective in influencing
public opinion than interpretation and analysis. 37 Yet, as the
following chapters will demonstrate, the press's duty should not only
be to describe events but also to give the "meaning" and
"significance" of the news. Reporters, as Benjamin Demott has argued,
should act as continuous analysts of events rather than as "firemen"
to be requested only "on call" and then no longer required once the
fire is over.
The New York Times does, to some extent, have an audience of
national character. Yet, it can never claim to be a "national
newspaper" in a European sense, especially after the failure of its
West Coast edition two years after it had been launched in 1962,
because it was unable to penetrate the highly competitive Western
market and to compete with The Los Angeles Times. 38 It is not, in
fact, easy for any American newspaper to be a national daily
comparable to The (London) Times or Le Monde. This is due in part to
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the local nature of advertising and in part to the subcontinental size
of the country. 39
 Like the Wall Street Journal, the Christian Science
Monitor and U.S.A. Today, however, The New York Times has recently
been moving towards becoming a national newspaper with regional
editions printed in satellite plants across the country.
Nevertheless, it has not yet managed to put an end to the imbalance
between its local, national and international news diets. It has
indeed remained predominantly a New York daily. 40 "In traditional
news value, national events rank above international, state events
above national and local above state", wrote one observer, "so that if
the municipal leaders happen to be involved in a scandal at the same
time the French Parliament finally rejects EUC, then the latter is
likely to be relegated to the inner recesses of a paper where fewer
persons will read about it". 4 ' This stems from the traditional
interest of the American public in local, state and national news in
that order, except at time of national scandal or of war when their
interest shifts abroad.42
News gathering is primarily a type of business and the success of
any business depends on its revenue which is subject to economic
factors like circulation, the scale of advertising and the daily
expenses of its different services and personnel. As a "big
business", The New York Times reached its zenith in the 1950s and
1960s, when it became statistically without rival in the United
States, with a gross income of more than $112 million.43
Ironically, however, its spectacular growth over the last few
decades resulted in some serious antithetical consequences as it was
becoming managerially more complex. Its physical expansion generated
an evident lack of coordination between the management of the daily
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edition and that of the Sunday edition, and also between the editors
of the day and those of the night. 44 Hence, several small "dukedoms"
emerged within its ranks, namely the news department, the Sunday
department and the editorial page, each with its own personnel and
"territory". This often resulted in antagonism between those
"separate entities" and in extra-bureaucratic and managerial
complications. 45 At the professional level, the paper fell victim to
its own claimed "encyclopaedism" and, in the words of its managing
editor, was growing "dull" and "stodgy" with "long sentences and
countless dangling phrases". 46 Its news columns were generally devoid
of background, analytical or interpretive material which would enable
the reader to understand the complexity of events and their "whys" and
"hows": "... if news is viewed as the flow of information relating to
contemporary issues, on the basis of which political opinions take
shape and decisions are made, then the 'whys' are an integral part of
the news itself rather than something extra that needs to be justified
as equally important or even more important".47
The New York Times editorial columns in the 1950s and 1960s were
also criticised for their "lack of vitality" and for being "boring",
"unpersuasive" and "lacking in punch". 48 It became known as the "good
gray Times" partly because of its editorials which lacked "bite" and
partly because of its typography which looked dull and "old
fashioned". 49 Editing was another area in which the paper seemed
vulnerable to sharp criticism. It was often described as "chaotic"
with just everything thrown in anywhere without evidence of clear
professional consideration. The paper was particularly criticised for
not being selective enough and was accused of "intellectual
mediocracy" which, in the words of one observer, forced the reader to
do "a lot of digging... to sort the facts out in the welter of Times
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verbosity and to find out what they mean"; that is, do the work of the
editors. 5° Its foreign coverage was especially singled out for
criticism because, as already pointed out, it lacked essential
background, analytical material despite its relative extensiveness.
In order to heal The New York Times divisions and splits to
create one "coordinated newspaper" with firm authority at the centre
and to improve its writing standards, the post of Executive Editor was
established in the early 1960s and went to the former Managing Editor,
Turner Catledge. 51 Catledge, in an effort to bring all the separate
entities of the paper and its personnel under his control, introduced
the daily conferences with editors of the different departments. 52 He
gave more attention to the paper's "make up", typography, quality of
reporting, editing, and also to the competition of the electronic
media, especially Television. He also urged the editors to make the
paper "more readable" by making it simpler and brighter, and
instructed the reporters to make their news stories as simple and as
brief as possible.53
The growing powers of the Executive Editor resulted in a serious
diminishing in the authority of the publisher over what was printed.
In the 1950s, The New York Times publisher exercised considerable
powers and exerted evident influence on the choice of subjects to be
treated and even the way they were treated, at least with regard to
local and national affairs. A classic example of this is the paper's
support of General Eisenhower in the 1952 Presidential election.
Because of the influence of the publisher, who was an enthusiastic
supporter of the Republican candidate, The New York Times offered
General Eisenhower unequivocal support from the start before the
Democratic candidate was even known. 54 In recent years, however, the
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publisher has had little "psychological" influence on its conduct,
which stems largely from his choice of the Executive Editor and the
other senior editors.55
Despite constant attempts to introduce more analytical and
interpretive material into its columns, The New York Times has always
remained a news-oriented paper which "... has always gone in for
quantity rather than quality". 56 It has always given absolute priority
to "hot news" at the expense of the "hows" and "whys" of events. This
has tended to produce superficial and purely descriptive news
accounts, giving justification to the argument that a good newspaper
should not be judged according to statistics or printing linage, but
rather according to the quality of its coverage. This thesis explores
the manner in which The New York Times perceived and presented the
Algerian revolution, and the extent to which its coverage was adequate
in both qualitative and quantitative terms.
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CHAPTER II
ALGERIA FROM POLITICAL AWAKENING TO REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM
"As long as you keep Algiers, you will be constantly at
war with Africa; sometimes this will seem to end; but
these people will not hate you any the less; it will be
a half-extinguished fire that will smoulder under the
ash and which, at the first opportunity, ,will burst
into a vast conflagration". [Baron Lacuee, 1831]
"After decades of struggle, the National Movement
reached its final phase of fulfilment.... A group of
of responsible young people and dedicated nationalists
gathering about it the majority of wholesale and
resolute elements, has come to take the National
Movement out of the impasse into which it has been
forced.., and to launch it into the true revolutionary
struggle". [F.L.N. initial Proclamation, 1 November
1954]
France and Algeria to 1945
Before falling to French occupation in 1830, Algeria had for
centuries been the target of naval expeditions by various maritime
European powers. The Spanish dream of gaining a foothold along the
North African coast had been fulfilled in the early sixteenth century
when Spain was able to hold key positions stretching from Agadir to
Tunis, including the western and central parts of the Algerian coast.
It was in this context that the Barbarossa brothers, especially Arudj
and Khair-el-Din, settled in Algeria and helped to organize local
resistance to the Spanish presence. In 1516 Spain withdrew from all
its Algerian acquisitions apart from Mers-el-Kebir and Oran in the
west. The "State of the Algerians" was proclaimed and although it
later came officially under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, the
country remained, in the words of Charles-Andre Julien, "the mistress
of its own destiny" as Ottoman sovereignty was purely nominal.'
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Because of the country's extremely long coast and its
vulnerability from the sea, as proven by the Spanish invasion of 1505,
and because of the Mediterranean's long tradition of piracy from ships
of different nationalities, the founders of the Algerian state
realized its dire need for a strong military base if it were to
survive growing threats. After strengthening their defences, however,
the Algerians expanded their influence in the area and imposed
protection fees on all ships using the Mediterranean route. 2 This
situation displeased the European powers which, at regular intervals
throughout the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the
nineteenth, launched punitive expeditions against Algiers. As
attempts by individual countries failed to bring results, alliances
were formed in the hope of defeating Algeria. The last of such
alliances was in 1815 when seven countries led by the United States
attacked Algiers. Meanwhile, during the Congress of Vienna in 1815
and three years later at Aix-la-Chappelle, Algeria topped the agenda
of European discussions.3
North Africa's relations with France go back as early as the
thirteenth century when trade exchanges between them first began.
Diplomatic relations with Algeria formally commenced in 1534 when the
first French consul was sent to Algiers; he was also the first
European consul to be assigned to Algeria. 4 On many occasions both
before and after its revolution of 1789 France benefitted from
Algeria's military backing against its traditional enemies especially
Spain and Prussia. Algeria was the first country to recognize the
French Republic declared in 1793 and to offer full support at a time
when it was facing diplomatic and commercial isolation in Europe. The
Dey of Algiers provided the French with necessary food supplies and
with cash loans to pay for purchases from Algeria which increased
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sharply as a result of the drought and famine that had hit France.5
"It is in need that friends are known", wrote the Dey to the leaders
of the French Republic. This close relationship continued and an
estimated seventy treaties had been signed between Algeria and France
before 1830.6
The other side of French dependence on Algerian imports was the
growth of French indebtedness to Algerian creditors. As time went by,
France's debts to Algeria swelled. Delays in repayment and lack of
adequate explanations for such delays angered the Algerians. Anxious
to find a settlement, Dey Hussein again raised the issue with the
French consul on 27 April 1827 and demanded a plausible explanation.
Outraged by Deval's response - "My Government will not reply, it is
useless to write" - he ordered the consul to withdraw. After an
altercation, the Dey struck Deval with his ostrich-feather fan. This
incident was seen in Paris as an insult to the French empire and,
thus, led to the French expedition to Algiers in 1827. But, as
Metternich observed, it is not for a blow from a feather fan that one
"spends 100,000,000 francs and risks 40,000 men". The real reason
behind the expedition was France's dynastic dream of an overseas
empire to rival its neighbours, one that went back to the fourteenth
century. 7 A further reason was the traditional search for outlets to
internal problems through foreign adventures. Charles X, aware of the
unpopularity and weakness of his regime, sought to divert his people's
attention with the magic of glo!re abroad.
Although the French entered Algiers in 1830, the conquest of the
country as a whole was not completed until the early twentieth
century. Almost every year since 1830 provides evidence of Algerian
resistance to the French occupation. From 1830 to 1847, Emir
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Abd-el-Kader hampered France's attempts to expand into the interior.
In 1864, 1871 and 1916 fierce revolts broke out in different parts of
Algeria. As one French deputy put it, "[n]ever before in history was
there a colonization that required the support of 40,000 bayonets".8
But the French, having declared Algeria an integral part of
metropolitan France in 1848, were determined to continue their
campaign of "pacification" using ruthless and repressive methods.
Algerians were executed or imprisoned, their villages destroyed,
their lands and patrimony expropriated, their cultural heritage and
personal identity continuously attacked, and their human and political
rights deliberately dashed. They had, since 1830, been compelled to
live under a colonial system imposed upon them, which put Algerian
values under continuous siege and denied them access to the
possibilities of "evolution" they had long been promised. 9 French
settlers, on the other hand, were offered all types of support and
encouragement. Convicts, political undesirables and victims of war
and economic depressions were shipped off to Algeria and offered lands
confiscated from the Algerians. Later waves of non-French immigrants,
also coming from the least privileged strata of society and victims of
European political and economic crises, crossed the Mediterranean to
start a new life in Algeria, benefitting from all the rights and
privileges guaranteed by their acquired French nationality. The Law
of 26 June 1889 made every European immigrant automatically a French
citizen.'°
France's violation of its own pledge of 1830 to protect the
Algerians, their property and their cultural heritage, continued
unabated throughout its presence in Algeria. In simple terms, a
Spanish, Italian or Maltese immigrant was able '-to enjoy human and
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political rights in Algeria without having to concede anything; an
Algerian had to renounce his language and religion. But, for the
Algerian, Islam represented a fundamental part of his identity and
heritage and a valid long-term social code. In 1932 Ben Baddis,
leader of the Association of Ulemas, reacting to French claims of
Algerian readiness for assimilation, declared: "Islam is our religion,
Algeria is our country and Arabic is our language"." This later
became the slogan of the nationalist movement in its struggle for
Independence. It was this repressive and discriminatory French policy
that helped to keep Algerian nationalism alive, and it is in the light
of this repression over more than a century of colonial rule that the
Algerian revolution, which forms the context of this thesis, must be
understood.
At the beginning of this century and especially during the
inter-war period, Algerian resistance to the French occupation took
the form of political activism. The Algerians began to believe that
it was possible to influence French policies in Algeria from within,
through political channels and the ballot box. The newly formed
political parties led the field, demanding immediate action on the
part of France to improve the socio-economic and political conditions
of the Algerian population. Their demands, however, fell on deaf ears
as the French authorities persisted in their repressive conduct,
aligning themselves unequivocally with the colons and their interests.
Political life in Algeria between the two World Wars had been
enlivened by the activities of emerging nationalist parties. Despite
their antagonism, these parties helped to "educate" the Algerian
population to understand fully their contemporary conditions and
future prospects. 12 The worsened socio-economic situation because of
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the war opened the way for the Algerians politically to lay the
foundations for a more coherent and more effective nationalist
movement. Despite mounting pressure by the Vichy regime on the key
leaders, 13 the Algerians - led by the Popular Party (P.P.A.) - waged a
continuous campaign for self-determination. They declared their
pro-Ally stance as inseparably linked with their right for
self-determination. They, indeed, saw Algeria under French colonial
rule as the victim of an unjustified occupation which did not differ
much from that of the Nazis in Europe.14
After falling to German occupation, France resorted to a policy
of promises towards its overseas colonies. These colonies were
pledged to be granted the right to self-determination as soon as the
War was over, provided that they stood on the side of France against
Germany. The Algerians took such promises for granted as thousands of
them were recruited to fight with the Allied forces on the European
front.' 5 Promises of the 't Liberation" of subject peoples were
frequently made; the Atlantic Charter emphasized the right of all
peoples to self-determination, and the United Nations Charter adopted
at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 would stress the same right.
These ideals and promises, however, were to be undermined by the
attitudes of some colonial powers. France, in particular, sought to
restore its colonial empire at any cost.
As the War drew to a conclusion France instructed its troops
throughout the overseas dependencies to be prepared for potential
"disturbances" in the colonies, sensing that the colonial peoples
would inevitably ask for the fulfilment of its war-time promise of
self-determination. The German forces eventually surrendered on 7 May
1945. On Victory Day, 8 May, hosts of people throughout the world
30
took to the streets to express their spontaneous delight at the Allied
victory. Yet, freedom was regained only in Europe, as the War
continued unabated on the Asian front and was ended only by the United
States use of the atomic bombs against Japan.16
V-E Day and Its Aftermath in Algeria, Problems of Reporting
Convinced by the promises of the Atlantic Charter and those of
the French during the War, scores of Algerians took to the streets to
stress their demands for a "new deal".' 7
 The nationalist leaders, who
obtained authorisation to organize a march and lay a wreath in memory
of the dead, believed that the sacrifices of the Algerians would have
to bring a more democratic system to post-war Algeria.'8
The marchers carried the Algerian flag alongside the flags of the
Allied nations to demonstrate their attachment to the principle of
self-rule.' 9
 Ironically, however, on the day that victory for
democracy was being hailed world-wide, repressive methods were being
used elsewhere to quieten legitimate demands for the right to
self-determination. Republican France, whose own legitimacy could be
found in those war-time principles so frequently expressed, utilized
authoritarian ways and means to quash aspirations for democracy.
Whilst the Algerian troops, who had fought on the European front, were
parading the streets of Paris under the warm cheers of the Parisian
crowd, an estimated 45,000 of their compatriots - who were celebrating
the same victory - were being killed in Setif, Kherata and Guelma.2°
During and immediately after World War Two, The New York Times
had no resident correspondent in the whole of North Africa. This was
perhaps inevitable in the context of the War, bat it consequently
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failed to report the events of V-E Day in Algeria on time and at first
hand. Being heavily dependent on French official sources for
information, its reports dwelled largely on the Government's line
which it reproduced at face value. To minimise the effects of the
killings on its image abroad, France tried to keep a low profile on
the situation, blaming the uprising on the food shortage that had hit
the country as a result of the War and the recent drought. 2 ' These
claims found much echo in The New York Times which filled its columns
with heavy doses of French opinions. The quality of news reporting
depends exclusively on the quality of the source and on the
information available at the gathering end of the line. This is why
newspapers and their correspondents are expected to diversify their
sources of information and avoid relying on a single source, because
the inevitable result of this is the distortion of the news. This
point will be developed in much more detail at a later stage of this
thesis.
The French press, not surprisingly, also gave absolute credence
to the economic argument. Le Monde stated that the "action of the
minority of agents provocateurs was facilitated by the grain shortage
which was due to the bad harvest caused by the drought". 22 Most of
the Western press, at least immediately after those events, went along
with the official contention. Only the Christian Science Monitor
questioneed the Government's argument and hinted that the uprising was
politically motivated: "Despite the veil of censorship with which the
French government has surrounded the recent riots in Algiers, it is
manifest that these disturbances had a serious character". 23
 This,
one supposes, might have been of interest to The New York Times
readers had they been told about it, but they were not.
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Because of the evident lack of eyewitness accounts, the paper
failed to go beyond routine reporting, which was exclusively dependent
on second- and third-hand information, to let its readers know about
the complexity of the situation and traditional French excesses in
Algeria. The economic factor undoubtedly played a significant part in
leading the Algerians into open protest against the colonial system;24
but the major factor behind the uprising was their growing political
awareness and their realization of the importance of the new
circumstances provided by the Allied victory to which they had
contributed. Evidence shows that their action represented a
deliberate effort to show their demands for a "new deal" and to
express renewed antipathy to the colonial regime imposed upon them
since 1830.25 France was now being assertively asked to put its
war-time promises into practice. 26 The policy of systematic
repression exercised by the colons, with the acquiescence of Paris,
was a major reason behind the new nationalist bid for
sel f-determi nati on.27
It was not until 24 May that The New York Times told its readers
that "the problems in North Africa are political as well as economic".
Yet, despite this little, timid divergence of opinion which did not
touch the core issue of France's iron-fist response to the Algerian
demonstrations, the paper continued its entente cordia7e with the
French Government. Failing to send a correspondent to Algeria, it
persisted in playing the "news" without analysis or independent
substantiation. Its reports, filled with factual errors and fallacies
of judgement, gave the reader the impression that it was the Algerians
who were to blame for the violence, and that the French army's
ruthless reaction was justifiable: many French were killed and several
French officials "were slain.., by the rioters": It played down the
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high casualty toll amongst the Algerians by simply relaying the
official figure of 1,000 dead. In this, the paper's reporting did not
differ much from that of Le Monde which had put all the blame on the
Algerians asserting, with due exaggeration, that many French had been
"massacred" and their homes and farms attacked.28
The New York Times, steering closer to the rock of journalistic
partisanship, sided with the official claim that a group of
troublemakers incited by "German propaganda" was behind the
nationalist action. It searched far afield for a possible foreign
connection, reproducing at some length the argument that those events
were part of a "fascist plot" to destabilise the French empire.29
This idea was given force in the French press, which blamed "Hitlerite
elements" for the uprising.30
Every sign, however, points to the fact that the uprising had
been incited from within Algeria and by provocations from the French
police. It was the killing of the young demonstrator carrying the
Algerian flag and the wounding of others that transformed the march
into a riot which eventually turned into a popular uprising against
the colonial system. 3 ' Co7on-organized vigilantes, on the other hand,
embarked on a wave of killings and summary executions of Algerians.32
The police, the Army, the Navy, the air force and the Foreign Legion
were all mobilised for large-scale operations of systematic
pacification and ratissage. 33 "At the time of this campaign", the
/
distinguished French historian, Charles-Andre Julien, later wrote,
"the Foreign Legion troops burned, looted and killed at leisure".34
The Cruiser Duguay-Trouin bombarded coastal villages; Douglas
divebombers made as many as 300 sorties a day destroying at least
forty villages	 The colon daily L'Echo d'Alger summed up the
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general mood at the time through the slogan c'est L'heure du gendarme.
Those acts of repression, which continued unabated throughout the
month of May, claimed the lives of an estimated 45,000 people; 6,000
more were arrested, ninety-nine of whom were to be sentenced to death.
The French authorities succeeded, to a large extent, in concealing the
truth about the police and army conduct in Algeria not only from world
opinion but also from public opinion in France, which would later be
shocked as the realities of the May killings unfolded.
Because of the news blackout and tight censorship imposed by the
authorities on information from Algeria, Le Figaro's Pierre Dubard,
who had witnessed the French coup de force response to the Algerian
demonstrations, was able to dispatch his report to Paris only eight
weeks after the killings. The report presented a serious challenge to
the official argument. As a result, the French official sources were,
in the words of Phillip Knightley, "completely discredited; the danger
of accepting statements at face value was amply illustrated, and the
manner in which each newspaper's political line had influenced its
version of the Setif attack had been clearly shown".36
Yet, the French press revealed the full scale of the May killings
only as late as 1947. It was then that Liberte' informed its readers
that "thousands of innocent Algerians were murdered, villages
destroyed and the hunt for the nationalists began", with the full
acquiescence of Paris. 37 L'Humanite', arguing along a similar line,
stressed the excessive "ferocity" with which the police and army had
responded. 38 A7ger-Re'publicain went back to the story in 1949, stating
rather vigorously that "on 8 May 1945, 30,000 victims lost their lives
to fascism and to the co7on clan [who wantedj... to deprive the
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Algerians of the fruits of victory to which they had contributed".39
It was in June 1945 that The New York Times' readers learnt for
the first time that "French ground and air forces killed or wounded
more than 10,000 Arab rebels", when the paper picked up a story from
the Rome edition of the American Army newspaper Stars and Stripes.40
As J. Galtung and M.A. Ruge have argued, there are different ways of
presenting an event, and particularly many ways of presenting "fights
for Independence". 4 ' By using the term "rebels", for example, the
paper gave the impression that the victims of the May killings had
been armed, whilst evidence shows that they were civilians taking part
in a peaceful march marking the end of the war. To them this was a
legitimate way, falling within the democratic spirit traditionally
preached by France, to make a bid for a new deal for the Algerian
majority. The New York Times, timidly veering towards a detached
stance, told its readers about "the most effective counter-measures"
against the Algerians which had been taken by the French airmen, who
"flew as many as 300 sorties in a single day with medium and heavy
bombers obtained from the United States". To the paper, however, this
tactic seemed justifiable "[ b ] ecause of the difficult terrain".42
The paper did considerably better a year after V-E Day and its
immediate aftermath in Algeria, when it reflected on the means adopted
by the French authorities to stamp out nationalist protest. It seemed
to have freed itself from the monopoly of the French information
services, although its Algeria-related reporting was still coming only
from Paris. Offering its appraisal of the situation in hindsight, it
drove home the inescapable fact that 
"[tjhe French used not only
troops but gunboats in suppressing the uprising with the utmost
severity". 43
 It also conceded that the nationalist action had been
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politically motivated and carefully planned, contrary to its
previously held view that it had been spontaneous and mainly motivated
by the economic difficulties facing the local population after the
war. The concerted marches, the highly calculated timing of the
nationalist rallies and the display for the first time of the Algerian
flag evidenced the political nature of the May uprising. Meanwhile,
its readers learnt about the French Government's attempts to conceal
the truth about the police and army response to the nationalist
protest: "... between 7,000 and 8,000 natives (the figures cannot yet
be established) were slaughtered in the drastic reaction, including
bombing and mass executions".44
Despite such developments in the paper's perception of the
crisis, the nationalist version was presented to its readers eighteen
months after the uprising, taking the form of a letter published on 30
December 1946. Written by the Secretary of the Committee for Freedom
of North Africa, Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Ahrass, it was given the title
"North African 'Iron Curtain'". Dr. Aboul-Ahrass pointed to the "iron
curtain" France had woven around its North African colonies to conceal
the repressive conduct of its troops in Algeria which had resulted in
"bloodshed, terror and revolt". This, he pointedly added, was played
down if not completely ignored by the American media. With the aid of
American bombers given the free French through Lend-Lease to help the
fight against Germany, "40,000 Algerians were slain, 200,000
imprisoned and 3,000 native homes strafed and pillaged...". He
concluded his letter by reminding readers of North Africa's
contribution to the Allied victory: 65,000 North African soldiers "...
laid down their lives and hopes that aspirations of men like Willkie
and Roosevelt might become realities".
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The aim of the French coup de force response to the Algerian
demonstrations seemed to be twofold: to deal a decisive blow to the
nationalist movement and Its apparatus, and to establish a horrifying
precedent that would possibly deter the local people from similar
showdowns in the future. But, ironically enough, repression only
helped to increase Algerian discontent and to radicalise nationalist
attitudes towards Algeria's relationship with France; 45 moderates like
Ferhat Abbas became "federalists" or "autonomists" and Algerian
nationalism took a new turn.46
The events of May 1945, in short, represented a decisive turning
point in the evolution of Algerian nationalism. They had a
significant impact on the attitude of young Algerians, especially
members of the Seventh Regiment of Algerian tirailleurs who had fought
with distinction on the European front during the War. They had just
returned to eastern Algeria, when they learnt of the killings of
Setif, Kherata and Guelma. Most of them henceforth became convinced
of the necessity to pursue a military course of action. Some would
eventually become prominent leaders in the Algerian revolution which
was to be officially declared on 1 November 1954.
	 "Everyone of the
'new wave' of Algerian nationalists prominent in the National
Liberation Front today", wrote Edward Behr in 1961, "traces his
revolutionary determination back to May 1945... each of them felt
after May 1945 that some form of armed uprising would sooner or later
become necessary". 48 This was not perceived by the contemporary
press, including The New York Times.
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The Outbreak of the Algerian Revolution
After May 1945 the French authorities tightened their grip on
Algeria in the hope of forcing the nationalists into submission and
into accepting the fait accompli colonial. The nationalist movement
came increasingly under siege: political parties were outlawed, their
leaders were imprisoned and freedom of expression was restrained even
further. Some modest reforms were offered to the Algerians under the
Statute of 1947; but their implementation was, as previously, blocked
by the colons and their strong lobby in the Government. 49 For the
Algerians, "political revolution" had already got underway and nothing
would satisfy them but national sovereignty. "No solution can be
accepted by the Algerian people, if it does not imply an absolute
guarantee of a return to our national sovereignty", declared Lamine
Debaghine of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties
(M.T.L.D.).50 The French Fourth Republic was now preoccupied with
threats coming to it from its opponents within metropolitan France and
also from the colonies, notably Indochina. Hence, when the Algerians
decided to adopt "direct action", France was caught by total surprise
and reacted in evident panic.5'
In 1947 disenchanted Algerian nationalists founded the
Organisation Secr'ete (O.S.), a paramilitary organization which sought
direct military action. But, before it became effective it was
uncovered by the French police and was totally dismantled in 1950.
Some of its members were arrested, but most of them escaped either
abroad or to the Algerian maquis. The French authorities and the
co7ons, confident of the strength of the French presence in Algeria,
,
seemed little concerned about these new developments. L'Echo
d'Alger's comment on 21 April 1950 typified their over-confidence:
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"The combined forces of justice and public order will continue
unfailingly until the destruction of every single germ of revolt in
our Algerian soil". It was however from the ranks of the O.S. that the
early leadership of the Algerian revolution came.52
Some of those O.S. members, who had escaped arrest and remained
in Algeria, turned to clandestine action under the M.T.L.D. Their
objective was to lay the foundations for a more effective military
front and to safeguard the M.T.L.D., which had become bogged down in
immobi7isme and routine and in needless personal feuds within its
leadership. 53 The Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action
(C.R.U.A.), which was launched on 23 March 1954, embarked on a
large-scale campaign to rally the Algerian rank and file behind one
unified front, to heal the divisions that had manifestly occurred
within the nationalist movement and to prepare for military action
which was planned for 1 November 1954.
	 The C.R.U.A. soon became the
Front de Libe'ration Nationale (F.L.N.) which was to lead the
revolution heralded by the synchronized attacks on French military
installations on 1 November 1954. This particular date was chosen
mainly for strategic reasons as most French soldiers would then be on
leave because of the national holiday; this would provide the F.L.N.
with more chances of success in its operations and especially to
acquire arms from the installations targeted.55
These F.L.N. attacks caught the French authorities totally
unawares, despite earlier warnings by their intelligence services that
military action by the Algerian nationalists was imminent. Such
warnings, however, had not been taken seriously by Paris on the ground
that Algeria had, unlike its neighbours, remained calm and untouched
by nationalist "agitation". 56
 When reports about the alarming scale of
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the attacks flooded in, the authorities immediately branded the
attackers as "cut-throat outlaws", reaffirming that Algeria would
always remain French.57
The New York Times, like most of the world press, was caught by
surprise by the emergence of the F.L.N. and its first military
operations. Still unrepresented in Algeria, it informed its readers
through a dispatch from Paris which gave the event prominent
front-page display under the headline:
TERRORIST BANDS
KILL 7 IN ALGERI
FRENCH SEND AID.
In an editorial on the same day, also with the title of "Terror t', it
lost no opportunity to express sympathy for France which was "having
hard luck in North Africa", as a result of nationalist "flames"
spreading from Tunisia and Morocco to the hitherto calm Algeria. To
this thought it was to come back a few days later in a "News of the
Week in Review" comment, which voiced "surprise" at the outbreak of
violence in Algeria, for long considered "an island of relative peace
calm in an area otherwise inflamed by Moslem nationalism".59
This surprise stemmed from a preconceived acceptance of the
French assertion that Algeria was "French territory", and considered
to be as much a part of France as Brittany or Normandy. The paper,
whose articles were filled with heavy doses of French views did not
cease telling its readers that Algeria was "constitutionally" an
integral part of France. 6° As Robert Desmond wrote about half a
century ago, news correspondents should verify all information they
get from officials "lest they be made for propaganda". 61 The New York
Times, however, concealed from its readers the fact that Algeria had
become "an integral part of France" only by a simple administrative
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decree and without the consent of the Algerians. Nor were they told
about Algeria's pre-1830 existence as an independent nation, referred
to by French leaders as early as the seventeenth century as "la
Re'pub7ique d'A7ger" or the Republic of Algiers, long before the term
"Republic" became associated with France in 1793.62 Readers were also
not told about France's earlier dependence on Algeria for assistance
which had been deemed necessary for survival. 63 As Charles-Andre'
Julien has argued, most French, after an intensive process of
indoctrination stretching from primary school to university, came to
believe that Algeria was an integral part of France. Those same
people would have protested vehemently if it had been declared that
Alsace had become an integral part of Germany after 1870: "France is
prisoner of myths it created itself, the most dangerous of which is
'Algeria is France'". 64 Time magazine, unlike The New York Times,
touching on the question of how Algeria was now considered to be
French, drove home the lesson but not until 30 May 1955 "... Frenchmen
fondly imagine they have made [it] a part of metropolitan France by
simple administrative fiat...".
The recent nationalist military action brought panic and
confusion to French ranks and dealt a severe blow to the myth of
L'Alge'rie Française. Unable to identify the men or the organization
behind the attacks, the authorities immediately injected the rumour
that foreign quarters were to blame. This rumour found much echo in
the press, not least The New York Times which blamed the Egyptian
government, the Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists for these new
developments in Algeria. 65 The (London) Times endorsed this claim
more forcefully a year later: "... the terrorists were directed from
Cairo by men who were direct agents of the Government.. ,,66 This is
perhaps a typical example - if not a disturbing one - of press
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willingness to indulge in speculation on complex matters based on the
views of one of the belligerent sides in the absence of eye witness
knowledge or independent substantiation. Every sign seems to point to
the fact that the nationalist military action was planned and directed
purely from within Algeria by disenchanted nationalists who had
already fought for independence through political channels and turned
to military action only when other means had failed to bring about the
necessary reforms.
The National Liberation Front counted for its success primarily
on the support of the local population and, from the start, insisted
on the "Algerianness" of both its motives and direction. 67 Its
initial "Proclamation" stressed that its main objective was to offer
to "... all Algerian patriots of all walks of life and of all parties
and political groups, which are purely Algerian, integration in the
struggle for liberation regardless of any other consideration". 68
 The
term "front" was deliberately chosen to indicate that it did not
represent one specific doctrine, political group or programme but an
amalgamation of the different political tendencies. 69 The F.L.N.
believed that with the backing of the Algerian population, victory
would be attainable despite the limitation in its military
capabilities. It was equally convinced that despite its affluent
resources, the French army would never achieve military victory so
long as it failed to conquer the minds of ordinary Algerians. 70 Aware
of the vital importance of popular support for its cause, the F.L.N.
directed it attention towards the masses to strengthen the ranks of
L'Arme'e de Libe'ration Nationale, which had launched the armed
insurrection with no more than 3,000 under-equipped fighters. As the
F.L.N.'s motives and objectives became clear, the local population -
especially the inhabitants of the rural areas who represented 96
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percent of the overall Algerian population - soon began to rally
behind its cause.7'
This fact was not perceived by The New York Times which was
unequi vocati ng:
ALGERIA MOSLEMS ALOOF IN REVOLT.
Its first correspondent in Algeria, Michael Clark, whose pro-French
stance soon became manifestly evident in a series of articles from
Algiers, echoing French statements in official handouts, ventured that
the F.L.N. had not "... obtained the support or even acquiescence" of
the Algerian population which had "... failed to respond.. ,,•72 He
hastily concluded with an extravagant assertion that the majority of
Algerians were "non-political" and that "nationalism is still
something beyond their Ken". 73 So the notion that Algeria was French
and that most Algerians were happy with the status quo became an
essential part of the context created by the reporter, established in
his mind and possibly in the thoughts of the reader. Clark's
subscription to the French Government's stand is perhaps more evident
in his book Algeria in Turmoil - A History of the Rebellion, 74 which
blames the country's problems on the nationalists whom it accuses of
"extremism" and fanaticism. To many Anglo-American historians this
book, the first major work on the Algerian-French conflict to be
published in English, represented "a distinctly pro-French point of
view". 75
 His partiality was confirmed in a report by a team of French
deputies visiting Algeria in June 1955 that emphasized the growing
popular support for the F.L.N. and its cause. 76 The support and
protection the nationalist fighters enjoyed among the 8,000,000
Algerians was pointedly stressed by Time magazine a few months
later.77
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During the first few months of its existence L'Armee de
Libe'ration Nationa7e, because of its small size and rudimentary
armament, was forced to rely on hit-and-run tactics and on acts of
sabotage aimed at draining French resources. But, despite its limited
resources and military capabilities, it managed to create a continuous
feeling of insecurity and panic within French ranks. 78 By the time
the first year of the revolution drew to a conclusion, its activities
had reached most parts of Algeria, especially in the north where the
bulk of the population lay. The fighting ability of the nationalist
units was recognized by the French themselves. "They are naturally
beautiful fighters", said one high-ranking Foreign Legion officer.
"They are tougher than the Viet Minh Communists; they are the best
marksmen I have ever fought against". 79
 The first few months provided
the F.L.N. with its toughest test, as it found itself involved in a
continuous process of basic organization in order to lay down its
vital political and military institutions. 80
 It was not only
necessary for it to unite all the Algerian political groups behind its
cause and to attract large-scale popular support; it was also
imperative to attract support from abroad. 81
 Yet, its earlier
difficulties were partly eased by the fact that it did not find
recruitment a problem. This was due to two main reasons: the anger
which the French repressive measures provoked amongst the Algerian
population, and the F.L.N.'s own success especially its ability to
face the vastly superior French military machine.82
As the effectiveness of the F.L.N. operations became evident, The
New York Times - which had so far given its readers nothing beyond
French claims that the situation was under control and that the
country was now quiet everywhere - resorted to cautioning France
against the "strong and well-organized... rebel army". Remarking that
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the nationalist units were now in control of whole areas in the
eastern districts of Algeria, it predicted that "more serious trouble"
was in the offing. 83 The (London) Times, arguing along a similar
line, had editorially pointed out that this sort of guerrilla warfare
favoured the F.L.N. who held all the cards: "The initiative is theirs;
they know the country and can count on the voluntary or enforced
cooperation of most of the local inhabitants". 84 Against this
background of surge in the F.L.N.'s popularity and appeal, the
hitherto pro-integrationist Algerian politicians conceded that they
had already been "left behind by recent events", and that they could
never claim to be representatives of the Algerians unless an election
was held to gauge public opinion.85
The New York Times, which had demonstraated an ardent zeal in the
cause of the French interests, maintained a merciless assault on the
F.L.N. fighters during the first few months of the Algerian
revolution. It branded them as "outlaws" and "fugitvies from justice"
whose aim was not a negotiated settlement but the "eviction of the
French" and the "total destruction of everything European" in North
Africa. 86 As Phillip Knightley has argued, the tone of the reporting
of the war in Algeria was set by the French authorities who, through
different forms of propaganda and political pressure, sought to
portray the Algerian nationalist fighters as "evil" and "savage
barbarians" to which innocent victims were handed over. 87 The New
York Times and much of the press, because of the poor reporting from
the scene, fell in with this deliberate deception. The (London)
Times, doing no better, painted the F.L.N. fighters as "outlaws",
"savage fanatics" and "criminals" responsible for a "wave of
barbarism" in Algeria. 88 The Economist, on the other hand, was more
cautious and more subtle in its appraisal of the F.L.N. Refusing to be
46
duped into those hasty, overloaded descriptions clothed with French
stereotypes, it used straightforward terms such as "nationalists" or
"dissident nationalists", "revolt" or "uprising"; 89
 none of the
terminology the reader had become accustomed to in The New York Times.
The F.L.N. insisted from the start that it adopted violent means
to further Algerian demands for independence only because no other
option was available, especially after the failure of earlier attempts
to bring about peaceful changes in the country. 9° Its violence was
not being directed against individuals but against a system and a
"retrogressive colonial regime". 9 ' Pledging commitment to
international laws on war, it left the way to negotiations with France
always open. Its "Proclamation t' of 1 November 1954 offered "an
honourable platform of discussion with the French authorities provided
that they recognize, to the people they still subjugate, the right of
self-determination". 92 Meanwhile, it insisted that its use of violence
was only a response to the systematic repression used by the colonial
authorities against the local population to bolster French domination
93	 ,in Algeria.	 As Charles-Andre Julien remarked in 1955, the French
had not kept their promises of reform in favour of the Algerian
majority; there had always been a dichotomy between words and reality.
The Algerians had in vain sought change through the ballot box; now
they wanted to win change through revolutionary nationalism.94
They complained of a systematic campaign of "structural violence"
directed against them by the colonial authorities. This was aimed at
preserving colon supremacy at all levels, socio-economic and
political. 95
 Up to one and a half million people out of a work force
of three and a half million were, in 1954, either unemployed or
underemployed. 96 Whilst all colon children benefjtted from education,
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only 18 percent of school-age Algerian children received primary
schooling. 97
 Illiteracy amongst Algerians ranged between 82 and 94
percent, whereas illiteracy amongst the colons almost did not exist.98
And as The Economist noted on 1 October 1955, while individual income
in France was estimated at 240,000 francs per annum, the average
income of an Algerian family was only 30,000 francs (f30). All this
might have been of interest to The New York Times readers had they
been told about it, which they were not. Nor were they told about the
campaign of "pacification" and "collective punishment", which included
bombing of villages, arbitrary arrests and executions, and regroupment
of the local populace in camps under constant military control, which
was aimed at deterring Algerian civilians from assisting the F.L.N.99
Perhaps it was all summed up by the French Minister of the Interior
when he declared that "[r]epression will be pitilessht.:l(m The
excesses of the French army in Algeria, including the use of torture,
will be addressed in greater detail later on in this thesis.
The New York Times, which displayed passionate zeal in the cause
of French military efforts to crush the F.L.N., was generous in its
description of the French army's drive; the sequence of its headlines
tells the story: "FRENCH MAP MAJOR DRIVE AGAINST REBELS IN ALGERIA;101
FRENCH PUSH HUNT FOR ALGERIAN FOE, CRUSHING OF REVOLT ASKED;'° 2 FRENCH
DRIVE ON REBELS;'° 3 FRENCH TAKE MORE ACTION to HALT ALGERIAN
DISORDERS". 104 It relayed at length French claims that an early
victory against the nationalist army was imminent, devoting
considerable space to the French Government's inflated figures about
alleged Algerian casualties on the battlefield.' 05
 And that was it,
not a word about the French army's excesses and violations of
international laws on war, especially on the treatment of prisoners of
war, and nothing on the repressive measures and acts of "collective
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punishment" and their heavy bearing on the civilian population. The
Economist, by its weekly nature as synthesizer of news media
information with the opportunity to write in more depth than the daily
newspaper, pointedly stressed the French "... violent methods to
repress the revolt", "... arbitrary police methods of handling
suspected rebels" and "... mass reprisals and indiscriminate
punishment of the innocent".'06
The French publications, which attempted to disclose the
excessive conduct of the French troops in Algeria became subject to
stringent measures whereby issues were seized and journalists
imprisoned. Those newspapers, which refused to follow the
Government's line, were attacked as unpatriotic and traitors to their
country. They were branded as "disgraceful" by the French Premier in
that they had so far lost sight of the French interest. Le Monde's
distinguished correspondent, Georges Penchenier, revealed the
indiscriminate reprisal raids carried out by the French army on
villages, after coordinated attacks by the F.L.N. in August 1955. He
spoke of old people, women and children executed by the French troops
which he was accompanying: "The ditch outside the village [of
Zef-Zef], along the Roman road, contained a thousand corpses. Here
the hour of repression has sounded.... This has become a war of race
and religion".' 07 Earlier, L'Humanite' had been seized and its
correspondent Robert Lambotte expelled from Algeria because he had
accused the French troops and Foreign Legion of carrying out
indiscriminate killings amongst Algerians including women and
children. "The forces of repression have gone mad", he had
concluded. 108
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The French authorities attempted to discredit any journalist
reporting on those excesses, claiming that the women and children who
had died recently had fought with the F.L.N. troops, and that all
those killed had been "combatants". To Penchenier, this was utter
deception. He again insisted that all the victims had been
non-combatants who had been killed after the French-F.L.N. battle. He
went on to describe, in detail, the Zef-Zef mayhem: "A dog tied to a
post began to whine on seeing us. Some chickens picked quietly among
the bodies. I do not recall seeing any adult males. I could
distinguish several children of less than ten.., a little girl, knees
bent hand in hand... an old woman... three other women with babies in
their arms. The coagulated blood was still red - it was a fresh
slaughter". 109 The French Government finally bowed to solid
eyewitness charges, conceding that its troops had carried out the
massacres. "The Zef-Zef incident was an isolated case that will not
recur, an unfortunate consequence of warfare", declared the Ministry
of the Interior." 0 To the Algerians, these excesses brought further
confirmation that only military force could ever win them national
independence; the F.L.N. was now firmly convinced of the need not only
to put more pressure on France inside Algeria, but also to bring the
Algerian cause to the attention of world opinion.
In addition to mobilizing all its resources inside Algeria, the
F.L.N. was aware of the importance of diplomatic manoeuvring to bring
pressure to bear on France. It was, from the start, eager to
internationalize the Algerian problem and to make it "... a reality
for the whole world with the backing of our natural allies")" it
was towards the United Nations that its diplomatic activities were
mainly directed. Its Bureau of Information in New York played a
significant role in publicizing its case and in gaining more
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sympathisers with its cause. 112 On the initiative of fourteen
Afro-Asian nations, the General Assembly agreed to register the
"Algerian question" on the agenda of its tenth session in October
1955. France, as expected, opposed this move on the ground that the
war in Algeria was an internal French issue, basing its argument on
Article 2 paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the members to submI3
matters to settlement under the present Charter".
After failing to block registration of the Algerian item on the
Assembly's agenda despite the support of its allies, especially the
United States, France walked out in protest.
The American ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge,
tried to justify the United States vote against the enclosure of the
Algerian question into the General Assembly's discussion, by asserting
that "[ujnlike Morocco and Tunisia, which are French protectorates,
Algeria under French law is administratively an integral part of the
French Republic...". He reiterated the French claim that Algeria fell
beyond the jurisdiction of the United Nations and that consideration
of the Assembly would conflict with the provisions of Article 2,
paragraph 7 of its Charter.'' 4
 The United States support for the
French position had, since the outbreak of the Algerian war in 1954,
been uniform. This support stemmed largely from its efforts to secure
France's full cooperation in N.A.T.O. Hence, declared Assistant
Secretary of State Henry A. Byroade: the United States should not
endanger "the great N.A.T.O. organization that is the only organized
strength of the free world against Soviet encroachment"115
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The United States material and diplomatic support for France in
Algeria angered many Congressmen. In a resolution to Congress, John
McCormack of Massachusetts called on the American Government to "...
administer its foreign policies and programs and exercise its
influence through its membership in the United Nations and other
international organizations t1 , so as to support other nations in their
effort to achieve self-government or independence which would enable
them to assume an equal status among the free nations of the world116
Harold Gross of Iowa declared that this resolution "... opposes
colonial exploitation in all its forms and by every government. To
support this claim and then provide funds for the support of French
colonial exploitation in North Africa, for instance, will constitute
the worst kind of double_talkt.fl7 The Senate Foreign Relations
Sub-Committee concluded its discussion of the resolution by declaring
that in essence, it was "... a reaffirmation of the principles of the
Declaration of Independence", a document which was described by
Abraham Lincoln as meaning "Liberty, not alone to the people of this
country, but hope for the world, for all future time". 118 These
calls, however, did not have much echo in the White House.
The New York Times, like the American Administration, attacked
the General Assembly for accepting to take up the Algerian question,
which it regarded as an internal French issue beyond United Nations
jurisdiction and which the Assembly had "no business interfering
in". 119 The (London) Times, following a similar line of argument, had
asserted a few months earlier that the Assembly's discussion of
Algeria would be "contrary to the mission of the United Nations".'20
The New York Times particularly attacked two of France's allies,
Greece for voting against France and Iceland for abstaining,
expressing regret that the result of the Assembly's vote was Possible
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simply because "two NATO countries failed to support France". This
brought a sharp response from Iceland's permanent representative at
the United Nations who, in a letter to the paper, ridiculed its claim
that his country might have "violated the NATO pact' t . Remarking that
it was through the right to self-determination that his country had
gained its full independence in 1944, he reaffirmed Iceland's
commitment to every people's right to self-determination. In response
to the argument that the North Atlantic treaty "obligates every member
to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area and to
assist every other member in restoring and maintaining its security
against an armed attack", he pointedly added: "NATO as a protector and
bulwark for colonialism is completely alien to my people and entirely
unacceptabi e" 121
The New York Times, steering even closer to the rock of partisan
journalism, criticised the United States, not because it did not
support France, which it did, but, ironically enough, for not using
conspiratorial tactics to influence the voting of other delegates,
notably the Latin Americans. When the General Assembly, after dubious
diplomatic nianoeuvres by France and its allies, finally decided to
delay considering the Algerian question, the paper lost no opportunity
to rejoice and to reaffirm its pro-French stance: "The French had good
cause for resentment and in fairness and common sense that cause
should be removed.... The French argued, with reason, that Algeria
was an internal affair and no business of the General Assembly's".122
The American Administration's rejoicement was equally ardent. Hailing
the Assembly's decision to delay the discussion of Algeria, Henry
Cabot Lodge claimed that this had moved the United Nations "out of a
most difficult situation fraught with danger" and that "wise statesmen
restored conditions necessary for full French participation in our
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work".' 23 To the F.L.N., however, the recent Assembly's decision was
nothing but "surrender to the blackmail" of the French Government and
its allies. 124 Its military efforts inside Algeria were, therefore,
to be intensified to bring more pressure to bear on France.
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CHAPTER III
TOWARDS FULL-FLEDGED REVOLUTION - "THE WORLD TAKES NOTICE"
"Men are so constituted that they are prone to support
a cause which they believe to be assured of victory".
(H.A.L. Fisher)
"... the most powerful single force in the world today
is neither communism nor capitalism, neither the H-bomb
nor the guided missile - it is man's eternal desire to
be free and independent.... The war in Algeria
confronts the United States with the most critical
diplomatic impasse since the crisis in Indochina..."
(Senator J.F. Kennedy, 1957).
/
The offensive launched by L'Armee de Liberation Nationa7e on 20
August 1955, as already explained, marked the beginning of a new phase
in the Algerian revolution which would, henceforth, become more
effective.' At the end of 1955 and during the first few months of the
following year, the nationalist units expanded their military
activities to the Oran Department hitherto untouched by war. This
period also saw the rise of the phenomenon of urban violence at a
large scale.
Although the regular troops of the A.L.N. did not then exceed
20,000 men, their knowledge of the countryside, the growing popular
support for their cause and the acquisition of more and better arms
strengthened their resisting capabilities and enhanced their
confidence in an eventual victory. 2
 The independence of Tunisia and
Morocco was another asset to the A.L.N. who could, therefore, use the
neighbouring territories both as a refuge and as a supply route for
the internal units. 3 As the war was expanding geographically, the
nationalist forces were gaining more control of the northern districts
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notably in the east. Such growing waves of Algerian dissent added to
the worries of the French authorities who would, consequently,
multiply their efforts against what they called the "insurgents".4
The Front de Libe'rat!on Nationale sought from the beginning to
strengthen its political and military position by gaining the support
of the up till now indifferent moderate nationalist groups. It was in
this context that Tewfik el Madani and Ferhat Abbas, leaders of the
Ulemas and the U.D.M.A. respectively, decided to abandon their
moderate stand and join the F.L.N. and its cause in 1956. The
Association of the Ulemas, Moslem Scholars, vigorously attacked the
"atrocities and acts of barbarity" repeatedly committed by the
colonial army under the pretext of suppressing the F.L.N.: no
solutions to the problem would be possible without recognizing "the
free existence of the Algerian nation, its distinctive personality,
its national government and its sovereign legislative assembly",
whilst at the same time preserving individual rights and interests.5
Members of the Algerian Communist Party also joined the F.L.N. but
were integrated into the A.L.N. units only as individuals.6
All this further demonstrated the F.L.N.'s determination to unify
the various nationalist groups under one front and its eagerness to
resist any challenge to its proclaimed role as the only representative
of the Algerian population. The wave of dissent, in effect, touched
almost every political tendency including Les Elus, the pro-French
deputies, who now expressed opposition to the policy of "integration"
which they had, hitherto, staunchly supported. A direct result of
these new developments was France's decision to formally dissolve the
by now obsolete Algerian Assembly in April 1956.
63
These rallies behind the F.L.N. strengthened its position as the
only spokesman for the Algerians and substantiated its claim as the
only force capable of uniting the various ideological tendencies
behind the principle of national independence. 8 It also made its
first serious attempt to define its ideology, and set up its
structural institutions during the Soummam Congress of 20 August 1956
which outlined the principles, methods and objectives of the Algerian
revolution. 9 This Congress stressed the F.L.N.'s leading role in the
process of liberation. "At the political level, all the parties and
groups (with the exception of Messali's M.N.A.)" wrote one of its
prominent organizers, Abbane Ramdane, in an El Moudjahid editorial,
"came to be integrated into the F.L.N. which has today become a unique
political force in Algeria".' 0 The popularity of the F.L.N. expanded
with remarkable speed at a time when the Algerian population as a
whole was becoming, in one way or another, involved in the
insurrection. By April 1956, it had become a mass movement.1'
The New York Times lost no opportunity to tell its readers about
the large-scale resignations of Algerian local politicians which
"symbolized new dissatisfaction with French policies in this
rebel-torn area where nationalists are pressing for complete
independence".' 2 The Economist, arguing along a similar line,
intimated that never had there been a more cogent demonstration of the
"fiction" of proclaiming that all Algerians were assimilable to
Frenchmen and that "L'Algerie, c'est la France". 13
The New York Times seemed especially concerned with the change in
/
the stance of Les Elus, who formed what came to be known as the "group
of sixty-one" to protest against the dictum of "integration" which
they had traditionally endorsed; the integrationist policy was no
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longer acceptable to them because it failed to recognize "Algerian
nationality". Remarking that the moderate nationalists now took the
view that the situation had deteriorated so far that only the F.L.N.
guerrillas could speak for the Algerian people, the paper quoted a
hitherto pro-integrationist politician as saying that the Algerians no
longer had any faith in the traditional parties which they regarded as
tools of the colonial authorities: "We have been passed over. If the
Government negotiates some sort of agreement with the rebels we can
perhaps be useful again".14
The (London) Times, arguing in a similar fashion, intoned that
Algerian political opinion had moved a long way in recent months;
whereas a year earlier the intellectual Algerian would have been ready
to accept integration of the type Jacques Soustelle appeared to be
thinking of, now he had passed beyond that point and was "interested
only in the recognition of Algerian nationality". 15 The Economist, in
a leading article headed "Algeria is African", stressed the same
thought. 16
As time went by, the statements of the former deputies of the
Algerian Assembly grew more favourable to the F.L.N. and, therefore,
more disappointing to the French. "Above all the Algerians want to
attain dignity as men", declared one. "They want to win their
political rights. Whatever the military resources of France, the war
will go on as long as these rights have not been obtained".'7
Reiterating the same argument a few months later, the former President
of the Assembly, Abderrahmane Fars, told Le Monde that the F.L.N.
which had been able "to muster behind it the Algerian people almost to
a man", was now the last hope of the Algerian population.18
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Algerian "Personality" Conceded; Self-Determination Still Denied:
Under growing pressure, the French Government formally accepted
the distinctiveness of the Algerian personality. Hence, talks of a
potential federal association between Algeria and France as an
alternative to the now obsolete idea of "integration", became the main
subject of the day-to-day conversation in French political circles.
To the F.L.N., however, this alternative was not acceptable because it
fell short of promising Algeria's right to self-determination.
To maintain its momentum and increase pressure on the colonial
authorities, the F.L.N. needed not only the sympathy but also the
active support of the local population. More efforts were made to
draw Algerians of all walks of like - workers, peasants, students -
into its cause. The trade union organization (U.G.T.A.) which it had
created under its control came to play a vital role in leading strikes
and in directing boycotts of the various institutions of the French
Establishment.' 9
 This need was highlighted in the final Declaration of
the Soummam Congress which stressed the importance of civil dissent to
enhance the military effort of L'Armee de Liberation Nationale. 20
The Algerian population by and large responded favourably to this
strategy despite France's multi-faceted campaign of dissuasion
including a massive use of force. 2 ' The French Government had long
claimed that the F.L.N. enjoyed no support from the local people and
that most Algerians were seeking French protection against the
"rebels". Such claims found much echo in The New York Times which
hastily asserted that villagers had given "evidence" of a wish "to rid
themselves of the rebels and rebel exactions". 22 The Economist, on
the other hand, stressed the view that the nationalist movement was
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firmly "entrenched" within the local population; its popularity with
the ordinary Algerian and his active support for the actual fighters
stemmed mainly from his belief that they were fighting to improve his
lot. 23
 This, one supposes, might have been of interest to the readers
of The New York Times had they been told about it, which they were
not.
Although the French Government had already conceded Algeria's
independent personality, it was still clinging to the view that it was
an integral part of metropolitan France and that its bonds with Paris
were indissoluble. France's traditional insistence on this claim
stemmed largely from the economic and strategic importance of Algeria
which, in the words of The New York Times, served as a "gateway" to
all French African territories and a "repository" of newly discovered
oil riches. 24 This idea had been stressed by The (London) Times a few
weeks earlier, arguing that because Algeria meant so much to France
both "economically and emotionally" the search for a fresh political
approach to Algeria was proving an "extremely painful process".25
In its efforts to stamp out the Algerian revolution, France
combined "reforms" with repression. The measures which were aimed at
bringing about some change in favour of the local population and which
came to be known as the Lol Cadre, or "outline law", promised the
abolition of the structural political division between Algerians and
colons by creating a single Electoral College, the provision of more
opportunities to the Algerians to be employed in the official
services, and the initiation of agrarian and industrial "reforms"
aimed at improving their living conditions. "I guarantee you the
fierce will of the Government", declared Premier Guy Mollet in his
address to the local population, "to accord you justice and full
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equality before the law".26
To the Algerians, who as former Premier Mend's-France admitted
had lost confidence in the promises of successive French governments,
under whose orders election results were consistently rigged and the
interests of the co7on minority fanatically protected, those measures
were no more than a drop in the ocean. To the F.L.N., they were
merely "contemptible sops". The Loi Cadre, like other schemes before
it especially the Statute of 1947, sought to keep French Algeria and
"ignored Algeria's right to self-determination" despite the promises
of cosmetic socio-political changes in favour of the local
population. 27 The F.L.N. fighters were simply asked to lay down their
arms and accept an outline law and an electoral regime imposed by
France. 28 "For 125 years, we have served as guinea pigs for French
schemes", declared Ferhat Abbas, "We still settle for nothing short of
independence" 29
The New York Times, offering an appraisal in hindsight of the
outline law, told its readers that despite its recognition of an
"Algerian individuality" it was still deemed unacceptable to Algerians
because it "failed to offer direct negotiations with the leaders of
the rebellion". The plan, which was "good in theory" but unworkable
in practice, was doomed to failure like a host of similar proposals
before, because the 1,200,000 pieds noirs were "still not reconciled
to loss of supremacy". 3° The Economist agreed but went further by
pointing out that the new proposals were "equivocal" and France's
record of promises in general was "poor". Whilst the plan recognized
Algeria's different personality, it sought to maintain the dominance
of the colon minority. Such contradictions, it cautioned, would only
contribute to prolonging the war. 31 To The (London) Times also, the
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scheme was not enough to make the Algerians feel that "a real
evolutionary road is offered to them as an alternative to
rebell ion" 32
The Fourth Republic Under Threat From Colon Extremism; Signs of Things
to Come
The colons' constant fear of potential Algerian reprisals stemmed
largely from their awareness of the injustices they had committed
throughout the years against the local population. They became more
and more sensitive to their dominant position which they saw under
threat and, therefore, became more attached to the idea of mob
violence. Even the most token proposals to improve the living
conditions of the Algerian majority aroused suspicion and fear of
being abandoned by France; they used every means possible to keep
Paris under pressure in order to halt any move towards reform. Their
emotional slogans, which were aimed at capturing the sympathy of the
metropolitan French, typified their almost hysterical attitude:
"L'Algerie c'est le France", "De Dunkerque a Tamanrasset...", "La
Mediterrannee traverse la France comnie la Seine traverse Paris".
Their frustration about the difficulty of preserving their privileged
interests, combined with a feeling of inferiority towards the
metropolitan French, led the pieds noirs to become the champions of
"French Grandeur". 33 Mob disobedience became their principal weapon
to make their voice heard by the Governnient.34
Their hostile reaction to the appointment of General Catroux to
succeed Jacques Soustelle as Minister Resident in Algeria culminated
in turbulent riots during Mollet's Algeria visit on 6 February 1956.
Catroux, who had been behind the Ordinance of 7 March 1944 - which had
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promised a few changes in favour of the Algerians - and also involved
in the negotiations that had led to Morocco's independence, was
accused of being "too liberal". His appointment was seen as a recipe
for the loss of L'Alge'rie Française and the collapse of French
Africa.35
Paris finally surrendered to extremist pressure and "the mob got
what it wanted". Catroux's appointment was withdrawn and Robert
Lacoste, the choice of the colons, was appointed instead. 36 Under
Lacoste French troops jumped from 120,000 to 400,000. The needs of
the army in Algeria, which was the largest France had ever sent
abroad, were high both in equipment and in manpower; and caused
serious strains to the French economy and treasury as France got most
of its military goods from abroad. 37 The pied noir paramilitary
organizations, such as Les Groupes Mel itaires de Protection Rurale and
La Section Administrative Specialise'e, which specialised in different
techniques of repression against the local population, were given
formal permission to operate freely: "'Psychological warfare' was now
the order of the day".38
The New York Times, in quite unprecedented fashion as far as its
Algeria coverage was concerned, cried out against France's surrender
to colon blackmail, attacking its failure to face up to the facts and
the weakness of successive French governments to solve the country's
crisis. Its editorial "MOB RULE IN ALGERIA" on 7 February 1956 drove
home the lesson: the withdrawal of General Catroux's appointment was a
clear illustration of France's political weakness. It was a serious
development, because Algeria was France's most dangerous problem. The
rioting of the pieds noirs, coming after months of severe guerrilla
fighting was dramatic evidence that a strong hand was desperately
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needed. "This is mob rule, which is shocking for one of the greatest
powers in the world". In the light of what was to come this was
almost prophetic. Nevertheless, despite this criticism which did not
approach the fundamentals of French policy in Algeria, the paper
continued to give general support to the French Government.
The events of 6 February 1956 established an encouraging
precedent for the colons, set the pattern for future mob violence,
heralded more governmental humiliations and represented a landmark in
the history of the Algerian war. 39 The pieds noirs were taught that
they could influence policy making in Paris through rioting. Such a
lesson, as explained in the following chapter, would not be forgotten
two years later during the Putsch of 13 May 1958 which would bring
down the French Fourth Republic and bring General De Gaulle back to
power. 4° Their belief was strengthened by the Government's appeasing
efforts. "You have believed France was going to abandon you", Mollet
told them. "I have understood your despair.... That is why I say to
you serenely, that even if I suffered by them, the dolorous
demonstrations of Monday have a healthy aspect. They were for a great
many, the means of affirming their attachment to France and their
anguish at being abandoned". "France will remain in Algeria", he
declared. "The ties between the metropolitan country and Algeria are
indissoluble" 41
To the Algerians, as Edward Behr has pointed out, those events
had shown that there were two scales of justice - one for the colons
"who were allowed the utmost leeway and enjoyed the tacit approval of
the police force", and one for the local population "on whom both
police and army had no hesitation in opening fire". 42
 In this
context, the paper cautioned that the Government's retreat under mob
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violence would increase the reluctance of moderate Algerian leaders to
enter into talks with Paris. 43 This retreat helped to destroy
whatever trust some Algerians might still have held towards the French
authorities and conversely strengthened the F.L.N.'s position. "After
what we have seen", declared one "moderate" Algerian politician, "it
is not expectable that we shall become more moderate ourselves.
Fateful days are not far off". 44 Jacques Chevallier, the then Mayor
of Algiers, reiterated the same view.45
The New York Times, in a series of pointed anti-colon articles,
blamed the extremists for wrecking any chance of a settlement along a
federal line or on the basis of "independence within
interdependence". 46
 It even ventured that the Algerian nationalists
might not have demanded independence "if any advance toward federation
had begun earlier". The readers were pointedly told that the
Algerians were still denied "the right to nationhood" because of the
French Government's fear of colon vigilantism. 47 Time magazine drove
home the same lesson a few months later, but revealed a new aspect of
the problem - army complacency with the extremists: "Should Mollet
show signs of giving in to Algerian demands for independence, much of
the army might well support Algeria's reactionary French colons in
open defiance of the government".48
In addition to the aggression of the pied noir extremist
organizations, the lcoal population did not escape the systematic
repressive measures of the army. Determined to put a rapid end to the
war, the army adopted "collective punishment" as a means of bringing
the people under control. Ironically, however, the collective
punishment applied by the French in Algeria did not differ much from
that applied by the Nazis in France during the Second World War and
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which resulted in indiscriminate massacres like that of
Oradour-sur-Glane. 49 The French army embarked on a campaign of
arbitrary arrests, indiscriminate bombings of villages and the
regroupment of the inhabitants of the areas, where the F.L.N. was
thought to be in operation, in camps later described by the
International Red Cross as "inhuman". 50
 "Everybody, everywhere, is
hiding something", became, in the words of Jean-Paul Sartre, the
army's motto: "They must be made to talk". 5' "You're going to talk!
Everybody talks.... This is the Gestapo here! You know the Gestapo",
one paratrooper cried at Henri Alleg after his arrest. 52
 Torture
became normal practice. I shall consider this whole problem more
directly at a later stage; at the moment it may be enough just to
state it.
The French army's campaign of repression against the Algerian
population reached its peak in 1957. According to F.L.N. figures as
many as 6,000 people disappeared between January and April of that
year. 53 "Psychological action" was used to scare the people into
submission and, therefore, rally them more easily behind the idea of
L'A7ge'rie Franca/se; and also to raise the morale of the French
troops. It included a variety of techniques that ranged from
propaganda through leaflets, films and banners - which all minimized
the French army's losses and exaggerated those of the A.L.N. - to
different forms of "brain washing".54
The French army, haunted by the memory of its experience in
Vietnam, claimed that it was not only fighting to protect civilians
against "rebel terror", but also to protect Algeria against "communist
subversion" and to defend the free world against international
comniunism. 55 Repression reached a degree of brutality", wrote
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Philippe Scherer, "rarely passed in the history of the French army...
with fascist methods". 56 To General de Bo llardire, who resigned
from his command in the Atlas Mountains in protest against the use of
torture, excessive repression lost France the claim to "moral values"
which had always been associated with French civilization. 57 The
repressive methods of the French drove the local population closer to
the F.L.N. as noted by Germaine Tillion: "The people for long
oppressed and denied their legitimate rights stood firmly behind the
F.L.N., for independence and for reasons to live". 58 Alistair Home
has commented that any other power, which had used repression in war,
realized that repression is a "double edged weapon", which would in
the long run present the adversary with a valuable and more effective
moral and emotional weapon.59
The French attempts to quell the Algerian revolution by military
force grabbed the headlines of the press in France and in the West.
The New York Times, treating generously the Government's strategy to
give "stern repression" priority over "reform", failed to expose the
far-reaching consequences of this strategy and its heavy bearing on
the civilian population. lacoste's over-optimistic statements about
the "last quarter of an hour" of the war continued to get into its
columns at considerable length. 6° However, French strategy was to
cause even The New York Times, a year later, to question the belief
that the Algerian problem could be resolved by force: despite the
dispatch of reinforcements to put French forces near the half million
mark, action by the F.L.N. units in the countryside and in the cities
continued to dominate the scene and frustrate Mollet's plans. 61 But
the paper's stance was not as clear as the stance taken by The
Economist which vigorously scorned the French army's claim that the
war was in its dernier quart d'heure. Although the Government was
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given the special powers in Algeria for which it had asked, the
Algerian revolution had passed the point where it could be destroyed
either by special powers and reinforcements or by the F.L.N.'s
tactical mistakes. 62
 The weekly, which was never openly unfriendly to
the F.L.N., had earlier drawn attention to the peculiar character of
guerrilla warfare and to the difficulty to face small hit-and-run
units with big army contingents. Almost prophesying an F.L.N.
victory, it had intoned that applied to Algeria, the experience of the
recent guerrilla wars suggested that the French might not now be able
to regain control: "If that is true, then France will sooner or later
recognize Algerian independence". 63 The F.L.N. military actions
reached an average of 2,624 per month in March 1956, as opposed to
only 900 in October 1955.64
Army Repression Amidst Surge of Popular Opinion Towards the F.L.N.
By 1956 control of French politics in Algeria had begun to slip
away from the government in Paris and into the hands of the colon
activists and their allies in the army and police, who were determined
to protect L'A7ge'rie Française at any cost. The central Government
was no longer obeyed. 65 On 10 August 1956 a group of these activists,
collaborating with some members of the police, planted a time-bomb in
the rue Thebs of the highly populated Casbah region in Algiers which
claimed the lives of many victims. 66 A few weeks later, the F.L.N.
retaliated with its first bombs in Algiers where one of the most
violent episodes of the Algerian war would take place. 67 This came to
be known as the "Battle of Algiers". 68 But, it was in fact nothing
close to a battle, simply because of the disproportionate nature of
the confrontation: thousands of paratroopers, policemen and secret
agents assisted by the colon activist groups were opposed to no more
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than 200 fidayene, urban fighters, and five leaders.
To draw the attention of international public opinion to the
Algerian cause, the F.L.N. organized an all-out strike, from 28
January to 4 February 1957, to coincide with the United Nations debate
on the Algerian problem. 69
 The strike gained a large following among
the population of Algiers despite the French army's massive display
and use of force. But, the strike provided the paratroopers, who were
converted into "soldats policiers", with an opportunity and a cover to
try to stifle the F.L.N. in Algiers and eliminate its leadership.
Acting under the Special Powers Law of 16 March 1956, the paras
embarked on a large-scale campaign of arrests, cruel interrogation and
torture against the Algerian community in the city.7°
The New York Times correspondent, human Durdin, watched the
army's response to the strike at first hand and gave a detailed
account of the tense mood now reigning in Algeria. Chronicling the
rough tactics used by the French in an attempt to break the strikehis
dispatch pointed out some clear cases of army excesses like the arrest
of shopkeepers and the looting of their shops. 71 His account,
however, stopped short of informing the readers about the other more
hideous excesses that were taking place in interrogation centres, and
which were now common knowledge not only in Algeria but also in France
and elsewhere. 72
 A fact which was not mentioned in the paper's
general reportage of the strike and its aftermath was that the
spontaneous popular response to the F.L.N. call was a clear
demonstration of the support the F.L.N. was enjoying amongst the
Algerians.
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The paras, given absolute freedom of action under the Special
Powers Law, continued their campaign of unwarranted arrests,
interrogation and a large-scale practice of torture which resulted in
the "disappearance" of hundreds of people like Larbi Ben M'hidi,
Maurice Audin and All Boumendjel. 73 An estimated 3,994 Algerian
detainees simply disappeared during this period. 74 It was through
this ruthless campaign that the paras, the police and secret services
scored a temporary victory over the F.L.N. in Algiers whereby France
"won the battle but lost the war" as the following chapters will
demonstrate. This wave of repression contributed to the awakening of
people's conscience, in France and abroad, towards the war in Algeria
and especially the conduct of the French army. 75
 In Algeria, as
already mentioned, it strengthened the F.L.N.'s position and enhanced
its popularity among the Algerians.
Many Frenchmen of all walks of life protested against repression
in Algeria, especially the practice of torture. General Paris de
Bollardire had already shown his indignation by resigning from his
post as Commander in the Algerian Atlas Mountains. 76 In a letter to
L'Express, he spoke of "the frightful danger that would be for us to
lose from sight, under the fallacious pretext of immediate
effectiveness, moral values that alone have up to now made for the
greatness of our civilization. 	 Represented by 357 prominent
signatories, French intellectuals wrote to the French President
deploring the army's conduct: "... for over a year, we have collected
a great number of concurring statements, based on testimony of
unquestionable validity, which affirms that these young soldiers have
to participate, regardless of their desires, in actions which would
arouse every human conscience.... We refer to the torture of
prisoners.., to the summary execution of innocent hostages, pillage
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and the destruction of entire villages as measures of intimidation and
reprisal" 78
Some individual French notables were quick to denounce the
practice of torture by the French army. Jean-Paul Sartre pointed out
that such "tortures bring no return, the Germans themselves ended by
realizing in 1944; torture costs lives but does not save them".79
Maurice Duverger branded it as "not only immoral but also stupid".8°
"Whatever its form and whatever its purpose", stated General Pierre
Billotte, "it is unacceptable, inadmissible, condemnable.. ,,81 "We,
who fought against the racist monstrosity..." warned Pierre-Henri
Simon, "are today conquered by Hitler, if our nation has adopted his
ideas and methods". 82
 But, these protests did not have much impact on
the army and its conduct; torture and other forms of excesses
continued unabated after 1957. Although the Mollet government was
forced to appoint a committee of inquiry into those charges, the
committee was not given appropriate power and authority to conduct its
investigation which got nowhere. 83 By 1956, most French had realized
the extreme gravity of the Algerian situation for the future of
France. But, as France-Observateur pointed out, French public opinion
was still "uncertain", "hesitant" and sensitive to "chauvinistic
propaganda" painting the war as a patriotic obligation.84
The New York Times, addressing itself rather timidly to the
question of French excesses in Algeria, failed to expose the heavy
bearing the army tactics were having on the Algerian population. It,
however, highlighted the repercussions reports of such excesses were
having among the French who were reminded of the "German methods" of
World War Two. "A nation with still memories of Nazi atrocities in
concentration camps and in occupied France", its readers were told,
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"has become troubled by reports that similar methods have been applied
by Frenchmen against Algerians". 85 Though it relayed a host of
criticisms by individual Frenchmen of the army's excessive conduct,
including the use of torture against Algerian detainees, its reports
were mainly weak and shallow. Time magazine, on the other hand, was
more explicitly critical of the army's atrocities. In a pointed
article headed "Against Torture", it revealed to its reader the
ominous fact that the army, "reduced to waging a gloryless police
action, is using cruel and cynical methods in totting up its weekly
bag of rebels killed".86
The New York Times addressed itself more directly to the problem
of censorship facing journalists in Algeria. "Virtually all sources
of information within Algeria are controlled by the French", Tom Brady
wrote from Algiers. Visiting news correspondents and other foreign
observers were, therefore, "suspicious of everything they see and
hear". 87
 A few months earlier the paper had told its readers that
most of the news about the war against French rule in Algeria
"reflects what the French authorities want to tell". 88 Foreign
correspondents always had great difficulty in contacting Algerians for
a second view: "... contact between a foreign correspondent and any
Algerian is extremely limited". 89 I shall consider this whole problem
of dependence on French official sources and its effects on the
quality of the paper's Algeria coverage at length in Chapter VII.
From France, C.L. Sulzberger reported on the growing fears of the
Government's attempts to curb the press and limit its freedom. Fears
were particularly voiced that the authorities were trying to silence
those publications which contained material that displeased them.9°
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Le Monde's issue of 6 January 1957 was seized in Algiers because
it carried a story about the killing of a seven-year-old Algerian girl
by the bullets of the French troops during one of their raids. The
editor of France-Observateur, Claude Bourdet, was arrested and
prosecuted in France because of an article in which he had attacked
the army's conduct in Algeria: "A hundred thousand young Frenchmen are
threatened with being thrown into the 'dirty war' of Algeria, to lose
their best years there, perhaps to be injured, perhaps to be killed,
for a cause few among these approve, in the kind of warfare which
revolts most of them". Bourdet was charged of "undertaking to
demoralize the army". 91 Many writers had their homes ransacked by the
police because of articles they had published criticizing France's
Algeria policies, especially the army's conduct. Police also kept a
close watch on many publications, especially France-Observateur,
L'Express, Te'moignage Chre'tien and Esprit. 92 Yet, the French
Government generally avoided prosecuting newsmen because imprisoning
reporters, editors or publishers was not as important as intimidating
them into silence and self-censorship; attempts which The Economist
described as "squeezing the press". The Government wanted to deliver
a sharp message to the press proprietors that publishing articles on
torture and other army excesses in Algeria would certainly result in
seizure by the police and, thus, frighten away advertisers and drive
the publication into brankruptcy.93
The American free-lance writer Herb Greer and the film director
Peter Throckniorton, were the first Western reporters to report the war
in Algeria from the F.L.N. side during the winter of 1956-1957. They
spent considerable time in A.L.N. camps, interviewing fighters,
meeting victims of French bombings, recording action and photographing
casualties of both sides. Their eyewitness accounts were later
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broadcast on American Television and throughout the world "to the fury
of the French authorities", as Greer later wrote, "who attempted to
suppress our film in New York and to discredit our photographs and our
articles"
To the F.L.N., "revolutionary war" was the only option left to
the Algerians to resist French "political and military terror" and the
army's attempts to "pacify the hearts and souls" of the local
population through "systematic extermination". 95
 Though it always
resented violence, it believed that it was the only way for its
survival". It's our only way of expressing ourselves", Yacef Saadi
told Germaine Tillion. 96 The distinguished French writer, Jean-Paul
Sartre, later gave credence to this view: "Our Army is scattered all
over Algeria. We have the men, the money and the arms. The rebels
have nothing but the confidence and support of a large part of the
population. It is we, in spite of ourselves, who have imposed this
type of war-terrorism in the towns and ambushes in the country.
Within the disequilibrium in the forces, the F.L.N. has no other means
of action. The ratio between our forces and theirs gives them no
option but to attack us by surprise. Invisible, ungraspable,
unexpected, they must strike and disappear, or be exterminated".97
The New York Times, openly siding with the French official line
and filling its columns with heavy doses of anti-F.L.N. opinions,
struck hard at the Algerians' use of violence. It blamed the F.L.N.
for the wave of violence that had been sweeping the country since 1954
and lost no opportunity to express its sympathy with the French forces
which were engaged in a guerrilla war in which "no ground rules
restrain the rebels". 98
 The paper failed to go beyond routine
reporting, which was heavily dependent on governmental sources, to let
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its readers know about the F.L.N. and its motives at first hand
through an eyewitness reporter. The (London) Times, also critical of
the F.L.N., even praised what it called the French army's "humanity
and courage". 99 One fact, still alluding most of the western press,
was that the F.L.N.'s violence in Algiers, as already explained, had
been provoked by the bombs of the co7on activists collaborating with
the secret services. 100 This inclination towards the French point of
view and heavy reliance on official sources could perhaps be explained
by referring to the generally accepted argument in journalistic
circles, that the news media tend to devote more attention to those in
power at the expense of those without power. It is also widely argued
that there is an inherent western "loyalty-bias" which often affects
the quality of coverage of non-Western news by the Western media.
Relevant to this argument, which is considered more directly in
Chapter VII, are the numerous theories of communication such as
"elitism", "meaningfulness", "relevancy", "proximity",
"underdog-colony and topdog-motherland", which suggest that there was
an inherent bias towards France in The New York Times coverage of the
Algerian-French conflict because of its loyalty to N.A.T.O. and to the
interests of the United States.'01
The waves of unwarranted arrests, interrogations and even
executions would, in the words of one historian, only destroy any
illusion of "a certain idea of France". Massu's ruthlessness would
only kill Voltaire in the eyes of the Algerians including those
Westernized intellectuals. The French Government was facing a real
dilemma: it could not pursue a campaign of repression without risking
to push the population closer to the F.L.N.; and it could not
implement reforms in favour of the Algerians without being attacked by
army and co7on activists as a surrender to F.L.N. pressure.'02
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The Algerian revolution became a true timass movement" in mid-1956
when the National Liberation Front benefitted from a considerable
erosion of opinion towards its cause. Several factors contributed to
this, especially the independence of both Tunisia and Morocco, the
execution of the two F.L.N. prisoners, Ferradj and Zabanah, and the
retreat of the Government in front of extremist colon pressure and mob
violence.' 03 The F.L.N. improved its military effectiveness, scored
its first diplomatic victory at the United Nations and, in the words
of Germaine Tillion, became "too closely associated with the Algerian
masses for any lasting detente to occur without its total
agreement" 104
In addition to the half-a-million troops drafted into Algeria, as
explained in detail in the following chapter, the French army used
highly advanced military hardware mainly supplied to it by the United
States through N.A.T.O. The A.L.N., on the other hand, did not have
more than 100,000 men. Nonetheless, relying on hit-and-run tactics,
its small units scored important victories on the battlefront which
gave the official organ of the F.L.N., El Moudjahid, reason to boast
that those small guerrilla units had not only managed to "put pressure
on the formidable forces of French colonialism, but they now control
all the national territory".' 05 Monthly French losses in lives, as
acknowledged by Minister Resident Robert Lacoste, had passed from 30
in November 1954 when the war had first started to 285 in January
1956. 106
The New York Times gave considerable attention to the growing
strength of the F.L.N.-A.L.N., especially the "continuing ability of
the rebel forces to maintain themselves in the field against more than
450,000 French soldiers".'° 7 Whilst intimating that the nationalist
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forces had "had the upper hand almost everywhere", it had earlier
openly sided with the Government's argument that the F.L.N. had no
right to represent the Algerians and that there was still no "valid"
interlocutor to negotiate a settlement with France.' 08 It also
hastily dismissed the Algerian demands for independence as
"extremist". 109 In aLL this, the paper reflected the extremist French
view that the F.L.N. had to be put aside to reach a settlement.
The Economist, arguing along a different line, observed that
there seemed to be no way now, if there ever had been one, of setting
the F.L.N. aside, intimating that the latter had "secured virtual
recognition as the only 'worthwhile negotiating party'". 11 ° This, one
supposes, might have been of interest to the readers of The New York
Times had they been told about it; but they were not, because of the
paper's "sin of omission". The Economist also showed disagreement
with it on the question of Algeria's future: "It is now impossible to
envisage a future status for Algeria other than in some form of
federalism or independence...". To this thought, the weekly was often
to return.'
The quality and direction of the news presented to the readers is
essentially based on "what is available at the gathering end of the
line". The correspondent on the spot has to diversify his sources of
information especially on complicated matters like international
conflicts and wars. Relying on one source of information inevitably
leads to distortion of news. It is widely accepted in journalistic
circles that the duty of the correspondent is "to tell the story of
the people in the nation he is assigned, not merely the official acts
of the government and the announcements of the press attach(s".112
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The Conflict and its Repercussions in the World
By 1956, Algeria had already become France's uncontested number
one problem, causing mounting political, economic and financial
strains. The New York Times, realizing the high stakes involved,
intimated that the Algerian war was the "gravest" and "most burning"
political and military problem not only of the French Fourth Republic
but also of its allies. 113 Columnist C.L. Sulzberger branded it as
"the great cancer" that was slowly corroding France) 14 Highlighting
the distinctiveness of Algeria from any other post-war French problem,
the paper pointedly stated editorially that it occupied a "unique
position" in contemporary affairs, different from Indochina, Tunisia
and Morocco, and far different from "the true colony" like French West
or French Equatorial Africa.115
The paper predicted that France's economic difficulties would
last as long as the financial requirements of the military campaign in
Algeria continued.' 16
 Those requirements, $1,700,000 a day, and the
Government's consequent resort to "special taxes" to meet them,
brought the pressure of the Algerian reality into the home of the
ordinary French, and "brought into play the long-standing and stubborn
political cleavages in French societytt.7 People and politicians, as
The (London) Times had earlier observed, were becoming more prone to
accuse one another of betraying French interests, of creating "another
Indochina", of failing one way or another to measure up to the
challenge. 118 Time magazine, following a similar line of argument, had
gone even further arguing that the anguished question of Algeria - the
possibility that it might become another Indochina closer to home -
was "the one unknowable in all comfortable cal culations about the
future of parliamentary democracy in France"•"9 With hindsight, as
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the following chapters will demonstrate, this was a sound observation.
Algeria was so important to France that it determined its
attitude and policy towards the external world. The position of other
countries towards the Algerian Conflict became, in the editorial words
of The (London) Times, "the tOUChstone" by which the sincerity of
foreign governments was measured.12° France's sharpened concern for
its image and prestige in the world was far more closely linked with
the challenge it was facing in Algeria, affecting its overseas
generally, than with questions of European unity or Western relations
with the Soviet Union.'2'
The conflict directly affected the N.A.T.O. alliance and even
threatened its unity. Making Algeria its absolute priority, France
sought effective assistance from its allies to stamp out the Algerian
revolution. Up until August 1956, as many as ten French military
divisions serving in Germany under N.A.T.O. out of a total of
fourteen, had been transferred to Algeria, "to the detriment of the
Atlantic shield in Europe",' 22 and despite the evident fear of the
supreme allied Commander General Grunther. "If the French problem
became sort of permanent, we would have a reevaluation", he declared.
"We are assuming that French divisions in Algeria are in Germany".'23
France got the moral, financial and military support it wanted
from its allies especially the United States. American financial aid
to France stood at 136 billion francs in 1956 and at 500 billion
francs in 957•124 Reassuring the French authorities that the United
States was solidly behind France's policies, the Eisenhower
Administration viewed Algeria as a purely "internal French problem"
and "not appropriate" for discussion by the United Nations. But,
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because Algeria's defence was a N.A.T.O. responsibility, the problem
was in the words of the American Ambassador to Paris, Douglas Dillon,
"important for all the countries of the Atlantic alliance".' 25 The
New York Times, again showing its guardianship of Western interests
and perhaps confirming the view explained earlier that there is an
inherent bias in the reporting of non-Western news by the Western
media, warmly hailed the American Government's support for France on
Algeria. 126 Not by coincidence or mere timely mellowing did its
editorial page intone: "Both our countries have the same ideals, the
same system of democracy, the same philosophy of life in essential
respects. We need each other. We stand or fall together". Arguing
that American security rested upon its allies, it asserted that the
United States had to stand on the side of France and its policies in
Algeria, for any policy pursued by the American Government that did
not take this into account was "bound to fail".127
Although many Algerians were angered by the pro-French stance the
United States Government had adopted since the beginning of the
conflict, branding it as a betrayal of the traditional principle upon
which the American Republic had been founded, the F.L.N. and its cause
found a sympathetic ear among many American individuals and
non-governmental organizations. Trade unionists, especially Irving
Brown the then representative of AFL-CIO in Europe, openly supported
Algeria's right to independence and repeatedly denounced the French
military campaign, which was aided and financed by the N.A.T.O.
alliance.' 28
 Because of this pro-Algerian stance, Irving Brown was
declared persona non grata by the French authorities, denying him
entrance into Algeria. It was against this background that the
President of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, strongly reproached the
Eisenhower Administration's policy towards Algeria: "We of the AFL-CIO
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protest vigorously against even a single American helicopter or any
other military equipment designated for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the Defense of free Europe being used against the
Algerian National Liberation forces. Instead, let our Government urge
France to strengthen the cause of world peace and freedom by
championing the establishment of a federation of democratic states of
North Africa". 129
But, the most prominent American sympathetic voice for the
Algerian cause was that of Senator John F. Kennedy, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on United Nations Affairs. In
his speech to the Senate on 2 July 1957, he vigorously attacked the
failing policies of France in Algeria which favoured the co7on
minority, "stifled" educational opportunities for the Algerians,
"jailed, exiled or executed their leaders, and outlawed their
political parties and activities". Stressing that the most powerful
force in the world was not the H-bomb but "man's eternal desire to be
free and independent", he reproached the United States Government for
supporting the French military campaign in Algeria. He described the
Algerian problem as the "most critical diplomatic impasse confronting
the United States since the crisis in Indochina' and went on to cite
the reasons which made it an important issue for the United States:
"The war in Algeria, engaging more than 400,000 French
soldiers, has stripped the continental forces of NATO
to the bone. It has dimmed Western hopes for a
European common market, and seriously compromised the
liberalization reforms of OEEC, by causing France to
impose new import restrictions under a wartime economy.
It has repeatedly been appealed for discussion to the
United Nations, where our equivocal remarks and
opposition to its consideration have damaged our
leadership and prestige in that body....
It has diluted the effective strength of the
Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle Eas 30 and our
foreign aid and information programs".
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The New York Times, in a front-page story, lost no opportunity to
remark that the Kennedy speech was "the most comprehensive and
outspoken arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented
by an American in public office". 13
' But, its editorial on the same
day openly reproached the Senator's attack on the French Algeria
policies as "at the very least risky" because of France's traditional
"sensitivity" to, and "distrust" of, the true motives of the United
States. It concluded by reiterating the official view of the State
Department that Algeria was an internal complex French problem which
should not be made an American affair.' 32 A few days later Senator
Kennedy forcefully answered his critics:
"No amount of hopeful assertions that France will
handle the problem alone, no amount of cautious
warnings that these are matters best left unmentioned
in public, and no amount of charges against the motives
or methods of those of us seeking a peaceful solution
can obscure the fact that the Algerians will someday be
free. Then, to whom will they return - to the West,
which has seemingly ignored their plea for
independence; to the Americans, whom they may feel have
rejected the issue as none of our affair while at the
same time furnishing arms that help crush them; or to
Moscow, to Cairo, to Peiping, the 1 etended champions
of nationalism and independence".
Le Monde, unlike The New York Times interestingly enough, pointed to
the fact that the Kennedy speech not only helped American public
opinion to learn about the Algerian problem, but also pinpointed "much
truth" and "opened the eyes of many Frenchmen" towards France's policy
in Algeria.'34
Successive French governments, adopted the view that the Algerian
revolution was directed, financed and equipped from abroad. "It would
have foundered long before this", Foreign Minister Christian Pineau
declared before the United Nations Poli tical Committee, "had it not
received help from certain countries Which supply it with arms, money,
directives and even bases of operations"135 Droz and Lever have
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commented that it is not surprising that the French authorities blamed
the continuation of the war on foreign involvement, because any
government which finds itself in serious trouble, traditionally
denounces the "foreign hand" rather than faces immediate realities.
The French Government's failure in this case was refusal to understand
Algerian nationalism, its motives and its demands. 136 It was widely
believed that the war would immediately cease if President Nasser of
Egypt was overthrown. This was, in fact, the main reason behind
France's participation in the tripartite attack on Egypt in 1956. The
French saw Suez simply as another theatre of the Algerian war.'37
The New York Times, asserting that many of the F.L.N. military
strikes had been announced in advance from Cairo, gave its readers the
tacit impression that without Egyptian support the Algerian revolution
would collapse.' 38
 But, The Economist, addressing itself to this
question a few months later, ridiculed the theory that Nasser's
overthrow was the key to a French victory in Algeria: "The Algerian
rebellion has deep enough local roots for Nasser's fate not
necessarily to be decisive to its future".' 39
 This view was shared by
many observers who pointedly argued that even if Nasser had been
overthrown, the Algerian revolution would have kept the same momentum.
Although he supported the Algerian nationalist movement, President
Nasser had no influence over its organization or conduct.'4°
The New York Times, searching farther afield for possible foreign
involvement, gave credence to the French official view that the Soviet
Union had penetrated the Algerian nationalist movement, asserting that
the "liberation of the Algerians" was not so important to the Kremlin
as was the "dissension" the war had caused in the North Atlantic
Treaty alliance.' 4 ' Already in May 1956 the paper had indicated its
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acceptance of the French view of the status of Algeria within the
French Union by playing the familiar Cold War argument and by
referring to the Soviet Union in the following way: "If Mr. Khrushchev
is so concerned about the peoples struggling for national liberation
he has a great opportunity to show that solicitude right at home. Why
should not the Ukraine be independent, or Byelorussia, or Latvia, or
Lithuania...? If Mr. Khrushchev wishes to be known as a liberator,
why does he not give the peoples opportunity to decide freely whether
they wish to be governed from Moscow or to govern themselves?"42
The F.L.N. had since 1954 insisted upon its total independence
from foreign influence. Welcoming any assistance from any country
regardless of its ideological direction, it dismissed the French
argument that it was dependent on Egypt as "vain slandertt.143 As far
as arms were concerned, the F.L.N. repeatedly denied its dependence on
any particular country: "We have to buy them wherever we can get them,
and they cost us dearly. Some come from the Middle East, but we buy
them all over Europe as well, including France". In response to
French allegations that the nationalist movement had been infiltrated
by world communism, the F.L.N. reiterated its independence from
communism both internal and external, accusing France of trying to
denigrate Algerian nationalism, make Algeria a Cold War issue and,
thus, win more support from its allies, and, possibly, even a direct
American military intervention.' 44 Interviewed on American Television
in 1957, the F.L.N. representative in New York, M'hamed Yazid, was
asked: "... it is said that the F.L.N. is communist and that the
countries of the East provide it with a lot of arms, is it true?" He
replied: "We are far from being communist, but when one makes a war,
one needs arms. We prefer Western arms; if I find one who can give
them to me, I don't see why I should refuse".'45
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The F.L.N. had always sought to internationalize the conflict in
order to attract outside assistance, and to exert more pressure on
France to change Its approach to the question of Algeria's future.146
During the first three years of the revolution, the F.L.N. succeeded
in making Algeria not perhaps an "international issue" in the full
sense of the word, but an issue widely discussed at the international
level. 147 Arab countries were showing growing concern; France was
using every means to draw its allies into the war. The Algerians had
repeatedly denounced the support France was getting from the N.A.T.O.
alliance to continue its military campaign in Algeria.' 48 The F.L.N.
participation in the Bandung Conference in 1955 made Algeria a primary
concern of the Third World countries. At Brioni in Yugoslavia, a year
later, the Algerians gained unequivocal support from the three leading
figures of the non-aligned movement, Nehru, Nasser and Tito, who
denounced the French policies and expressed sympathy for the Algerian
people's demands for self-determination. And during the Afro-Asian
Conference in Cairo in December 1957 the F.L.N. obtained a resolution
condemning France's colonial conduct in Algeria.'49
The French attempts to stamp out the Algerian revolution
themselves helped to internationalize the conflict. On 22 October
1956, for example, the French air force - with the approval of the
Defence Minister and the Minister Resident in Algeria - highjacked the
Moroccan plane which was carrying five F.L.N. officials from Rabat to
Tunis where they were to attend a peace conference with the Tunisian
Premier and the King of Morocco. The idea of the conference,
interestingly enough, had formerly been encouraged by the French
Government. This operation was largely condemned in different
international circles as an illegal act of piracy committed in
international space.' 5° It seriously affectecf relations between
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France and the newly independent states of Tunisia and Morocco which
were to be drawn closer to the F.L.N., and posed a serious question in
international law on navigation in international space. 151 The
highjacking, which further discredited the French word in Algerian
eyes and thus jeopardized - at least temporarily - any chance of
rapprochement between France and the Algerian nationalists, did
nothing to "decapitate" the Algerian revolution as the French had
hoped.152
The New York Times gave its readers a rare eye-witness account of
this incident through its correspondent Thomas C. Brady who had been
on the same plane as the highjacked F.L.N. officials. A front-page
report with a four-column headline cautioned against the possible
consequences of such an act, especially in the long run. The
high-jacking was seen as almost certain to produce "an open break"
with Tunisia and Morocco. These two countries' anger was based on
their belief that the French Government had sanctioned their
approaches to the Algerian leaders to seek a ceasefire in Algeria and
then seized the F.L.N. officials while they were, in effect, under
Moroccan protection.' 53
 The paper, however, failed to address itself
to the legal implications behind this act and the serious question it
posed In International law, unlike Time magazine which would openly
describe it as an unlawful "aerial kidnap".154
The Economist went even farther in its criticism. Under the
title "Algeria: Scoop or Blunder", it strongly urged the French
Government to use the opportunity of the seizure of the five
nationalist leaders to open up negotiations with the F.L.N. This
would help find a solution to the Algerian problem and prevent
"turning all North Africans - as opposed to Algerians only - into
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people ready to buy guns and turn them on Frenchmen". Treating the
captured men otherwise would be disastrous to France: they really
represented Algerian opinion; unless they were treated as
interlocuteurs va7ables - the valid spokesmen - whom the French
Government said it wanted to meet, "there is no future for that
government in French North Africa".'55
The Algerian Question as a U.N. Issue
It was at the United Nations that the Algerians really sought to
internationalize the conflict. Backed by the Afro-Asian group, the
F.L.N. tried to isolate France internationally especially in the U.N.
General Assembly. 156 The Algerian question was gradually becoming a
U.N. issue. It was placed on the General Assembly's Eleventh session
in September 1956, and was discussed by the First Committee in
February 1957 and during as many as seventeen meetings. A draft
resolution put to the First Committee in February 1957 by eighteen
Afro-Asian countries called upon France to recognize the right of the
Algerian people to self-determination and to enter into negotiations
with the Algerian nationalists. The resolution failed to get the
required majority with a vote of 34 for, 33 against and 10
abstentions. A second draft resolution put forward by Japan, the
Philippines and Thailand and which merely expressed the hope that
France and the Algerians enter into negotiations to end the war, was
passed by 37 votes to 27, with 13 abstentions.' 57 France, boycotting
the discussion, insisted that Algeria was an integral part of
metropolitan France: "To separate Algeria from France, would be to
alter my country's boundaries", cried Christian Pineau.'58
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The New York Times reaction to the United Nations' debate of the
Algerian question was predictable. Reproaching the Afro-Asian
countries for their attacks on France's policies in Algeria, it hailed
Pineau's defence of the French position as "reasonable and
impressive".159 Its editorial on the same day vehemently attacked the
General As sembly, accusing it of becoming "a forum for attack, for
quarrels, for divisive tactics". It concluded by venturing that the
Assembly could help the Algerians most by giving France enough time to
implement Its policies: "The French are making a fair offer on
Algeria. They should be given every chance")60
In this, the paper reflected the stance adopted by the American
Government towards the question of the United Nations' role on
Algeria. The United States firmly supported the French position and
voted against all the proposed resolutions during the discussion of
the issue by the First Committee in February 1957. Arguing that
France was doing its best to reach a peaceful settlement, Henry Cabot
Lodge, the United States U.N. Ambassador, cautioned the other
delegates: "We must, at the very least, do nothing here at the United
Nations which will interfere with that evolution".'6'
The New York Times, hailing the American Government's stand on
Algeria, called for more cooperation between the United States and
France on this and other issues. Its editorial on 8 February 1957
typified its position:
"The United States has now backed France to the hilt on
the Algerian question in the United Nations General
Assembly. Ambassador Lodge's intervention on Wednesday
gave the French everything they could desire. It was
the right thing to do, and it should help a bit in the
process of repairing the deteriorated relations between
our two countries. From every angle - United Nations,
Algerian, French and American - this was sound policy".
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In this, the paper's position was not much different from that of Le
Monde which, naturally, praised the United States for supporting the
French thesis at the United Nations, and for expressing itself "with
perfect clarity and with loyalty towards its ally, for which [French]
public opinion will be grateful".162
Despite this, The New York Times had earlier exposed the
extensive "efforts of diplomacy and propaganda" which the French
authorities had been busy making in order to influence international
opinion. Such efforts were directed particularly at the United
States, mainly because of its prominent position in the Western World
and its influential role at the United Nations. Efforts were also
made to influence the Afro-Asian countries because of their repeated
attempts to indict France for its Algerian policies. 163 The French,
however, failed to halt the growing wave of sympathy for the Algerian
cause at the United Nations. The General Assembly's 12th session in
December 1957 adopted an important resolution which expressed the hope
that "pourparlers will be entered into" by both sides - Algerian and
French - to find a solution to the conflict in conformity with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and
promised to "take note of the offer of the good offices" made by
Morocco and Tunisia.' 64 This offer implicitly recognized the role of
the F.L.N. as the only valid spokesman for the Algerian people and
was, therefore, deemed unacceptable to France.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AND ALGERIA: SELF-DETERMINATION
CONCEDED AS THE MILITARY OPTION FAILED
"France is prisoner of mythes it created itself, the
most dangerous, of which is 'Algeria is France'".
[Charles-Andre Julien, 1956].
"L'A7ge'rie Française is a lamentable stupidity.... It
is simply mad to believe that our forced domination has
any future whatsoever". [General de Gaulle, 1958]
The first few months of 1958 were marked by a temporary drop in
the military activities of L'Arme'e de Libe'ration Nationale. This was
due mainly to the partial success of the electrified barriers)erected
on Algeria's eastern and western frontiers, in reducing the flow of
arms to the nationalist units inside the country.' These units,
nonetheless, now utilized relatively effective arms in comparison to
the hunting rifles which had hitherto formed the bulk of their
weaponry. 2 By the second half of 1958, the nationalist units based in
the neighbouring countries had grown into a well-equipped frontier
army that was to exacerbate the problem for France already presented
by the internal units. 3 This growth in number and in materiel brought
with it changes and modifications in the structure and strategy of the
A. L.N .
The birth of what became known as the "external front" resulted in
a shift of the centre of military tension from the interior to the
Algerian-Tunisian border. 5 This shift enabled the A.L.N. to exert new
pressure on the French army, and generated more tension between
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Tunisia and France which helped to internationalize the Algerian
problem, something that France had always sought to avoid. 6 Such
tension culminated in the French air raid on the Tunisian village of
Sakiet-Sidi-Yousef on 8 February 1958. This incident, as explained
later, gave wider visibility to the Algerian problem in international
circles, and greater awareness of its implications.7
Inside Algeria, the French army launched a gigantic military
drive under the command of General Challe who masterminded the plan
that was aimed at wiping out the strongholds of the A.L.N. in the
areas under its control. "Plan Challe" involved mobilizing as many
troops as possible, establishing military posts throughout the
country, and regrouping or simply eliminating the inhabitants of what
became known as the "forbidden zones" 8 The partial success of this
drive, thanks mainly to the early good results of the electrified
barriers in controlling the movement of the nationalist units, and
preventing supplies of arms through the frontiers encouraged French
officials and generals to become optimistic that a military victory
was now in sight if not just around the corner that would keep Algeria
French.9
The New York Times treated generously French optimism about a
foreseeable military victory. It reflected at some lengthy the French
army's military drive against the A.L.N. units and the joint success
of the electrified barriers and "Plan Challe" in temporarily reducing
the military activities of the A.L.N. inside Algeria. Its reports
served to inflate French military gains, citing under prominent
headlines the Government's exaggerated figures. Its issue of 5 March,
for example, gave credence to official claims that Algerian losses
during the first two months of 1958 stood at 8;500 dead. But its
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reporter, D.W. Lawrence, was quick to put the record straight and
question the Government's over-optimistic reports. In an extremely
lengthydispatch from Algiers which appeared under the double column
headline:
France and Algeria Facing
Long and Costly Struggle
Early optimism in Paris is vanishing -
Neither side can deal knockout -
Rebels Growing Stronger Daily,
Lawrence stated that France faced a long, tough and expensive struggle
in Algeria. There was no short or easy road to victory. Early French
optimism had faded, and the many months-old contention of Robert
Lacoste that the war had entered its "last quarter-hour", had now
become a kind of "cruel joke in Algerian cafs")0
The Algerian revolution, during the period 1958-1959, experienced
some serious difficulties and setbacks which were the direct result of
these two factors: the electrified barriers and "Plan Challe". In
addition to preventing arms getting through, the electrified barriers
also deprived these internal units of vital regular contacts with
their leaders in the neighbouring territories, especially in Tunisia.
"Plan Challe" mobilized almost all the French army, equipped with the
latest in military technology, in an all-out offensive against the
Algerian forces throughout the country. It also deprived the National
Liberation Army of the local population's support upon which every
revolution thrives, by devising new repressive methods like the
"regroupment camps"
The New York Times highlighted the significance, from the French
point of view, of the Challe offensive, arguing that together with the
systematic campaign of psychological warfare or "revolutionary war" as
it was technically known, it represented the last card the French
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generals in Algeria had to play, if they were to avoid another defeat
similar to that in Indochina.' 2 But, as its editorial "Offensive in
Algeria" concluded on 26 July, despite this massive military drive
that was costing France dearly, the French army would be in no
position to crush the Algerian revolution: the guerrilla type of
warfare the F.L.N. was conducting could not be stemmed even by "vastly
superior forces".
The (London) Times also voiced doubts about whether the offensive
would be enough to pacify the country, arguing that "the disquieting
thought that It may be too late cannot be banished"; and that
pacification, considered as a military problem alone, could take a
matter of years.' 3 Yet, its treatment of the French military efforts
was, on the whole, illuminating. Asserting that much efforts "deserve
the highest praise", it hailed Challe's strategy and Lignes Morice for
controlling the movement of the Algerian army units, cutting down the
number of F.L.N. recruits and increasing the difficulties of what it
hastily called "terrorists" in getting supplies of munitions and
medicine. 14
The thesis that a French military solution to the Algerian
problem was out of the question, was accurately and firmly reflected
by The Economist which stated that though the big French offensive had
achieved some temporary success, it would not, in any sense, bring an
end to the Algerian revolution. The weekly, foreseeing the unabated
continuation of the war, was convinced that the F.L.N. was as strong
as ever.'5
The New York Times, now devoting more attention to eyewitness
reporting, cast doubt on the French official cOntention that the
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A.L.N. fighters had been weakened and demoralized as a result of the
Challe offensive and the effects of the barriers. The paper took the
unprecedented step - as far as its coverage was concerned - of sending
a correspondent to the nationalist camps to spend time amidst the
A.L.N. fighters and, thus, assess both their strength and weakness at
first hand. Michael James was the first New York Times reporter to
spend three days in an A.L.N. camp and examine the Algerian forces'
organization, armament, training and morale.
It Is worth noting that the paper's assessment of L'Arme'e de
Libe'ration Nationale had hitherto dwelled largely on the French
Government's own accounts. Michael James' on-the-spot dispatches
about the A.L.N.'s military strength and morale, represented the first
serious challenge to the French official reports and showed that The
New York Times was now taking an intense interest in the fighting
ability of the Algerian forces. His thorough eye-witness accounts
also represented the most comprehensive assessment yet printed by the
paper. Praising his hosts' manners and hospitality, James informed his
readers that those people were "hospitable to a fault". That was
reported to be one of their best-equipped bases and they insisted on
sharing what they had, which was little except for a plentiful supply
of guns and ammunition. 16 In another dispatch, he hailed their
seriousness and impressive determination to win:
"In three days with rebel forces, this reporter has not
heard a single spontaneous laugh. This is no
reflection on morale, which would seem excellent, but
an indication tha 7the men are aware of the bitter job
they have to do".
Accompanied with pictures of the A.L.N. troops, Michael James
depicted their training methods as "rapid and drastic" and their
weapons stock as "a fantastic collection" of gUns of various
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nationalities and calibres. Referring to the guerrilla tactics
followed by the Algerians, he observed that it was difficult to see
just how, if the current situation were maintained, the French could
win. 18
 Openly scorning the French claims of demoralization among the
nationalist forces, he was under no illusion as to the A.L.N.
strength. His stay indicated that if the French still believed in a
sweeping military victory they were in for a big surprise: the A.L.N.
was "obviously a well-organized and disciplined professional military
organization", though there was not much spit and polish.19
The idea that the level of morale and discipline of the
nationalist army was as high as ever was later confirmed by French
prisoners after their release by the Algerians. Fifteen of these
prisoners, as reported by The New York Times on 22 May 1959, portrayed
the nationalist forces as of "high morale" and of "iron discipline";
they were also impressed by the dedication of the A.L.N. commanders to
their cause and their strong determination to continue the struggle
until "independence is won".
By March 1958, The New York Times had become convinced that the
immense French military efforts would not in any way be enough to
bring the war to an end, and that the attempt to cling to the myth of
L'Alge'rie Franaise a little longer was impracticable. Ridiculing the
French argument that the Algerians had been weakened, it vigorously
stated that if the nationalist forces could persist on no greater
scale than their current operations, they were capable of "bleeding
France white". 2° The paper informed its readers that despite the
gigantic French military efforts, the nationalist forces would still
be strong enough to continue the war at a devastating scale. An
editorial for 7 March commented that the French were setting up a bold
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front, but at the very best they were making little or no headway in
Algeria: the Algerian guerrilla units were as strong and numerous as
ever and perhaps better armed. Although they were getting aid over
the Moroccan and especially the Tunisian frontier, that aid did not
make all the difference for "Even with the borders sealed, the
Algerian rebellion would continue".
For Time magazine also the nationalist army was as strong as ever
and still inflicting heavy losses on France despite the Government's
claims that life in Algeria had returned to normalcy. 21 It did not
lack further opportunities to comment upon the evident growth of the
Algerian revolution. Whether by voluntary allegiance or enforced
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support, the Front de Liberation Nationale had grown steadily more
powerful. After four years of continuous warfare, whole regions of the
country had fallen Into nationalist hands and were effectively ruled
by F.L.N. mayors, tax collectors and administrative officers.22
Though the magazine recognized the fact that the numerical and
material disparities between the nationalist forces and the French
army were undoubtedly in France's favour, it emphasized that the
Algerians had "relied heavily and successively on a moral weapon: the
20th century's prevailing anti-colonialism".23
The Economist did not cease pressing the theme that France was
fighting an unwinnable war. Whilst recognizing the differences in
military capability, it openly cast doubt on official French optimism.
about the turn the war was taking; and vigorously flayed those who
still believed that the F.L.N. could be crushed. It drew a parallel
between Algeria and Indochina, where the Vietnamese guerrillas had won
the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu despite France's theoretical
military superiority. 24 It reminded its reades that the Algerian
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revolution depended heavily for its success on the local population's
support. Without such support the nationalist forces could not have
been able to survive the massive Challe offensive and to tie down a
much larger army than the French had ever used in Indochina. 25 The
Economist praised the Algerians' strong determination to win despite
all odds: "This was seen in the original forty years' struggle against
the French occupation, and it has been seen again today". 26
 Such
realism was refreshing in the context of perceptions that were all too
frequently pre-determined by emotional and rhetorical factors.
The London weekly provided an extended look into the rapid and
steady growth of the Algerian revolution, intimating that the movement
which began as a "sabotage by 500 to 1,000 men, armed mostly with
shotguns" had now grown into a large-scale war with alarming results
not only in Algeria but in France itself. 27
 Earlier, in a leading
article filled with scorn for the French official contention that a
military victory over the F.L.N. was in sight, and headlined "Meet the
Rebels", The Economist was in no illusion that the French were no
closer to victory than during any of the previous last quarters of an
hour proclaimed by the French Minister for Algeria, Robert Lacoste.
Indeed, on a long-term view, it concluded, the Algerians had some
undeniable advantages: an almost limitless supply of manpower from
Algeria's predominantly youthful population; ready access to arms
across Algeria's enormous frontiers; the support of the Afro-Asian
bloc, including financial aid from the Arab world; the probability
that world opinion was moving in their favour, especially after the
bombing of Sakjet-Sjdj-Youssef and, not least, the gradual financial
exhaustion of France.28
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France's Growing Burden Because of the War
The situation in Algeria continued to determine and often shake
the Internal affairs of metropolitan France. The war drained French
financial resources and caused political strains and power vacuums
which threatened the future of the country's fundamental institutions.
This threat to metropolitan France was the main reason behind the
change in attitude in French public opinion. Aware of the increasing
burden Algeria was putting on every aspect of their lives, as many as
two-thirds of the French became, by the end of 1959, ready to accept
negotiations with the F.L.N.29
In January 1958, 27 percent of the French population still
believed that Algeria should remain under French control. Those who
did not believe in France's ability to keep Algeria French, saw their
numbers increase from 25 percent in March 1957 to 51 percent in
February 1959.30 More and more people came to regard the war in
Algeria as France's most serious problem: 68 percent by 1959. At the
same time, a majority of the French became convinced that Algeria's
independence was the only long-term solution to the endemic problems
of both Algeria and France.3'
The increase in The New York Times' coverage of the
Franco-Algerian conflict reflected its growing awareness of the
socio-economic and political effects of the war on France. The paper
particularly focused on the financial burden Algeria was imposing on
the metropole and highlighted the serious dilemma of the French
Government. The dire need to keep up the flow of troops into Algeria
to meet the increasing demands of an ever expanding war, had to be
balanced against realization of the fact that this process was
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draining France's treasury at a cost of not less than $3,000,000 a
day.32
Between 1954 and 1958 as many as five French governments
collapsed because of the war in Algeria. This gave rise to continued
political anxiety, uncertainty and lawlessness. As The New York Times
remarked on 17 January 1959, the war widened the political divisions
and hardened the internal ideological conflicts which not only
weakened France's governing power but also threatened to kill its
democratic system altogether. A "News of the Week in Review"
commentary piece, "France: Crisis No.19", exposed at length the
political strains the war was causing. It had irreparably embittered
feelings among the parties: the nationalist right, angered by the
danger of the loss of another part of the old French empire, was
increasingly violent in denouncing as "traitors" the advocates of
negotiating with the F.L.N. Many moderates had been frightened into
silence. The Socialists complained of the economic burdens of the
war. And there was growing disrespect for the Government's authority
in the military and among colon extremists.33
Noting that the war had by 1958 become France's major
preoccupation, The New York Times, again with a title of crisis,
intimated that Algeria was at the heart of most of France's troubles,
including its budgetary, labour, foreign exchange and inflationary
difficulties. The political crisis culminated in the resignation of
the Gaillard Government; this served as a prelude to the downfall of
the Fourth Republic as a whole. The current crisis was evidently
"much more serious than the normal squabbles over the internal affairs
that made one French Government look much like another". 34
 Unless an
answer was found quickly, the war could wreck any effort to bring
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internal peace and economic health to France.35
The Sakiet Raid: More Internationalization of the Al gerian Problem
The Algerian war also seriously affected France's international
image and strained its relations with the external world, notably with
its former North African colonies. The air raid of 8 February 1958,
which the French claimed was aimed at F.L.N. bases on Tunisian soil,
was In fact an Indiscriminate act of "punishment" against what the
French generals viewed as Tunisia's complacency in the war. Using
American-made planes and bombs, the French bombed the Tunisian
frontier village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, causing many casualties among
civilians mostly among women and children.36
The Sakiet raid had direct repercussions on Algeria. It enhanced
the process of internationalizing the conflict, aggravated the strains
within France's internal political structure and precipitated the
crisis that led to the eventual collapse of the Quatrieme
Re'publique. 37 The raid was the work of some desperate officers in
Algeria who had masterminded and implemented it apparently without the
knowledge of the Paris Government. Yet, fearing the revolt of the
Algiers generals, Premier Gaillard later publicly supported this
ill-fated operation. History was, thus, repeating itself. As in
February 1956, France seemed to be governed from Algiers and not
Paris.
The Paris-based columnist C.L. Sulzberger observed that the
generals of Algiers, who on many occasions had shown disagreement with
governmental policies on Algeria, had once again shown signs of
"getting out of hand". 38 This time however with catastrophic results,
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for in the words of Yvs CourrIre, "Algiers became the master of
Paris". 39
 Gaillard was as puzzled and confused as Mollet had been in
February 1956.40
The New York Times was aware of the direct impact of the
Franco-Algerian conflict on the neighbouring states of Tunisia and
Morocco. A "News of the Week in Review" piece "Algeria's Neighbors"
informed its readers that both Tunisia and Morocco were not officially
involved in the Algerian war against the French. But, their moral and
material support for the Algerian National Liberation Front was
causing anxiety and frustration among French officials; this was at
the heart of the serious strains in their relations with France. And
as long as the war continued French relations with Algeria's
neighbours would be under considerable stress. 41 A few weeks later,
the paper specifically quoted Premier Bourguiba declaring his
country's total support for the F.L.N. and its cause short of going to
war: "Our position is like that of the United States with respect to
the Allies in the first years of World War II. We are not one of the
belligerents, but we are not neutral either. We will not help the
French to close the border against our Algerian brothers".42
The Sakiet incident and its aftermath continued to be given
voluminous coverage by The New York Times. It reflected at length on
the damage caused. Three days after the incident, for example, an
illustrated page-three story was published under a prominent four
column headline:
French Air Attack on Tunisian Village Leaves Death and Destruction.
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It graphically showed the extent of the ferocity of the bombing which
had reduced shops and classrooms to rubble. Another story the same
day, emphasizing the heavy losses in human lives, was headlined:
TUNISIANS BURY
68 BOMB VICTIMS
14 Women and 14 Children
Among Them - Damage
to Village Found Heavy.
Well down in the story, a Tunisian observer was quoted as saying that
somehow the French had "hit the targets that are supposed to be spared
in civilized warfare: women, children, schools and Red Cross
vehicles".
At first, in its detailed account of the raid, the paper blamed
this "irreparable tragedy" on a few individuals suffering from the
"trigger-happy madness" that often overtakes men with deadly weapons
in their hands. 43 Soon, however, it voiced doubts about the actual
mastermind of this raid. Reflecting that the bombing was a perfect
example of Clemenceau's dictum that "war is too serious an affair to
be trusted to generals", it underlined that this "brutal reprisal" in
which so many innocent men, women and children had been killed or
wounded had either been an uncontrolled, frigid military decision made
in Algeria, or the "French Government and people have temporarily lost
their judgement and their customary sense of civilization".44
The (London) Times focused more on the international implications
and highlighted its far-reaching significance, branding it as "a
turning point both in North Africa and in France itself", comparable
to the exile of the Sultan of Morocco in 1953 and the highjacking of
the five Algerian leaders in 1956. This incident, like the other two,
seemed to have been an "essentially political coup, which the
government in Paris did not initiate but found itself unable to
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disown". The paper concluded by cautioning the French Government that
the initiative of a local army officer in Algeria was always liable to
throw everything into disorder.45
Time magazine also highlighted the serious threat the army
generals in Algeria posed to metropolitan France. This idea was given
force in pointed articles under such captions as "The Accused". The
magazine went so far as to call the raid a "murderous blow" that had
earned France worldwide obloquy; and frayed the government directive
enabling local air force officers to bomb villages and kill civilians
at will under the guise of "hot pursuit".46
Casting about for a way to repair the damage done to
Franco-Tunisian relations, The New York Times hoped that the French
Government would distance itself from this "tragedy TM , and made the
suggestive proposition that the government made amends in the obvious
ways open to it: It might rebuke the offenders, compensate the wounded
and bereaved and make it clear that France had not bombed
Sakiet-Sidi-Yousef. 47 The paper took up the same theme again a few
weeks later, urging France to apologize to Tunisia and offer to
indemnify the victims and sufferers. It argued that France would seem
a greater nation in the eyes of the world if its leaders expressed
official apologies for the killing of innocent Tunisians and the
destruction of purely civilian property, if they made a generous offer
of indemnity: "Honorable amends do not mean weakness".48
To its evident disappointment, however, that was not the course
France chose to take. As a result, the paper launched fierce attacks
on Premier Gaillard for his "unyielding and uncompromising" 49 support
for "this idiotic act" 5° which resulted in the "killing of many
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innocent Tunisian men, women and children". 51 Noting that the raid
and its aftermath had dealt a terrible blow to peace in the area, it
stated that the French would be incredibly obtuse if they did not
realize that the bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Voussef had been a grievous
error which had made a settlement in North Africa much more
difficult. 52
Time magazine, arguing along a similar line, ridiculed the French
Government's argument that the Sakiet air raid was an act of
"legitimate self-defense" and that in Gaillard's words, "the majority
of the victims were soldiers of the Algerian F.L.N.". By the time
Gaillard had spoken, dozens of foreign diplomats and journalists had
visited Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef and confirmed that a high percentage of
the 209 casualties (79 dead, 130 wounded), inflicted by the French air
force, had been women and children. 53 Earlier, and in response to
French claims of Tunisian exaggeration, its article "With Bombs and
Bullets" had stated that "[n]ewsmen stumbling through the rubble and
counting the bodies laid out in long rows by the village cemetery,
felt that the incident needed no exaggeration".54
The New York Times, having long endorsed a local solution to the
Algerian problem that would save France's pride, voiced its fear that
the raid would damage France's thesis that Algeria was a purely French
affair, by accelerating the process of internationalizing the
conflict. This incident had hit public opinion everywhere in the world
"with stunning impact", and was a major development in contemporary
affairs: the United Nations, N.A.T.O., France, Tunisia, the Arab world
and the United States were crucially involved. 55 Le Monde also
endorsed the view that an almost certain consequence of the raid would
be to enhance the internationalization of the "North African
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question"; something that France had always tried to prevent.56
The New York Times, which never failed to show its guardianship
of Western interests, seized this "ill-conceived" raid 57
 as a serious
blow to the Western world as a whole, the result of which was that
Algeria would be lost to France and North Africa to the West. 58 It
had earlier warned that the West had, as a result, suffered a severe
jolt and by the same token its enemies, and especially the Soviet
Union, had gained a victory. 59 The (London) Times solemnly agreed,
arguing that the danger of the Algerian war spreading through some new
Sakiet incident was as real as the danger of the whole of North Africa
being pushed into a bitter, active hostility towards the West.6°
Carrying this theme farther, The New York Times warned against the
serious repercussions of the raid on N.A.T.O.'s defence and the
security of the Western world, by turning all the North Africans
against France and its allies which, as C.L. Sulzberger cautioned,
would be a devastating blow to the West: N.A.T.O.'s eastern flank was
already split wide open by the Greco-Turkish quarrel over Cyprus.
"Now its southern anchor, from Casablanca to Bizerte, quivers with
threats of new eruptions - which could only add to the torments of
Algeria in between". 6' This comment to a large extent typified the
Western press.
Time magazine, on the other hand, put the Sakiet air raid in a
wider historical perspective and examined the fundamental reasons that
lay behind this short-sighted conduct. Goaded by the frustration of a
war It could never win or end, it observed, France had lost its head
and the result had been "a murderous display of the kind of ruthless
brutality" that the West usually ascribed only to Communism. The raid
and its devastating aftermath, was an inevitable consequence of
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France's obsession with reconquest: "Among the retreating colonial
powers, the French have clung longest to the savage techniques of
imperialism's unhappy past". 62
 Highlighting Tunisia's anger at
Western indecision and lukewarm reaction to the French raid, an
article "Tough Talk" quoted at length Premier Bourguiba urging the
West's two biggest powers to take a firm position against the Sakiet
bombing. "The time has come for the United States and Britain to
choose between colonialism and freedom. Since these two countries
after the Sakiet bombing, requested us not to go before the U.N.
Security Council, it is impossible for them not to take a stand in
favor of the country which has been the victim of aggression and
against the country which has been guilty of aggression".63
The New York Times gave considerable attention to the impact the
Sakiet incident might have had on American-Maghrebian relations,
because of American involvement in the affair. Calling it a "tragedy"
for the United States, 64
 it urged the American Government to condemn
the action, try to keep the friendship of both Tunisia and France and
face the unhappy fact that the bombers the French had used, and even
the bombs, had come from the United States.65
In an official statement issued the day after the raid, the
United States Administration declared that it was "profoundly
disturbed" by the reports it had received of the Sakiet incident.66
It, however, failed to take a clear and firm stance against the raid,
despite the fact that many American officials, as reported in The New
York Times, had privately expressed shock and embarrassment over the
incident especially the use of American equipment to carry out the
raid. 67 Yet, the American Government did what it could to dissuade
Tunisia from taking the affair to the United Nations General Security
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Council. It then, together with Great Britain, offered its "good
offices" in an attempt to bring about a Franco-Tunisian rapprochement
away from the United Nations.68
This rapprochement was not, however, easy to bring about, as the
mission of the good officers, Robert Murphy and Harold Beely, was
limited only to the effect of the problem, Franco-Tunisian tension,
and failed to address the central issue itself, the war in Algeria.
Adopting the same argument, the Tunisian weekly L'Action,
editorialized that the good offices undertaken without a clear
definition of their object, had "little chance of achieving a
result". 69 The Algerian National Liberation Front initially welcomed
the demarche and voiced its hope that they would bring about
negotiations with France and, thus, end the war. 7° It soon, however,
expressed disappointment and vehemently attacked the Murphy-Beely
mission because of its limited objectives.7'
Successive French governments had promised French public opinion
that the war in Algeria was in its "last quarter of an hour". But,
each time such promises proved wrong by the intensification of the
military activities of the A.L.N. France had each time responded by
putting the blame for its lack of success in Algeria on "interfering
foreign hands". At one stage it was President Nasser. At another it
was international Communism. Now, Tunisia was to blame. "Without its
incessant intervention", declared Defence Minister Jacques
Chaban-Delmas, "the operation in Algeria would already have ended".72
In this context, The New York Times printed a letter in which its
American writer drew a parallel between France's help for the
Americans in the late eighteenth century and Tunisia's help for the
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Algerians in 1958: France Itself had set a traditional precedent for
Tunisia by having allowed arms "to be smuggled out of France to us
American rebels" and by having even signed an alliance treaty with the
Americans in 1778. Soldiers and sailors were thereafter sent across
the Atlantic "to encourage the American rebellion in the British
Empire". As an encourager of rebels, therefore, France had a splendid
record, and Tunisia still had a long way to go before it could be
equalled.73
To The New York Times, it was both natural and understandable
that the Tunisians were ready to help their neighbours to achieve
independence, even to the detriment of their relations with France at
a time when they desperately needed French economic assistance.
Indeed, one of the weapons France used against Tunisia was the abrupt
halting of credits. Besides the elements of common origins, religion
and culture which made the two peoples "almost indistinguishable",
North Africa was a single political and economic entity, and progress
in Tunisia and Morocco would not be possible or complete without the
independence of Algeria as well. Because the real support for the
Algerian nationalists and their cause stemmed largely from the
Tunisian masses, "[i]t would be not only illogical but politically
suicidal for ... (Premier Bourguiba to turn his back on the Algerian
National Liberation Front...".74
The (London) Times also propounded the thesis that the source of
the Franco-Tunisian crisis was the Algerian war which coloured and
dominated almost everything in Tunisia. It was difficult to see how
France's relations with the Tunisians, upon which depended to a great
extent the attitude of France's allies towards Tunisia, could become
normal and the French reap the rich dividend that was awaiting it
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there, so long as the Algerian question remained unsettled. The paper
attributed Tunisia's support for the Algerians mainly to a "natural
sympathy" towards a neighbouring nation; but also asserted that, by
helping the F.L.N., Tunisia was hoping to be able to "canalize and
control the future shape of Algerian nationalism" and, thus, dissuade
it from turning either to Cairo or to Moscow.75
Premier Bourguiba repeatedly warned the Western powers that an
almost Inevitable consequence of the continuation of the war in
Algeria and the Algerians' "despair of the West", would be a turn
towards the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance. If
that happened, all North Africa would follow: Tunisia was for Algerian
independence because "Tunisia's own independence is in the balance".76
Because of this, the Tunisians enthusiastically supported the Algerian
revolution and put increasing pressure on their government to follow
suit. The editorial stance taken by L'Action towards the Algerian
liberation movement typified Tunisian public opinion:
"The Algerian Army is already finding and will continue
to find refuge and help on our soil. If need be,
Tunisian volunteers will go to fight for liberty beside
their Algerian comrades. We will aid the Algerians
morally and materially with all the means at our
disposal. We are linked by a common destiny and if the
French seek to reconquer Tunisia - the better to crush
the Alger9n people - they will only confirm this
destiny".
Under mounting Tunisian pressure, following the Sakiet raid,
France agreed to withdraw its troops from Tunisia, with the exception
of the Bezerte base which it was granted permission to keep. The
agreement provoked a heated debate in French political circles, where
most deputies in the National Assembly voiced their disapproval of the
removal of French troops from Tunisia. Another political crisis
developed precipitating the downfall of the Gaillard Government.
124
France came once again to face and agonising period of power vacuum
which was later exploited by the pied noir extremists who, with the
collaboration of the army generals of Algiers, orchestrated the
military coup of 13 May 1958 to counter what they saw as the growing
threats to L'Alge'rie Française.78
The 13 May Coup and the Aggravation of France's Political Crisis
The co7on activists seized on the execution of three French
prisoners by the F.L.N., in retaliation for the execution of three
Algerian prisoners by the French, as a pretext to show their anger at
the Paris Government. 79 The F.L.N. decision to execute the prisoners
was in accordance with its earlier warning to the French authorities
against further executions of Algerian detainees: "The blade of the
guillotine must stop. Let French opinion be warned. Beginning
tomorrow each Algerian patriot to mount the scaffold signifies one
French prisoner before the firing squad".8°
The extremist pieds noirs launched their demonstration in Algiers
on 13 May; this later developed into a military insurrection against
the French Government. The insurrection began with the occupation of
the Gouverneinent Ge'nra7 building and the formation of what became
known as "Committees of Public Safety" throughout Algeria, and ended
with the collapse of the Fourth Republic. 8' Once again, as on 6
February 1956, activist influence in Algeria prevailed over
metropolitan authority which eventually gave way to mob rule. France
came, therefore, to resign itself to the harsh reality of being at the
mercy of the Algiers generals. Extreme rightist activists played on
t	 otois of ordary pieds noirs and instigated a mood of
insurrection which was initially born out of ahysterical fear of
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France's possible abandonment of "French Algeria". 82 The army,
believing that the advent of a military regime would consolidate its
position in Algeria, lent its full support. 83 Concessions to the
Algerians, which might lead to self-rule or autonomy, were firmly
ruled out, and the long-cherished illusory policy of "integration" -
championed by the former Governor General Jacques Soustelle - was
given a new lease of life.
With the memory of Its defeat In Indochina - which it blamed on
the government's "weakness and indecision" - still fresh, the army
seized the opportunity offered to it in Algeria to take revenge
against the "treason" of the politicians. 85 It therefore immediately
sided with the co7on activists, forming a united front against Paris.
It was this front which succeeded in bringing down the Fourth Republic
and in bringing General de Gaulle back to power.86
France's political crisis got abundant front-page and editorial
coverage in The New York Times, which highlighted the seriousness of
the political difficulties facing the Fourth Republic and their
implications for the future of France. In an editorial "CRISIS" on 17
May 1958, the paper noted that the phrase "political crisis in France"
had almost lost its meaning. But this time it seemed to be the real
thing: "a decisive turning point in the history of the Fourth
Republic". The current situation in France was portrayed as "extremely
serious" and of "revolutionary" consequences which were symptomatic of
a division between Frenchmen that still had not been healed. Fears
were now growing that the military insurrection in Algeria might
spread both to metropolitan France and to the other French colonies.
Most of France's military strength was concentrated in Algeria and
under the direct control of the insurgent generals; and even the
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loyalty of the army contingents still at home had not been put to the
test.87
The same thesis was reflected, although less extensively or
prominently, in other news media. Time magazine observed that "[t]he
sands of time for the Fourth Republic's parliamentary regime seemed to
be running out". 88 The (London) Times solemnly agreed and complained
that the big question, which had always puzzled politicians and
commentators alike, remained unanswered: was Algiers to be ruled from
Paris or was Paris to be blackmailed from Algiers? 89 The Economist
addressed Itself to the main reason that lay behind the insurrection
and concluded that it was the army's frustration and obsession with
the idea of a military victory in Algeria: the Fourth Republic was a
casualty of the Algerian war. 9° Le Monde attacked what it branded as
the "madness of those ultras who believe that they could be able to
defy France and with it the world without irreparably losing all that
they pretend saving". 9' Tunis's Petit-Matin, while deploring the coup,
warned that the rowdy characters who had perpetuated the madness of 13
May were capable of much worse in future. Recent events had shown the
world the true face of French colonialism.92
The New York Times focused on what it saw as an inevitable
consequence of the army insurrection: de Gaulle's bid for power. A
Sulzberger column from Paris with the headline:
No Fishing Rods Upon the Rubicon: This Time
the Gaullist Power Bid in France Is For Real,
highlighted the General's popularity among the insurgents, who
regarded im as the only nan capable of solving the French crisis. It
had long been evident that the Algerian storm would some day sweep
northward. It was also clear that when it blew across France, its
political epicentre would focus on General de Gaulle. This had
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happened; the chances were now increasing that he might soon be
brought back to power and again become responsible for France's
fate.93
As May wore on, The New York Times emphasized the need, not only
for a more efficient political framework, but also for a stronger
politician to make the system work. Its readers were told that France
was on the verge of civil war and that the French people would have to
make their choice between General de Gaulle and "inviting chaos".94
The remedy to the country's crisis had to be both a structural and
attitudinal revolution with a stronger man to implement new policies.
An editorial full of support for de Gaulle's advent to power, intoned
that the French malaise went much deeper than dissatisfaction with
form and structure. The corrosion of French politics at home had been
coupled with disastrous colonial policies and seemingly endless
bloodletting in North Africa to create demand for a new approach to
the country's problems and a new man to cope with them.95
The paper stressed the theme that General de Gaulle was the only
man available to France who could put the country on its feet again.
But, it emphasized the difficult task awaiting him and the "fearful
responsibility" he would have to carry if he were to succeed. This
Involved the necessity of making a solid settlement to the Algerian
problem, the restoration of civilian authority over the army, the
reconstruction of French unity and discipline and the establishment of
a strong constitutional system acceptable to most Frenchmen. 96 This
view was further expounded in the next day's editorial which closed on
the note that de Gaulle would have to accomplish all those tasks,
otherwise the "consequences could only be disastrous to France, to
Algeria and to the entire N.A.T.O. structure". The (London) Times,
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arguing along a similar line, warned against exaggerating his
prestige: while most of the army, like the co7ons, looked on him as
the only solution to the current stalemate they had made the mistake
of overrating his popularity in France. 97
 It agreed however that he
would be responsible for the fate of the new republic whose success or
failure would depend on his political skill and judgement.98
The New York Times predicted that the most fearful danger de
Gaulle would have to face was the growing strength of the very forces
that had helped him to power. A Sulzberger column, questioning
Will There Be Shooting or Merely Shouting
At the Wake of France's Fourth Republic?
warned that the influence of the Rightist forces revolting in his name
would Increase and would eventually make it hard for the General to
curtail the pressure of the army and the die-hard colons.99
Highlighting his dilemma, the paper observed editorailly that the task
was a supremely difficult one for, although he had come to power
through the process instigated by colon-army insurrection, his primary
objective would have to be to curb those same forces and bring them
firmly back under the control of Paris.'00
Similarly, The (London) Times cautioned that "the wild men of
Algiers" were getting the upper hand again. It argued that most of
those who had been behind the May military coup, showed their support
for de Gaulle only out of convenience and not because of their
Gaullist" sympathies: "If he put an end to the revolt in Algeria, and
to the Fourth Republic, they would be grateful to him. If he did not,
they would have to try other means". 101
 In its editorial "THE
RIVALS", a few weeks later, it intimated that the extremist pieds
noirs, led by men like Soustelle and General Massu, had their "own
deep convictions" other than those liberties which July 14 was
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supposed to symbolize; they operated under the guise of the so-called
"Committees of Public Safety".102
The Economist and Time magazine also stressed the theme of the
danger posed by the army and colon extremists. In a leading article
"The Challenge from Algiers", The Economist made the suggestive
proposition that exemplary measures might help to restore some
discipline in the army. But that could be too dangerous for a badly
weakened country for those measures could not be wholly safe as long
as the Algerian war continued to keep the army "too big for its
boots". 103
 However, this was a risk worth taking because the cost of
hesitation and weakness would be incalculable; leniency would
encourage more insubordination. More concessions to the pieds flairs
would substantiate their belief that they had the right and the power
of veto on the composition and policy of the government. The
authority of the government would be further undermined: "The seeds of
rebellion can cross the Mediterranean". Time warned against those "die
hards" who for the "weeks, perhaps months to come... would be restive
and potentially dangerous".'04
The story of de Gaulle's return to power got abundant coverage
under big headlines in The New York Times which reflected at some
length the tense mood in both Algeria and France and the peculiar
circumstances under which he was given the Premiership. The paper
gave his election at the General Assembly a massive banner headline
over all the eight columns of Page One accompanied with his picture:
DE GAULLE NAMED PREMIER in 329-224 VOTE
ASKS 6-MONTH DECREE RULE, LEFTISTS RIOT;
ALGIERS IS DISPLEASED BY CABINET CHOICES.'05
The same day it editorialized on the legal impl ications of the
General's advent to power, arguing that this rpresented the "climax"
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of France's grave crisis, it was not endorsed by all Frenchmen, but
was, in fact, Imposed on the nation and a reluctant Parliament by a
military insurrection, centered in Algiers but reaching into France
itself. This insurrection, which General de Gaulle refrained from
repudiating, made him - under the circumstances created by France's
governmental weakness - the only politician in the land who could save
the country from the threat of civil war.'° 6 Le Monde's publisher and
editor-in-chief similarly reflected the view held by many Frenchmen
when he wrote that "...whatever reservations one could have about the
present, and still more for the future, General de Gaulle would appear
the lesser evil, the least poor risk".'07
The (London) Times stressed the "ominous" fact that the General's
standard and prestige suddenly rose as a direct response to "one
extreme and unrepresentative section of French opinion" - the military
and colon insurgents.' 08 Accepting the argument that he was probably
the only man capable of putting an end to the country's crisis and
perhaps close the breach between the insurgents and metropolitan
France, it cautioned that as events mounted up, he would appear to
come on the shoulders of men who had risen against the legal
authority.' 09 Putting the matter in a wider perspective, on the other
hand, Rome's Ii Tempo noted that France was on the verge of civil war,
as it found itself in the midst of a serious institutional crisis
brought on by exhaustion through its efforts to maintain its imperial
pretensions contrary to the realities of the time.11°
De Gaulle's Return to Power: What Plans Did He Have For Aiqeria?
After de Gaulle returned to power and the Fifth Republic got
under way, the Algerian question remained to bedetermined. Most
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observers were surprised to see, at least in the first few months,
that he was following the same footsteps and implementing the same
policies as his predecessors. His policy on Algeria was characterized
both by ambiguity and by obsession with the myth of L'Alge'rie
Française. 1'1
 These characteristics were reflected in his statements
and declarations: for example, he concluded his speech in Mostaganem
in western Algeria in June 1958 with the phrase "vive L'Alge'rie
Française". 112 France's persistent ambiguity on the future of Algeria
was also reflected in his stance and attitude: whilst he carefully
avoided Using the operative word "integration", he made it clear that
his intentions were to keep Algeria under French control. And whilst
he was lecturing the world about the need for peace in Algeria, he
intensified the French military campaign against the nationalist
forces. 113
For France, and General de Gaulle was no exception, Algeria was
of vital importance for both "emotional" and "geopolitical" reasons.
Keeping Algeria French was regarded as paramount to safeguarding the
country's honour and the army's pride after the disintegration of the
empire and its grandeur. Moreover, it was the military coup in
Algeria that had given birth to the Fifth Republic after causing the
downfall of the Fourth. Economically, the newly discovered oil riches
in the Algerian Sahara promised to solve France's economic problems.
Meanwhile, it was in Algeria that France, of all the N.A.T.O.
countries, was fighting a "hot war" because of which, as C.L.
Sulzberger remarked, "French nationalism is more aroused than the
nationalism of any ally".4
De Gaulle and his new republic also failed to address themselves
to the crucial question of how Algeria was to be governed and, apart
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from the long-cherished myth of "French Algeria", what its
relationship with France would be. The New York Times reflected this
ambiguity which persisted at a time when both sides in Algeria,
nationalists and army-colons, were still adamant in their attitudes:
"The fighters of the National Liberation Front say that Algeria shall
be Independent and they say it rifle in hand. The extremist group of
European settlers, or colons, as they were called, want an Algeria
consisting of a group of departments governed as an integral part of
France" 115
Jacques Soustelle, whose illusory plans were rejuvenated under
the new republic, again called for the integration of Algeria into
France and insisted on one united country "from Dunkirk to
Tamanrassat". De Gaulle more or less shared the same views. Though
he deliberately avoided using the critical word "integration" he
relaunched the same Soustelle integrationist doctrine, albeit Under a
new guise, pledging implementation of a policy that would produce "ten
million Frenchmen" in Algeria with "the same rights and duties".'16
Addressing an Algerian crowd during his visit to Mostaganem ifl July
1958, he declared: "All men who live here must be equal. We have
begun to make them equal and I give you my word that they will be".117
Whilst during his African tour in the summer of 1958, he
initiated a plan whereby France's African Colonies south of the Sahara
would be able to choose their own destiny through balloting, General
de Gaulle Ignored the choice of the Algerian people whose situation
was "left.., unclear and apparently unchanged",'18 The New York Times
informed its readers that while "black Africa" was offered a free
choice to determine its future along the lines of a federal union with
France or total independence, "no specific political future was held
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out to Algeria" which was now "more isolated as a political problem
than ever". Located between two independent states and former French
protectorates, Tunisia and Morocco, and now bounded on its extreme
southern borders by countries that could be independent if they wanted
to, Algeria became the last major overseas area where France still
resisted nationalist demands. Whilst the peoples of other colonies
knew that a "no" vote would bring them independence, the Algerians
knew only that a "yes" vote would mean, in de Gaulle's words, that
they "want to behave like full-pledged Frenchmanll.:u9 The fact that
they were left in the dark on what a "no" vote would mean to their
future, confirmed the thesis that the old French undemocratic
practices in Algeria were still as existent as ever, despite the
shining rhetoric which coloured the first few months of the Fifth
Republic.
In this context, The Economist wondered whether France, by
turning to de Gaulle had willfully voted for war in Algeria, "for
continued repression, for rejecting the Moslem community's aspirations
to a proper part in directing its own affairs"; and whether France had
truly voted for this in Algeria, while allowing the rest of French
Africa, to choose its own destiny.' 20 The (London) Times shared the
same concern and highlighted the ambiguity of de Gaulle's draft
constitution and the obscurity of his plan for the overseas colonies:
even more obscure were the intentions for Algeria, which would vote in
the referendum as a department of France. But as to whether it would
subsequently be able to opt, like other overseas territories, for a
change in status was not said.' 2 ' As many observers pointed out, de
Gaulle was offering independence to people who had never expressed
genuine desire for it, whilst withholding this offer from those who
had. Ferhat Abbas had this in mind when he declared that de Gaulle
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had already promised Independence to the Africans, asking: "For what
reason should the Algerian population be treated worse? We are not the
enemies of France. We wish, on the contrary, to cooperate with the
French on the basis of new relations when we have obtained
independence" 122
During the referendum, French voters approved de Gaulle's
constitution which left Algeria's future status unclear and totally
undefined.' 23
 In Algeria, like all previous French elections there,
dubious methods were widely utilized to influence the current voting
process. 12
	"Psychological action", using the latest in propaganda
technique - films, radio broadcasts and leaflets, to name but few, was
stepped up by the French army in order to influence the outcome of the
Algerian vote.' 25
 Only the partisans of a "yes" vote, for example,
had access to Algerian Radio during their electoral campaign. Those
who advocated a "no" vote, like the Association of the Ulemas, were
refused permission to use it. As Lorna Hahn had observed the French,
with their army and police units numbering three-quarters-of-a-million
men, employed every trick to influence the vote in the referendum,
making the election as unrepresentative and undemocratic as any
election previously held in Algeria. The right to freedom of
expression was further violated when those metropolitan publications,
which were critical of the army's voting tricks, were seized in
Algiers.' 26
 Jacques Soustelle erroneously accused their
correspondents of what he called "lies, violence, blackmail and
terror" •127
The Algerian National Liberation Front voiced unequivocal
°PPOSition to the constitutional referendum because it provided no
hope for an independent Algeria, for French elections in Algeria had
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never been fair or free. "To boycott the referendum, is to say 'yes'
to the Algerian state", the F.L.N. told the Algerians. "General de
Gaulle and the 'Committees of Public Safety' have decided to make the
Algerians vote within the framework of French Constitution", wrote the
official nationalist organ, El Moudjahid. "The F.L.N. has already
denounced this operation, stating that the [colon] factions of Algiers
expected to use three million Algerian votes to assure their triumph
in France".' 28 The nationalists denounced the referendum as a new act
of aggression against the Algerian people and responded by stepping up
their military activities in Algeria and also by bringing the war to
metropolitan France itself, in order to draw the attention of French
public opinion to their struggle for national independence. This
sparked a wave of violence which shook France badly and brought the
war, with all its trauma, to the Frenchman's own backyard.
Emphasizing what it called the "terrible effectiveness and...
remarkable display of coordination" with which the Algerians responded
in France, The New York Times wondered whether the F.L.N. and the
cause of the Algerian independence would gain or lose by such action.
It concluded that in front of a consistent French refusal to accept
the Algerians' right to independence through peaceful means, the
nationalists were left with no other option but to use violence. This
perhaps justified the commonly held view that men in the thick of a
revolution may well be forgiven if they sacrifice fundamental
principles to the needs of some difficult time:
"From the beginning, nearly four years ago, when the
insurrection started in Algeria, the F.L.N. has
dancSed cospete independence. The successive French
Governments, the army and the French or European
residents in Algeria will not willingly grant
independence or abandon Algeria. This is the impasse.
The F.L.N. therefore, can only reach its goal by a
victory of conquest. Being a revolutionary movement,
it uses the classic tacs of civil strife, sabotage
and guerrilla warfare".
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The paper quoted prominent F.L.N. leaders threatening to intensify
their military efforts if the conflict with France remained
unresolved; and cited an El Moudjahid editorial warning that unless
the Algerian people was permitted to take the destiny of the country
into its own hands, the Algerian war would "assume gigantic
proportions".130
The (London) Times also reflected nationalist opposition to de
Gaulle's constitutional referendum, and the subsequent eruption of
violence in metropolitan France itself, branding it as "a deliberately
dramatic gesture" because of which "enough spectacular damage" had
been done and communal suspicions and antagonisms would increase.
Charging that the outbreak of this wave of urban violence in France
was a result of the F.L.N.'s loss of influence after General de
Gaulle's return to power, it asserted that this had forced the F.L.N.
to step up its efforts to make up for the lost ground, and to remind
the French and the Algerians that the "rebellion" and its leadership
were still intact.'3'
In addition to its decision to bring the war to French soil, the
F.L.N. decided to create the Gouvernement Provisoire de La Re'publique
Alge'rienne (G.P.R.A.) on 19 September 1958 which was the first
Algerian nationalist government since occupation in 1830.132 The date
was intended to coincide with the opening of the United Nations
General Assembly debate and also with the constitutional referendum.
The creation of the G.P.R.A. was aimed at "legalizing" the status of
the Front de Libration Nationale. "We must have an international
personality", said a report of an F.L.N. Committee. "After this work
in the dark, we need to go out to the daylight".'33 The G.P.R.A. was
a significant step towards gaining more interntiona1 recognition of
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the Algerians' right to independence. Leaders of the Algerian
revolution regarded its inauguration both as a "continuity" and as a
"resurrection" of the pre-colonial state,the Daw7a.' 34 The
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was proclaimed on 19
September 1958. Its Premier declared that "[ t ] h is proclamation was
made in the name of one people that has been struggling for four years
for independence; it restores the Algerian State, which the
vicissitudes of military conquest of 1830 had brutally and unjustly
suppressed from the political map of North Africa"..'35
The inauguration of the Provisional Government marked the
beginning of a new phase in the Algerian revolution. After having
consolidated its position militarily, the F.L.N. turned to more
political and diplomatic action, using the G.P.R.A. as a means of
diplomatic pressure and as a tool for possible negotiation with
France. Ferhat Abbas had been deliberately chosen to preside over the
G.P.R.A. because of his reputation in French political circles for his
moderate stance and political experience. To the Algerians, these
criteria were enough to reassure both French and world opinion of
their good intentions.'36
No sooner had the G.P.R.A. been inaugurated than it launched an
intensive diplomatic campaign aimed at putting General de Gaulle on
the defensive. It declared its readiness to negotiate with the
representatives of the French Government at any time, freed some
French prisoners and temporarily stopped its military activities in
France. It was in this context that de Gaulle recognized the
"courage" of the Algerian fighters and offered his "peace of the
brave" initiative, calling upon them to lay down their arms and send
representatives to Paris to meet with French representatives. But
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there appeared no common ground for talks. Whilst de Gaulle wanted
ceasefire to be followed by legislative elections then by
negotiations, the F.L.N. insisted on negotiations first, then
ceasefire and then elections. The Algerian leaders reaffirmed their
position that any settlement which stopped short of independence was
out of the question and reiterated their determination to continue the
struggle which, they believed, had by then reached a point of no
return 137
The New York Times was openly hostile to the formation of the
G.P.R.A., asserting that this move would put "a great future handicap"
on General de Gaulle and would hinder progress towards a peaceful
settlement to the Algerian problem. Its editorial for 20 September,
"The Algerian 'Government'", argued that the F.L.N. had chosen its
moment "to strike very shrewdly - perhaps too shrewdly". "The setting
up of the Provisional Government of the Algerian F.L.N. has taken a
great gamble, and gamblers more often lose than win", it intoned.
Dismissing what it called "the two extremes of independence and
integration" as impractical solutions, it asserted that the ideas of
autonomy, partial independence or a Commonwealth status had been
possible future solutions.138
The paper strongly criticized the F.L.N. for boycotting the
November elections, charging that because of this stay-away policy the
elections would not bring about "a badly needed settlement to France's
Number One problem": the fact that only the advocates of "integration"
stood as candidates in the coming elections dealt a terrible blow to
de Gaulle's "ardent efforts" to find a solution to the conflict, it
concluded by asserting that the fault was much more with the Algerian
nationalists than with de Gaulle and his government: "The F.L.N. had a
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splendid OPPortunity to win ground for themselves and put an end to
the cruel COflfl j Ct that has now lasted four years. They threw this
chance away".'39
The (London) Times also reproached the F.L.N. for boycotting the
elections and, thus, causing a major setback to de Gaulle's plan. In
an editorial, "Disappointment from Algeria", it strongly criticized
the "F.L.N.'s cold shoulder" towards the new proposals and praised
General de Gaulle's "brave gesture" in calling for elections whilst
the country was still ravaged by war: the F.L.N. boycott would mean
the election of forty-six Algerian Deputies whose views would not be
noticeably different from the twenty-one colon Deputies. This
"prefabricated band of colon 'ultras'" would be the natural ally of
the extreme right in the French Assembly, and would make it harder for
General de Gaulle to carry out his plan for Algeria and might even
influence the course of French politics as a whole.' 4° The Economist,
on the other hand, showed no unfriendly criticism of the F.L.N.
decision to boycott the election, but its leading article "A Muffed
Chance", in its 1 November issue, underlined the thesis that the
representatives likely to be produced from those elections could not
have the same authority and respect as those delegated by an election
in which the F.L.N. had joined.
Like his predecessors, General de Gaulle sought to stem the
Algerian revolution through socio-economic and political reforms in
conjunction with the ever-increasing French military effort. He
introduced, during his visit to eastern Algeria in October 1958, a
plan which later came to be known as the "Constantine Plan", pledging
to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Algerian population.
It promised to bring salaries and wages in Algeria to similar level as
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those in metropolitan France, to distribute 617,500 acres to Algerian
peasants, to create chemical and metalurgical complexes in Algeria, to
provide one million new houses, to create 400,000 new jobs and
educational provisions for two-thirds of Algerian children of school
age. 141 The G.P.R.A. vehemently criticized the plan as another
propaganda lure for world consumption. The socio-economic "reforms"
put forward by General de Gaulle were devised mainly to protect the
interests of the pied noir community and would hardly benefit the
Algerian majority.'42
Whilst de Gaulle told the world about his soclo-economic
proposals, he strongly endorsed the intensification of French gigantic
military campaign against the nationalist forces, in the hope of
achieving a military solution to the conflict. The generals of
Algiers believed that having a general at the top of the government
would enable them to achieve victory over the F.L.N. -A.L.N. Under the
command of General Challe the army, therefore, launched its biggest
offensive ever, putting the nationalist units throughout the country
under constant pressure.' 43 Those units were also cut off from their
'poVtica ea.Sership outside Algeria and deprived 0f reinforcements of
arms and ammunition.'44
In addition, electrified barriers along the frontiers were made
more effective. "Regroupment camps" were set up in an attempt to
isolate the nationalist forces from the local population. The
"quadril7age" technique, which meant the division of Algeria into four
major military zones, was replaced by 't La mobilite' offensive", which
meant the use of mobile units that were more adapted to the conditions
of guerrilla warfare throughout Algeria. The outcome of this
offensive was devastating for the local population, as villages were
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indiscriminately bombarded and, at times, strafed to the ground.
F.L.N. losses were also high; the offensive succeeded in temporarily
reducing the effectiveness of the nationalist forces inside the
country. 145
Meanwhile, "counter-revolutionary warfare" or "psychological
action" continued unabated under de Gaulle, mainly because of the
growing strength of the army after the May insurrection.' 46
 This
included arbitrary bombing of villages, 147
 collective massacres of
civilians, 148 brain-washing of suspects using the latest in the "art"
of interrogation, 149
 and the forced displacement and regroupment of up
to two million people in camps under harsh conditions.' 5° The
ferocity of these methods had been summed up by the distinguished
French soldier, Jean Muller, who had written shortly before he was
killed in action in 1958:
"We are far from the pacification for which we had been
called. We are dispirited to see to what point human
nature could decline, and to see the French egoying
processes which stemmed from Nazi barbarism".
These repressive methods, which the French army used at will against
the civilian population, confirmed the Algerian people's total support
for the F.L.N., without which the revolution would have been stamped
out in its first few months. They also further demonstrated the
frustration of the colonial regime and the isolation and unpopularity
of the army of occupation.'52
With the publication of Henri Alleg's La Question in 1958,
torture became a major issue in the Franco-Algerian conflict. Henri
Alleg, the editor of A7ger Re'publicain, was arrested and tortured by
the paratroopers. In La Question, basically a manuscript smuggled out
of prison, he described his experiences which made the book a best
seller in France before it was banned, making it the first book to be
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banned in France for political reasons since the eighteenth century.
When L'Express simply mentioned the book it was immediately seized in
Algeria and when, the following week, it printed an article on La
Question by Jean-Paul Sartre, it was again seized in both Algeria and
France. Likewise, France-Observateur was seized for publishing
extracts from the book. The (London) Observer and the Manchester
Guardian were the only publications that were able to publish extracts
from the book and remain on sale, but their French audience was very
limited.153
,
Temoignage Chretien, in particular, followed the story with
interest; in 1959 it published two important articles on the practice
of torture by the paratroopers in Algeria. The first article, which
appeared on 10 April, made public a report sent by thirty-five
priests, serving as reserve officers in Algeria, to their bishops in
France telling them about methods being used by the army "which our
consciences condemn - arbitrary arrests, torture, summary executions,
and the killing of wounded on the battlefield". The second article,
on 29 December, informed the French people about the special training
camp, Joan of Arc camp, which was used to teach officers in the French
army the different methods of torture; water torture and electric
shock were said to be recommended by their instructors.'54
Algeria's Right to Self-Determination Recognized
The all-out French army offensive to some extent succeeded in
reducing the military activities of the F.L.N. inside Algeria.155
But, the F.L.N. managed to find ways to compensate for those losses,
mainly by intensifying its external military and diplomatic efforts.
In military terms, the Algerian forces based ir neighbouring Tunisia
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and Morocco, launched a big offensive across the eastern and western
frontiers and through the electrified barriers. In diplomatic terms,
the F.L.N. succeeded in gaining more publicity and sympathy for the
Algerian cause throughout the world, as more and more countries
declared their recognition of the G.P.R.A. and their open support for
the Algerians' right to independence.156
It was in this context that de Gaulle recognized Algeria's right
to self-determination, offering the Algerian people a choice between
"La Session", "La Francisation" or "L'Association".' 57 As for the
first option, "Secession", which was simply another French euphemism
for independence, he warned of what he regarded as its potential
frightful consequences which might lead to political chaos and an
eventual communist takeover. The second, "Frenchification", meant the
integration of Algeria into a France stretching "from Dunkirk to
Tamanrassat". The third, "Association", was much preferred by General
de Gaulle and meant Algeria's autonomy within the French union, with
France to be in control of defence, economic planning and development,
and foreign relations. 158
 Nonetheless, and contrary to the true
spirit of the self-determination principle, he insisted that the
Algerian choice would have to be ratified by metropolitan French. In
addition to the fact that France would have the power of veto over the
Algerians' vote, their independent decision would be possible only
with the passage of four years after "military pacification" was
achieved.
The New York Times was full of praise for General de Gaulle's
declaration on Algeria, giving it full play and prominent front-page
coverage, which was lengthy but generally lacking in critical
penetration. Its editorialists also wrote favourably of it, arguing
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that he had gone further than any French Government leader ever had,
and he had gone "in the right direction"•159 The next day's issue
also presented a strong defence of General de Gaulle, asserting that
no one but he could have "conceived a Plan of this boldness": unlike
other programmes, this "spelled out a democratic way by which
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Algerians might cease to be French".
	 Discussing the possible
outcome of the proposed referendum, it predicted that since the choice
would be done through balloting involving ten million Algerians and
one million pieds noirs, Frenchification would not win.161
The (London) Times also had only praise for de Gaulle's plan as
when on 17 September, under the caption "COURAGE AND LOGIC", it called
it a "revolutionary step" whereby Algeria was for the first time
explicitly offered self-determination on the same terms that it had
already been offered other French colonies. The paper's own stance
was unambiguous: although in theory the Algerians were offered three
choices which ranged from integration to autonomy within the French
Union to total independence, it was desirable that the Algerians, by
their "good sense", would reject the two extreme choices and choose
Instead "a path of moderation and prosperity": association with
France. It concluded by suggesting that it was not too late for a
political solution to the Algerian problem.
The Economist and Time magazine echoed similar views. The
Economist expressed its belief that what made General de Gaulle's plan
a "liberal" one, was the fact that the Algerians were offered a chance
to choose their own future: "What could be more liberal than to
entrust the people of Algeria themselves with the destiny of their
country?" Because they were promised a free choice in deciding "their
own fate through universal suffrage", the longcherished myth that
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Algeria was bound to remain for ever an integral part of France had
been destroyed.' 62 Time was quick to paint de Gaulle's words "I deem
it necessary that recourse to self-determination be here and now
proclaimed" as a "watershed in French history". It hailed him for
coming out with such a programme: no other French leader had ever
dared to offer the 9,000,000 Algerians what he was holding for them -
"a free choice to decide their own future political status, even to
secede peacefully from France if that was what they wanted".'63
The fact that General de Gaulle conceded Algeria's right to
self-determination and vaguely accepted the possibility of an
independent Algeria, completely destroyed the old myth of Alge'rie
Française. 164 Yet, despite its liberal connotations, the offer was
made subject to some conditions deemed unacceptable to the leaders of
the Algerian revolution. As already explained, de Gaulle made a
possible Algerian vote subject to French ratification giving France,
therefore, the power of veto over the Algerians' choice. In case of a
vote for independence, he intended to "reestablish and regroup" the
partisans of "French Algeria" by partitioning the country - a
possibility which the Algerians totally rejected. In addition,
Algeria would choose its destiny only after four years of "military
pacification". De Gaulle was, in short, advocating peace through
war.'65
The G.P.R.A. welcomed de Gaulle's proposals on Algeria's right to
self-determination, but complained that they were not democratic
enough to make a settlement possible, and strongly rejected the
"conditions" attached to them: a free and democratic choice could not
take place whilst "an occupation army of more than half a million
soldiers and almost the same number of gendarmes, policemen and
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militiamen" were still present in the country, and whilst the same
administrative apparatus, which had for long been condemned for its
"electoral fraud", was still in existence.' 66 On the other hand, it
declared Its readiness to meet with representatives of the French
Government to discuss the "conditions" and "guarantees" of
self-determination and the way to apply it. It also named the five
detained leaders - Ben Bella, Bitat, Alt Ahmed, Boudiaf and Khider -
as its representatives in any possible pourparlers.167
The New York Times referred, in passing, to the hard conditions
de Gaulle had attached to his plan for Algeria, which were, from the
Algerians' standpoint, not only contradictory with the principle of
self-determination but a negation of it altogether. The hardest
condition was the intended military pacification of the country which
the French had always tried in vain to achieve: "If they are to do so
now they will need some forbearance on the part of the rebels or they
must make still greater military efforts".'68
The paper, on the other hand, criticized the G.P.R.A.'s response
to de Gaulle's offer on the ground that the Algerians had, after all,
been offered self-determination and that "... basically, was what they
had fought for".' 7° In another lengthy but shallow comment, "Rebel
Reply", its readers were told that the Algerians' reply was
"disappointing". The G.P.R.A. was particularly reproached for naming
as negotiators with the French Government, the five leaders who had
long been in French prisons and who could have had no recent contact
with the Algerian forces.' 7' Urging the Algerians to "think again"
and to be "more accommodating" to what it labelled de Gaulle's
"statesmanlike proposal", the paper asserted that the Algerian leaders
ought to recognize that they had a golden opportunity to achieve most
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of their aims and to end the war which the world, including the
Algerian people, wanted over.172
The paper's general tone, however, was somewhat cordial with the
stress on the need for a quick settlement to the conflict, it was for
a time not without sympathy for the Algerians' stance, emphasizing
their willingness to enter into pourparlers with the French Government
about the application of the principle of self-determination: all
things considered, it would not have been realistic to expect the
Algerian leadership to go much further than it had done in meeting de
Gaulle's challenge. The G.P.R.A. had already expressed a readiness to
negotiate for an immediate peace and to enter into discussions on "the
political and military conditions for a ceasefire and the conditions
and guarantees of the application of self-determination".'73
Earlier, The New York Times had argued that despite the vagueness
of some of the points of the self-determination offer and de Gaulle's
insistence on keeping Algeria linked to France, Algeria's independence
was Inevitable, judging from other precedents in history: "No
nationalist movement with deep roots - and the Algerian one has such
roots - has ever stopped short of independence. If history is a
guide, Algeria will be independent some day".' 74 The Algerians had
shown realistic moderation in their views and a readiness for
negotiations with the French Government. What they still insisted on,
understandably enough, was a guarantee that the proposed elections
would be completely free and the voters' choice uncoerced. They were
firmly opposed to some possible consequences of the coming referendum
as stated in the de Gaulle plan, namely France's power of veto over
the Algerian choice and the partition of the country if the vote were
for complete independence. Despite what it saw as serious
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uncertainties surrounding the recent moves, the paper was not without
hope that those issues, given good will on both sides, would not be
beyond "a solution by enlightened statesmanship".'75
The (London) Times, focusing on the conditions de Gaulle had
attached to his offer, suggested three lines upon which his programme
could be criticized. The first line, was that despite the offer of
peace, no suggestion was made as to how the coming of peace was to be
hastened. The second was the four-year period of time required
between military pacification and elections, "... a long gap would
mean a long uncertainty, during which passions might be excited
instead of soothed..." The third, was the fact that the immediate
consequence of an Algerian vote for independence would be
partition.' 76 It, on the other hand, criticized the Algerians'
response to the offer, asserting that the F.L.N. leaders had little
more to win by turning off "an honourable ceasefire". Calling for
direct Franco-Algerian negotiations and noting that the stumbling
block now lay in the terms of a ceasefire, it concluded that this
could not be cleared by public exchanges alone.'77
The Economist drove home the lesson that de Gaulle, like his
predecessors, was looking for a solution hat would be short of
independence, whilst ignoring the F.L.N. as a valid negotiator and
spokesman for the Algerian people: the new plan, for all its "liberal"
look and for all the General's power and prestige, would not provide
the answer to the difficult problem which had "bedevilled France for
five years". It defended the G.P.R.A.'s attitude towards the new plan
and vehemently reproached the French press for presenting the
Algerians' reply as "intransigent", noting - with some sarcasm - that
those who had described It as such "must have expected a simple
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surrender". The Algerians did, in fact, make concessions in response
to the offer. The French having, in theory, admitted the right to
"secession" the F.L.N. no longer made the recognition of Algeria's
independence a condition that must be fulfilled before any
negotiations. Moreover, the G.P.R.A entrusted its fate to the verdict
of the people and described itself, in a vocabulary borrowed from
wartime Gaullism, as the "keeper and guardian of the interests of the
Algerian people", until the people was able to express itself freely.
The weekly remarked that after having been put on the defensive by
General de Gaulle's diplomatic offensive and because of its diplomatic
skill, the G.P.R.A. had "recovered the initiative".' 78
 A few weeks
later, it headed a leading article on the growing tension in France
Alarm Bells in Paris" in which it openly supported Ferhat Abbas's
topical declaration that the five-year-old Algerian problem and its
consequences, could not be settled by public statements. It also
endorsed his observation that "one cannot be in favour of peace and at
the same time against negotiations", referring to de Gaulle's refusal
to negotiate with the G.P.R.A., to the hard conditions attached to the
self-determination offer and also to the guarantees required.179
Yet The Economist, whose reporting was more realistic and more
detached than that of The New York Times, also held that both "the
onus and balance of advantage" were on the Algerian side, in making
the last concessions that would get the ceasefire talks underway. It
argued that de Gaulle was the best man the Algerians could hope for to
work out a settlement to the conflict; under mounting army pressure
and colon threats his offer was the ultimate point he could reach: to
expect France to offer more in public than de Gaulle had offered
already, was to ask too much from an army which had not obtained the
military victory it had long promised. The Algerians "ought to take
150
the plunge this time". If they did not, their refusal would be seized
upon by the French ultras to clai m that the F.L.N. could not risk a
genuine test of its strength.'8° Time magazine was slightly more
optimistic in its assessment of the recent diplomatic moves arguing,
under the headline "Closer and Closer", that "hope" had eventually
prevailed despite a "nightmare fear" because of the gap of opinion
separating the two sides.'8'
Colon Diehards Angered by de Gaulle's New Proposals
De Gaulle's recognition of Algeria's right to self-determination
aroused the anger and fury of the pied noir u7tras, 182 who accused him
of betraying their interests by abandoning the long-cherished idea of
L'Alge'rie Française, holding him responsible for what they called
"this national catastrophe".' 83
 Branding him a master of duplicity
and deceit intent on sellout from the very moment he came to power,
they complained that they had been duped into helping him to power and
were later betrayed. 184
 In "the wild, unreal atmosphere of Algiers"
immediately after the 13 May coup, the colons believed that de Gaulle
would put an end to the Algerian revolution, restore French Algeria
and introduce a kind of colon Golden Age in which "nationalist
aspirations would be forgotten and their sympathizers banished into
limbo". 184 They, out of frustration, devised countless slogans in the
form of equations which reflected their almost hysterical desire to
sustain their illusory interests in the country and to resist the
forward evolution of history: "France is in Algeria = Algeria is
French = Algeria is France = France is Algeria".'85
To the colon diehards and their sympathizers in France, the
struggle to maintain French control over Algerfa became a struggle to
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safeguard the future of France itself. To some extremists, the "loss"
of Algeria would even mean that France would not be worthy of
existence at all. 186 The recognition of Algeria's right to
self-determination widened the ever-increasing rupture between the
Paris Government and the colons, and increased rightist fanaticism
which became a major threat to de Gaulle and his republic. As E.S.
Furniss argued, what would have been considered moderate in Algerian
politics, would have been easily on the extreme right in metropolitan
France.' 87
 The ultras, and their activist groups in Algeria, whose
leanings were fascist,' 88 were convinced that de Gaulle would have to
be forced to abandon his recent offer of self-determination to the
Algerians, even if that meant another insurrection similar to that
which had brought him to power. He would, therefore, personally
become the direct target of those diehards' vindictive attempts to
preserve the outmoded colonial rule.' 89 As Jean Daniel of L'Express
warned, plots by factious groups would continue to represent a danger
to the new republic unless firm action was taken: "The flux of the new
politique plunges certain military circles in confusion and gives
courage to the agitators".'9°
The New York Times reflected, at some length, pied noir
bitterness and anger at de Gaulle's self-determination proposals, and
exposed the extent to which the diehards were causing a threat to him
and his government: the colons would fight his policy to the bitter
end and perhaps try to sabotage it afterward. They had vested
interests and power to defend and they would be the greatest losers if
the Algerians accepted his offer. Stating its faith in General de
Gaulle and discussing the threat they represented, it remarked that
such threat should not be exaggerated because those ultras were not as
strong as they had been a year earlier.'9'
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Taking vigorously the side of the Paris Government, the paper
stated that the "militant minority" could no longer overthrow the
republic; popular support, a strong parliamentary majority and a
strong executive made opposition of this sort "not very effective".
Passionately endorsing de Gaulle's ideas, it warned the ultras that
their vindictive violence and plots might drive him to go further than
he had in his recent offer for Algeria: his hand had been strengthened
against right-wing military and colon extremists "... by the obvious
approbation he has received from ordinary citizens".'92
The New York Times was not alone in exposing the anger of the
colon diehards at de Gaulle's recent moves. The (London) Times
highlighted the wide array of critics on the French right that was
organized in many groups and movements and united only in fearing that
/
his Algerian policy would destroy the hope of Algerie Française as
they understood this mythical slogan.' 93 Apropos the effects of the
right-wing extremists who were determined to stymie de Gaulle's plan
for Algerian self-determination, Time magazine commented that those
extremists, unable to carry the day by parliamentary means, had coldly
set out to create an atmosphere of civil war reminiscent of the May
1958 coup that had toppled the Fourth Republic.'94
Yet, The (London) Times was not without sympathy for the pieds
noirs, regarding their anxiety and anger as "understandable",
resulting from the"climate of violence and uncertainty" which had
generated the recent coup whereby the Four Republic was brought down.
It, however, blamed them for making the mistake of thinking that 13
May 1958 was "the first stage in a revolutionary process of which they
could continue to direct the course and pace". The 1958 insurrection
had succeeded, it argued, because French public opinion and army had
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been in sympathy with the mood in Algeria, and also because a strong
man had been ready to assume power and help France avert "chaos".
Circumstances were now different: there was no figurehead in Paris for
an anti-Gaullist insurrection. The army and public opinion were
content that General de Gaulle should lead.'95
More Gains for the Algerian Cause Internationally
The Algerian National Liberation Front always wanted to
internationalize the French-Algerian conflict, whilst the French tried
every means to vindicate their claim that Algeria was an integral part
of metropolitan France, and that the war was a strictly French
domestic issue.' 96 The Algerians sought assistance from world
opinion, foreign governments, and international organizations and
institutions.' 97 They embarked therefore, on a big diplomatic
campaign to win international sympathy, especially after the creation
of the Gouvernment Provisoire de 7a Republique Algerienne which
brought with it a worldwide recognition of, and subsequent support
for, the Algerian cause. 198 The G.P.R.A. came to rejuvenate the
diplomatic role of the F.L.N. and give the struggle for independence a
significant "international jurisdictional basis".'99
Algeria's neighbours provided most of the help to the Algerian
revolution, playing host to tens of thousands of refugees and to an
army which came since 1958 to launch a big offensive against the
French across the frontiers. Tunisia, in particular, became almost
directly involved in the war, 20° as frictions with France culminated
in the ill-fated French raid on the village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef and
the subsequent designation of Anglo-American "good offices", in an
attempt to find a settlement to the conflict bGtween the two countries
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outside the United Nations.20'
Not lacking the opportunity to highlight the scale of the tension
that existed between France and Algeria's neighbours because of the
war, The New York Times suggested three forms of the
internationalization of the Algerian problem involving Tunisia. The
first was the transfer of arms from other countries through the
Tunisian border to the nationalist forces inside Algeria. Possible
discussion of the mounting tension on the Algerian-Tunisian frontiers
in international institutions, such as the United Nations or N.A.T.O.,
was another form of internationalization. A third was the fact that
the Anglo-American "good officers" were "inexorably drawn into
discussion of the frontier question", an issue arising from the
Algerian war.202
Earlier, the paper had discussed a possible solution to the
Algerian problem through a North African federation, the formation of
which it considered "necessary" to end the war in Algeria. Its
editorial for 7 March 1958, "NORTH AFRICAN UNION", had argued that the
idea of such a federation, which would involve the independent states
of Tunisia and Morocco and also an independent Algeria, was favoured
by many leaders in both France and North Africa: "It [also] sounds
good and looks good on the map. The history of our times has thrown
these North African countries together for better or for worse. It
would be better if they could somehow ,join up peacefully into a
federation".	 To this thought, the paper was often to return.
The New York Times, however, erred in giving its readers the
impression that Tunisian and Moroccan assistance to the F.L.N. was
decisive. The Algerians in fact needed and welcomed assistance from
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their neighbours, but such assistance was not of vital importance as
to the course the Algerian revolution was taking or even to its
intensity. Though the F.L.N. appreciated the help it was getting from
abroad, it relied primarily on the response and contribution of the
Algerian population, and on the resources available to it inside
Algeria itself. The French had always claimed that had it not been for
the help the F.L.N. was getting from Tunisia, the war would have long
ended. Ridiculing this argument, The Economist's correspondent in
Algeria observed that the Algerian revolution was not dependent on
xtca factors: "P year ago, President Nasser was the culprit; now
it is President Bourguiba. Help certainly comes from these quarters.
But your correspondent found no evidence to support the view that
Tunisian help Is of decisive importance".203
In addition to the neighbouring countries, the Algerian cause
found a sympathetic ear among the other independent African states.
The Algerians regarded their struggle against French colonialism as a
part and parcel of a wider struggle involving the Afro-Asian countries
against colonialism in general: "The struggle of the Algerian people
is not an Isolated struggle nor is it unique in its kind; it is an
episode of the universal struggle which raises the African and Asian
peoples against European colonialism". 204 Meeting in Accra in April
1958, the eight independent African states endorsed the Algerian cause
and recognized the F.L.N. as the sole legitimate representative of,
and spokesman for, the Algerian people, pledging moral and material
support for the revolution. They also strongly urged France to end
its military occupation of Algeria and enter into negotiations with
the nationalist leadership.205
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Reflecting the popularity of the Algerian cause among the African
nations, The New York Times played the story of the Accra Conference
under a prominent front-page headline:
8 AFRICAN LANDS
BACK ALGERIANS
Independent Bloc at Accra
to Recognize Insurgents
- Counsels Peace.
But it reproached the Conference for recognizing the F.L.N. as the
legitimate spokesman for the Algerian people, painting this move as
contrary to the United Nations Charter, to which those countries had
pledged "unswerving loyalty". In fact, it veered back to its previous
position and away from the course of impartiality, by attacking the
F.L.N. and its conduct: "[I]t would seem to be contrary to the Charter
to proclaim the ultra-militant National Liberation Front as the sole
legitimate authority, and to pledge all 'practical' aid to it when it
has no mandate from the Algerian people and is in fact fighting not
only the French but also the more moderate Algerian elements which
might constitute a majority". 206
 In making this point, the paper was
merely echoing French claims of "F.L.N. unrepresentativeness" of the
Algerian people.
The paper's stance provoked an angry reply from the F.L.N.
representative in New York, Abdelkader Chanderli, who ridiculed its
accusation that the F.L.N. had no mandate from the Algerians. He
declared that the best mandate was the mass support of the population
testified to by the success of the nationalist army in combating
overwhelming French military forces in nearly four years.
Confirmation of this fact could be seen in the reports of many
correspondents including that of The New York Times in Algeria who had
written as early as 9 June 1957: "There is only one significant
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nationalist group in Algeria, the National Liberation Front".
Chanderli's letter closed on the sensible note that the resolution
adopted by the Accra Conference of the Independent States of Africa
was aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the Algerian question if
France agreed to negotiate a peaceful settlement then logically it had
to negotiate with those with whom it was fighting.207
The Second Conference of the Independent States of Africa which
was held In Monrovia In August 1959 also declared its support for the
Algerian revolution, and pledged full support for the Algerian people
in its struggle for independence. Moreover, it was the first time
that the Algerian flag was hoisted in another country outside the Arab
World and China. The New York Times highlighted the diplomatic
significance of this event to the F.L.N. and to its cause under
conspicuous headlines. Unlike its vigorous criticism of the 1958 Accra
Conference and its positive stance towards the National Liberation
Front, however, the paper showed much more understanding of the
attitude of the independent states of Africa during their Monrovia
Conference, and of their unequivocal support for Algeria's right to
independence. Its editorial for 8 August 1959, "Monrovia and Algiers"
admitted that it was "inevitable" that those countries should
concentrate more on the situation in Algeria than on their own
problems: "The political psychology of Africa in recent years has been
such that nothing matters more than the self-respect and legal
equality that came with independence".208
Le Monde also emphasized the diplomatic significance of the
Algerians' gains in Monrovia, noting that the G.P.R.A. had achieved
two successes during the Second Conference of the Independent States
of Africa. One was of a political nature; its 'admission to the
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Conference as a member with full rights and Its recognition as part of
the conclaves of the independent African states. The other was of
symbolic nature and that was the approval of the Liberian Government
that the Algerian emblem fluttered for a few days on the Parliament of
Monrovi a.209
The United States and the West Coming Under Algerian Criticism
The diplomatic offensive launched by the G.P.R.A. at the end of
1958 and the beginning of the new year, also included visits by
Algerian delegations to different countries throughout the world;
these visits attracted more support for the nationalist cause and
consolidated the position of the G.P.R.A. internationally. China, in
particular, provided substantial aid to the F.L.N. whose delegations
visited it regularly on both official and unofficial missions. During
a visit in December 1958, for example, a G.P.R.A. delegation was
greeted with a warm welcome, treated as an official government
delegation and received by both Mao-Tse-Tung and Prime Minister
Chou-en-Lai. The Chinese authorities repeatedly pledged support for
the Algerian revolution and for Algeria's right to independence.210
The New York Times reported this Chinese-F.L.N. rapprochement
with interest and under prominent headlines. Hence, the one which
appeared on 22 May 1959:
RED CHINA TO ARM
ALGERIA REBELS
Insurgent Spokesman Says
Military Mission Made
Deal with Peiping.
It had earlier referred the Algerians' search for new allies to what
it had viewed as the diminishing Egyptian support for the F.L.N., and
also to the F.L.N.'s own reluctance to seek direct assistance from the
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Soviet Union as a precaution against an alleged communist threat to
its leading position inside Algeria. Its Paris-based columnist C.L.
Sulzberger warned on 22 January 1959 that the F.L.N.'s decision to
enlist the aid of China was only an "initial step" in the direction of
moving closer towards the East: "if the Chinese are not able to
provide enough assistance, the Algerian leaders will find themselves
faced with a grim choice... [which might force them to seek] direct
Soviet help".
It Is worth reiterating that whilst it sought assistance from
different countries and sources, the F.L.N. was always determined to
preserve its freedom from the influence of foreign powers and to
t	 id&t dcsott makthg. It made it clear
from the start that it welcomed assistance from any source, be it
Egypt, China, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union or any other country as
long as there were no strings attached. It also reaffirmed its
commitment to seeking the friendship of all nations, from both the
East and the West without exceptions, as long as that friendship was
genuine and not based solely on sheer convenience or opportunistic
self-interest.
The G.P.R.A. vehemently denied Western allegations of communist
inclinations in its recent moves, emphasizing that seeking communist
assistance did not necessarily mean alignment with the communist
world. In this context, its Minister of Information, M'hamed Yazid,
reiterated Patrick Henry's words "give me freedom or give me
death". 211
 On another occasion, he made it clear that the Algerians
were looking towards the East because the alternative was not
encouraging: "They are looking at China, which is celebrating the
tenth anniversary of its revolution through themobilization of the
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masses. Perhaps those among us who advocated a western solution will
be swept away one day"2l2
Being engaged in a fierce war upon which the future of the
country depended, the Algerian liberation movement could not afford
being too selective or too choosy regarding its potential allies.213
"We are not playing games", declared M'hamed Yazid on the eve of a
visit by an F.L.N. delegation to China. "When we say we will take aid
where we find It, we mean It". 214 The obligations of the war, in
fact, left the Algerians with no other choice but to apply the simple
rule of considering the enemies of France as their friends and those
who were sustaining France, with both financial and military
assistance, as their enemies.215
The F.L.N. repeatedly denounced the mounting support France was
getting from its allies who had thus become directly involved in the
Algerian-French conflict, making it an international issue which
seriously threatened world peace. 216 It particularly blamed the
complicity of N.A.T.O. which was backing France to the hilt in its
Algerian campaign, providing it with the military and diplomatic
support needed to pursue the war, 217 and with the financial assistance
required to protect its shaky economy.218
The Algerians gave special attention to the stance the United
States was taking towards their cause, because of its leading role in
the Western world. Through its Bureau of Information in New York, the
F.L.N. had since 1955 been trying to capture the attention of American
public opinion and provide the American reader with an alternative
version of what was happening in Algeria. 219 But it was only after
the report of Senator John F. Kennedy to the Senate in July 1957, that
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the Americans had really begun to discover the Algerian question.22°
This was in itself a reflection upon the capability of the F.L.N.
Bureau of Information and upon the nature and quality of the reporting
in the American press.
The activities of the Bureau of Information, especially the
contacts it established in New York, now began to attract more
interest and, therefore, more sympathy for the Algerian cause in the
United States. Some Congressmen were explicit in their criticism of
the American Government for not helping the Algerian people to achieve
its independence. Representative Adam C. Powell, for example, attacked
'ns governmenVs óe'Therate 'iack of anti-coonia activities because
of its wish not to offend the N.A.T.O. colonial powers especially
France. He called for a real change in the United States policy
towards Africa as a whole. 22 ' Senator Wayne Morse reproached his
government for allowing France to use the American weapons issued to
it through N.A.T.O., against the Algerians. 222 A few months later,
sixteen Democratic Congressmen highlighted the plight of the Algerian
people because of the war which, they concluded, was a threat to world
peace. 223
 Whilst expressing their support for Algeria's right to
self-determination, the Congressmen urged the American Administration
to put pressure on France to enter into real negotiations with the
G.P.R.A.224
American academic opinion also became aware of, and more
interested in, the Algerian-French conflict. In 1958 alone, as many
as twenty-eight theses related to Algeria were submitted in different
American institutions. 225
 Private relief agencies, like the Quaker
organization "Friends Service Committee", warned against the serious
threat the war posed to international peace and exposed the plight of
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the Algerian refugees in the neighbouring countries. 226 Private
American individuals also became increasingly aware of the conflict
and the significant role the United States Government could play in
solving it. Hence, the following letter to The New York Times which
Is worth quoting at large:
"According to the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United
States is concerned about the integrity and
independence of the States of the Middle East.
Although final decisions about what happens in Algeria
must rest with the Algerians and the French, we cannot
as a people be spiritual isolationists. We have
admired Franklin D. Roosevelt because he continued to
speak up for 1ndan 1idependence. 1e are proud because
the Philippines are free.
Why as a people are we not as specific and
forthright in our sympathies today as we have been in
the past? Certainly for Americans to voice opinions on
such matters is not to interfere in the internal
affairs of another country.
NATO will be stronger, not weaker, if Algeria is
independent. We will be weaker, not stronger, if we
give military materiel that is used against those
seeking freedom....
Leaders in a country geographically separated from
French territory are seeking first-class citizenship
and political freedom in general... can those of us for
whom freedom was won before we were born fail to favour
the creation of a constantly expanding, voluntary
association of free people, in the interest of world
well-being and world peace? One would hope that
France's disastrous experience2	Indochina would cause
her to ask the same question".
Yet, despite the sympathy of many American individuals and
private groups for the Algerian cause and their condemnation of
France's policy in Algeria, the United States Government persisted in
adopting the same attitude which had first been put forward by Douglas
Dillon at the beginning of the Algerian revolution. It still put
faith in a unilateral French solution to the problem. 228 Whilst
almost totally ignoring the plight of the Algerian population, the
United States Administration continued to provide France with all the
financial and material help the war required. American Red Cross aid
to the Algerian refugees was estimated at only three-quarters of a
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million dollars, as opposed to the $655 million the United States
provided to France. 229 In this context, the Algerians complained that
the American Government was not interested in offering aid to the
peoples who were In desperate need, but was ready to offer such aid,
including the latest in military technology, to those who sought their
extermination. 230 Interviewed on American Radio in May 1958, Krim
Belkacem, responding to a question about what the Algerians expected
from the United States, had stated that they realized that the
American Government had so far guaranteed four years of war in Algeria
by a combination of military and financial support as well as absolute
diplomatic backing at the United Nations. He had also voiced the hope
t'tat the 'Eisenhower Admnstration wou'd 'listen and respond favourably
to the pleas of the people of North Africa as expressed during the
recent Tangiers Conference.23'
The United States was, however, only concerned about what it
viewed as the threat posed by international communism in the area,
especially Soviet attempts to gain influence in North Africa and the
Middle East at the expense of the West. 232 Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles had repeatedly declared that what the United States
feared was that the war in Algeria might destroy the N.A.T.O. alliance
in the same way the war in Indochina had destroyed the European
Defence Comniunity. 233 The paradox was that during this period American
rhetoric was as generous as ever in its support for
self-determination. The United States was, in theory, always ready to
support the demands of the Afro-Asian peoples for independence,
reasserting its "efforts to help remind those nations that they have
an alternative to Communist methods and Communist help in seeking to
advance" 234
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The almost hysterical preoccupation of the United States with the
threat international communism posed to the emerging nations did not,
however, yield concrete, positive results for the future of those
nations, and Algeria was no exception. Hence, the F.L.N. lost no
opportunity to outline the fundamental dichotomies between the United
States' idealistic rhetoric and its actual stance towards the issue of
colonialism especially in Algeria. Whilst the United States offered
its N.A.T.O. allies effective backing, including the "enormous weight"
of Its vote at the United Nations, It offered the subject nations no
more than "the emptiness of its declarations of principle".235
M'hamed Yazid labelled the American attitude towards Algeria as
"opposition to colonialism on Sunday".236
The New York Times now informed its readers of the Algerians'
anger at, and condemnation of, the United States colossal support for
France's military efforts in Algeria. It quoted Ferhat Abbas as
saying that America's absolute backing of the French campaign against
the Algerians would not only be "a cause of new difficulties" for
France, but would also generate a "strong current of hostility" in the
area towards the United States itself. 237 The Algerian nationalist
leaders were particularly offended by the fact that not only did the
United States provide France with the most sophisticated military
hardware, including the B.26 bomber, it also did its best to prevent
other countries from giving arms to the Algerian forces.238
It was in this context that the F.L.N. reiterated its
determination to provide the Algerian fighters with the arms they
needed against the strong French military machine: "We will arm
ourselves by every means available. This should not be mistaken for
blackmail. Whether the United States helps France or not, we will
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accept aid from any source as long as the war goes on" 239 Earlier,
It had made It clear that the Algerian people was in real need of true
friends regardless of their ideological orientation.240 Ihis was in
direct response to the claims, made by the French and largely echoed
In the West, that Algeria, and North Africa in general, were under the
constant threat of communist infiltration. Noting that the United
States' sole worry, with regard to Algeria, was to see Soviet weapons
reaching the nationalist forces, the official organ of the F.L.N.
wondered: "Is It with hunting rifles.., that America would like the
atoia'i 't..The'r'atirm krmy to defern itself against the B.26 which it
generously offers to those who have been encharged with its
extermination?" 24' As The New York Times observed, the United States
Government was now having a difficult task to maintain its full
support for France, especially when more and more countries throughout
the world were turning towards actively supporting Algeria's right to
independence. 242
The Algerlan Question TM
 Again Before the U.N. General Assembly
The Algerians, especially after the creation of the G.P.R.A.,
maintained an intensive diplomatic campaign at the United Nations,
aimed at convincing the international community of the necessity to
impose a settlement to the Algerian problem through a referendum under
U.N. supervision. During the 13th session of the General Assembly
(September-December 1958), a resolution sponsored by the Afro-Asian
group called for "recognition of the right of the Algerian people to
independence". It urged "negotiations between the two parties
concerned", but was short of the two-thirds majority required for
adoption by the Assembly. Once again France boycotted the
discussions, still claiming that the Algerian Conflict was a domestic
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French issue and beyond U.N. jurisdiction. And once again its allies,
the United States In particular, came to its rescue by voting against
the proposed resolution. 243
 Even when this was converted into a weak
resolution vaguely recognizing "the right of the Algerian people to
decide for themselves their own destiny", carefully avoiding the use
of the word "independence", the United States failed to offer its
support and abstained. The resolution again fell short of the
two-thirds majority needed, albeit this time by only one vote, 35 to
The United States' abstention was a significant development in
favour of the Algerians that was deeply resented by the French
Government. Yet, no change in the actual American policy towards
Algeria could be appreciated by the Algerians unless, in the words of
the G.P.R.A. Foreign Affairs Minister, "... no more American weapons
and dollars are put at France's disposal to pursue its war of
reconquest in Algeria". 245
 The flow of sophisticated American weapons
1to 'France woud, in fact, continue unabated. The G.P.R.A. deplored
the United States' position - abstention at the U.N. on the one hand
and military backing of France on the other - as grossly
hypocritical 246
During the 14th session of the General Assembly
(September-December 1959), the Afro-Asian group proposed a resolution
similar to the one they had proposed a year earlier. After "...
noting with satisfaction that the two parties involved have accepted
the right to self-determination as basis for the solution to the
Algerian problem", the resolution urged the Assembly to recognize
Algeria's right to self-determination, and called upon France to enter
into negotiations with the G.P.R.A. to end the conflict. 247
 In its
absence, France was again loyally defended by its allies who voted
against the proposed resolution, despite the fact that this merely
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reflected a demand which France had already technically conceded:
Algeria's right to self-determination. 248 In this context, the
Algerian delegates to the U.N. Assembly denounced what they described
as "manoeuvres and pressures by the Atlantic pact" and its opposition
to any resolution on the Algerian question regardless of its content:
"These pressures and these manoeuvres only confirm to
us the rightfulness of our position that no cease-fire
in Algeria is possible without agreement between the
two parties on the conditions and g4antees of the
application of self-determination".
The United States ambassador at the United Nations, Henry Cabot
Lodge, argued that his country did not vote in favour of the
resolution because it was not likely to hasten the achievement of a
settleet., as it failed to take into account the most significant
development on the Algerian question since it had been put before the
General Assembly: "the forward-looking proposals of General de
Gaulle". Yet, he asserted that the resolution embodied two principles
which were "of fundamental importance in our history and tradition":
the principle of self-determination and the principle of seeking
solutions to serious problems through peaceful means. 25° Earlier,
Secretary of State Christian A. Herter had declared that the United
States hoped that no action would be taken by the General Assembly
which might "prejudice the realization of a Just and peaceful solution
for Algeria such as is promised by General de Gaulle's far-reaching
declaration with its provisions for self-determination by the Algerian
people". 25' The American Government, mainly out of respect for French
sensitivity, was still clinging to the view that the conflict would
have to be discussed and solved outside the United Nations.
The Eisenhower Administration's policy towards Algeria again came
under vehement attacks in Congress, notably from Senator John F.
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Kennedy. He, a Presidential candidate for the 1960 elections,
dismissed the argument that Algeria was an internal French problem and
not a problem for international concern or a "proper subject for
American foreign policy debates", as unrealistic. Emphasizing the
far-reaching international ramifications of the Algerian problem, he
warned that it might jeopardize, beyond repair, American and Western
interests in North Africa: "It had endangered the continuation of some
of our most strategic bases and threatened our geographical advantage
over the communist orbit. It has affected our standing in the eyes of
the free world, our leadership in the fight to keep the world free,
our prestige and our security as well as our moral leadership in the
fight against Soviet imperialism in the countries behind the Iron
Curtain. It has furnished powerful ammunitions to anti-Western
propaganda throughout Asia and the Middle East, and will be the most
troublesome item facing the October Conference in Accra of the free
nations of Africa who hope... to seek common paths by which that great
continent can remain aligned with the West".252
Like the American Government, The New York Times did not change
its course, still did not want to believe that the conflict could be
settled inside the United Nations, and again plunged to the aid of
France. Once self-determination had been granted, it argued, the need
for action by the United Nations - if there ever had been such a need
- diminished. Commenting on the memorandum issued by the Afro-Asian
group at the General Assembly, in which it stated that there had been
no indication of improvement in the Algerian situation since the
Assembly's 13th session in 1958, The New York Times asserted that that
seemed to be true before September 16. But, "[o]n that date, there
was an improvement in the Algerian situation when President de Gaulle
issued his famous offer to the Algerians of three choices...
169
[integration, autonomy or independence]".253
The G.P.R.A. strongly criticized the argument that after de
Gaulle's September 16 declaration a U.N. resolution on Algeria would
not be helpful in promoting a speedy settlement to the conflict; it
particularly focussed its criticism on the United States Government.
Hence, M'hamed Yazid declared that the American ambassador to the
U.N., Henry Cabot Lodge, seemed as if he were "acting as France's
attorney" during its absence from the Assembly debate. 254 The
Algerians argued that the recent offer was aimed at international
consumption, and was perfectly timed to coincide with the General
Assembly debate to enable France once again to divert world attention
from the Algerian situation. They welcomed self-determination but
insisted that the "freedom of choice", essential to its
implementation, had yet to be guaranteed by the French authorities.
This argument was strongly endorsed by The Economist: "Self
determination is splendid, but freedom of choice requires to be
guaranteed; if the French refuse to discuss such guarantees, the
United Nations should request them to do so or provide Its own
services" 255
In its next issue, however, the London weekly hailed the mood now
reigning at the United Nations as "Sweet Reason on Algeria": despite
the differences of opinion still existing between the Afro-Asian group
on the Algerian side and the Western group on the French side, a
"flood tide of sweet reasonableness" had characterised the 14th
session of the General Assembly; the arguments that still divided the
two groups were about the "tactics" and not about the "goal".
Recalling the wider gaps of opinion that had previously divided the
two groups, it concluded that times had indeedchanged. With the
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right of the Algerians to self-determination already conceded, the
choice was now between two options: either a United Nations
resolution, or initiatives outside the U.N. Unlike The New York Times,
which seemed to put almost absolute faith in General de Gaulle and his
recent plan, The Economist deliberately avoided referring to any
particular name or initiative, emphasized the need for cooperation and
direct talks between the two Parties concerned, and paid tribute to
"men of good will" on both Sides, thanks to whom "a solution in
Algeria now seems much nearer".256
Despite its caution The New York Times, rounding up its discussion
of the General Assembly's Algeria debate with a "News of the Week in
Review" comment, implicitly reproached France for its intransigent
attitude towards the idea of a U.N. solution to the conflict. France
still claimed that the United Nations had no jurisdiction over what it
considered a purely domestic French issue. Despite the welcome
moderation of the recent draft resolution, which intentionally avoided
using the word "independence", or referring to the G.P.R.A. by name so
as to make it more accommodating to France, the French Government
uncompromisingly dismissed it as "unacceptable". Highlighting the
dire need for an early settlement to the conflict, its serious
international repercussions and especially its heavy bearing on both
sides, the comment closed on the note that the toll of the Algerian
war averaged ninety-five lives and cost France at least $3,000,000 a
day over the five year period257
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CHAPTER V
OVERTURES FOR A SETTLEMENT AND COLON INTRANSIGENCE -
THE BARRICADES. THE PUTSCH AND O.A.S. TERRORISM
"The present events in Algeria are ample demonstration
- if there is further need for this - that the
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had
every reason to call for these guarantees [when asking
for pourparlers]. The French people can recognize the
Algerian people's right to self-determination. But
that does not settle the problem since the application
of this right remains subordinate to the good will of
the army of occupation and the 'ultras'". (G.P.R.A.
Statement, January 1960).
"We want to halt the decadence of the West and the
march of Communism. That is our duty, the real duty of
the [French] army. That is why we must win the war in
Algeria. Indo-China taught us to see the truth".
(Colonel Antoine Argoud, November 1960).
"As soon as the state and the nation have chosen their
path, military duty is marked out once and for all.
Beyond its rules, there can be, there are only lost
soldiers". (General de Gaulle, November 1961).
Alternately shifting from diplomatic flexibility to more military
determination to continue the "struggle for complete independence",
the Algerian Provisional Government declared on 19 January 1960 its
complete commitment to making every effort to reach a peaceful
settlement with France.' A year after its inauguration, the G.P.R.A.
was attracting more attention from the international media and the
different international institutions, diplomatic and other. The New
York Times, for example, became increasingly interested in its
structure and in the organization of its leadership, and also more
aware of its pivotal role in the Algerian equation. The paper seemed
particularly interested in, and to a large extent pleased with, the
reshuffle in the G.P.R.A. which, it said, "enhanced rather than
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reduced the possibility of peace talks". Yet, continuing to rely on
French official sources and without independent substantiation it
wrote favourably of the ministerial changes only because the reshuffle
allegedly barred what it hastily labelled the "men of Cairo" and the
"men of Peiping" from controlling the G.P.R.A.2
Meanwhile, as Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber wrote in L'Express,
conspirators were busy during this period preparing for a decisive
attempt to take over authority In both Algeria and France: "... the
factions of Algiers were organizing, preparing, with the complicity of
local powers, their arsenals, and the army was progressively
enthralled by the certitude of its political mission". 3 Army-colon
anger reached a boiling point. General Massu, the Algiers army
commander, spelled out their grievances during an interview with Klaus
Kenipskl of Munich's Suddeutscher Zeitung, in which he vehemently
attacked General de Gaulle's Algeria policy especially his recognition
of Algeria's right to self-determination. As a result of such
criticism, Massu was recalled to Paris and later removed from his
/
duties and immediately replaced by General Crepin after what he called
"un entretien historique" with General de Gaulle.4
The New York Times, along with much of the press, was aware of
the by now familiar phenomenon of army-pied noir extremism and the
danger it posed not only to General de Gaulle but to the future of the
Fifth Republic as a whole. The extremists now threatening de Gaulle
were, ironically enough, the very ones who had been responsible for
his advent to power after the 13 May 1958 coup. On the eve of what
later became known as "barricades week", the paper ran a thorough
editorial criticism of colon fanaticism, warning against a large-scale
military conspiracy that could throw France into civil war. 5 It
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praised de Gaulle, quite excessively, for what it called his
"statesmanlike Ideas", "courage" and "extraordinary patience and
tenacity"; but wondered whether the Algerian conflict - "the primary
problem of France internally and externally" - had grown irretrievably
beyond the capacity of even a General de Gaulle, with the extremist
colons aggravating the situation.6
The (London) Times, arguing along a similar line, pointed to the
alarming frustration of those "wild men" who believed that French
Algeria could still be maintained, through total revolt against
metropolitan authority. 7 The Economist solemnly agreed and warned
against the potential metamorphosis of the co7on-army alignment
against de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic. The die-hard colons and the
army officers complained that de Gaulle's offer of self-determination
to Algeria had gone "too far" as a concession to the F.L.N.8
Remarking that the harsh criticisms of de Gaulle's Algeria policy
recently voiced by Massu to the West German newspaper were widely
shared by many "less exalted officers", The Economist reasoned that
the possibility of successful Franco-Algerian negotiations would
remain remote, as long as commanders-in-chief like General Challe were
adamant that "whatever happens, the army will never leave Algeria".9
Meanwhile, the extremist pieds noirs and their sympathisers in the
army were clearly waiting for a pretext to challenge de Gaulle and the
Fifth Republic as they had successfully challenged the Fourth in
1958.10
The recall of General Massu to Paris provided them with such
pretext: hundreds of rioters took to the streets and later barricaded
themselves inside a perimeter of barricades in the centre of
Algiers. 11
 The real reason behind their action was undoubtedly de
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Gaulle's recognition of Algeria's right to self-determination. Aware
of the army's traditional complacency, the colons hoped that the
paratroopers' refusal of a Paris order to clear the barricades would
grow into an open revolt by the army against the Fifth Republic.
This, it was hoped, would be substituted with a military regime in
both Algeria and France, as the best guarantee of maintaining
L'Algerie Française.12
The pied noir and rightist press ran wild, attacking de Gaulle's
decision to relieve Massu of his command and urging the colons to
"take action". For example, under the prominent banner headline
"General Massu is Relieved of his Duties", L'Echo D'Alger printed
Alain de Serigny's highly provocative article which had originally
appeared in France-Soir in its issue of 24-25 January, advocating
insurrection against de Gaulle and the metropolis. The article warned
the pieds noirs that their silence over the removal of Massu - the
"symbol and companion of the liberation" and the "most representative
of resistance to national disintegration" - would be regarded as
"cowardice" 13
The New York Times, in a long report by Thomas Brady which it ran
under the headline:
EUROPEAN MOBS IN ALGIERS RISE
AGAINST DE GAULLE; 19 DIE IN RIOT;
ARMY DECLARES A STATE OF SIEGE
provided a detailed account of the colon insurrection, emphasising its
multifarious Implications. Yet, the significance of the report lay in
the fact that it went beyond routine day-to-day reporting to provide
background to the recent crisis. Chronicling the history and
evolution of the 1,200,000 Algerian pieds noirs, Brady pointed out
that most of them were descendants of the earlier settlers who had
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come to Algeria in 1830. The Franco-Prussian war of 1871 forced many
of the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine to emigrate to Algeria.
Later, under-privileged immigrants of Spanish, Greek, Maltese and
Italian origins also went to settle in Algeria. He touched on the
evident economic disparity between the Algerian majority and the colon
minority, which stemmed largely from the settlers' acquisition of the
best land in the country from its legal owners by dubious ways and
means.' 4 But, he failed to explore the deeper socio-economic factors
that had provoked the crisis.
With increasing criticism of the pied noir dissidents and
sharpened editorial attack on their fanaticism, The New York Times
highlighted the gravity of the Algerian situation and warned against
the danger of further disintegration: once again Algeria had turned
into a testing ground for France and especially for General de Gaulle
and the Fifth Republic. Yet, asserting that the Fifth Republic under
de Gaulle was different from the Fourth Republic in which "leadership
[had] disintegrated", It allowed itself to venture that "however
disgruntled some army leaders may be, the army in Algiers remains
loyal to Paris", and offered to forecast that the army would certainly
not side with the colon extremists.' 5 With the benefit of hindsight,
it is clear that the paper's remarks and prophecies were too
overoptimistic. The (London) Times, following a similar line of
argument, ridiculed the "logic" of the barricades seeing no outcome
from their desperate tactics but further alienation from the colons:
"disillusionment with the PRESIDENT is one thing; using the army to
turn him out of office is another".'6
The New York Times, whilst making de Gaulle's victory over the
extremist pieds noirs dependent on the degree of support he could get
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from the army, intoned that de Gaulle's "... firm stand will
[eventually] carry the day". Reminding its readers of the already
heavy cost of the war and the dangers it represented for the future of
France, It intimated that It was advisable for both the Algerians and
the French "... to come to terms, on which they are really not too far
apart". A peaceful solution was possible despite the difficulties
which still needed to be overcome: "Given good will on both sides it
should not be beyond wise statesmanship to bridge these remaining
differences" 17
Columnist C.L. Sulzberger, casting about for the fundamental
reasons behind France's malaise and the multiple scizophrenia that
were tearing It apart, observed that the crisis was the result . of the
"tug between liberalism and reaction" and between "nineteenth-century
dream and twentieth-century reality". Whilst the Fourth Republic was
brought down "with a whisper" the Fifth - if it were to collapse as a
result of mob rule from Algiers - would "go with a bang", the
consequence of which would be nothing but chaos. In this, the
columnist reflected de Gaulle's own warning that if he failed to
curtail mob violence In Algiers, which was condoned and encouraged by
the army, "the unity, prestige and fate of France would be
compromised". Sulzberger, in fact, went farther to argue that in the
event of such failure, the unity, prestige and fate not only of France
but of the whole Western world, would be dealt a serious jolt.18
Against this background, de Gaulle asked the French Assembly to grant
him power to rule by decree.' 9
 The Assembly approved his request at a
time when a poll showed that 75 percent of metropolitan French wanted
the government to take a tougher line against the barricaders and
their sympathizers in the army.2°
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The New York Times criticism of the G.P.R.A. continued to inspire
strong responses from the Algerian representative in New York,
Abdelkader Chanderli. To its assertion that de Gaulle's offer of
self-determination for all Algerians had not been sanctioned by the
G.P.R.A., he replied - in a letter which the paper carried in its
issue of 28 January 1960 - by observing that what the Algerians wanted
were guarantees of free and fair application of self-determination
which the French Government had so far failed to provide. On the
contrary, only on 29 January de Gaulle reiterated the view that the
army would be given complete control of the proposed referendum.21
The letter aptly pointed out that the paper's own recent reference to
what it had called the "dangerous force" of the extremist army
officers and the die-hard pieds noirs was in itself "a clear
demonstration of the necessity of such guarantees for a free
consultation" 22
Chanderli, in a similar letter to The New York Herald Tribune,
criticized the American press for overplaying the alleged "terroristic
nature" of the war the Algerians were conducting, whilst turning a
blank eye on the more dangerous excesses being committed by the French
army against civilians, including torture, indiscriminate shelling of
villages and the regroupment of families in camps under constant
military control. 23
 A recent report by the International Committee of
the Red Cross had in fact revealed the alarming, often indescribable
conditions to which people were subject in those camps. The camps had
been set up in an attempt by the army to cut off the F.L.N. from the
local population. Algerian leaders often complained that the Western
media had failed to address itself to the plight of the two million
people being confined to those camps. However, commenting on the
report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the C.B.S.
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Correspondent in Paris drove home the lesson:
"Paris is suffering from a case of suppressed shame,
shame about the revelations of tortures and inhuman
conditions in Algerian internment camps, revealed two
days ago in a report by the International Red Cross.
This report and the shame it provoked have generally
been suppressed, however, partly by Government
pressure, partly by a curious self-censorship of the
French press, wch rarely prints unpleasant truths
about Algeria".
In this context the G.P.R.A. reassured the French people that it
wanted guarantees against the extremist pieds noirs and army officers,
whose intransigence was to blame for the continuation of the war, and
not against the average Frenchman: The French people can recognize
the Algerian people's right to self-determination. But that does not
settle the problem since the application of this right remains
subordinate to the good will of the army of occupation and the
'ultras'". 25
 In April 1960 the G.P.R.A. decided to adhere to the
Geneva Convention on war and called upon France to live up to them in
its military campaign in Algeria. Involving more than half a million
French troops and 130,000 A.L.N. fighters, the war had already claimed
hundreds of thousands of lives, 100,000 Algerians were still in prison
and interrogation centres, 300,000 refugees in Tunisia and Morocco and
two million detainees in internment camps. The G.P.R.A. urged the
international community to bring pressure to bear on France to abide
by articles 3 and 4 of the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment
of prisoners.
As Joan and Richard Brace have remarked, France violated in most
flagrant ways some sections of article 3 which advised against: "a)
Violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking hostages; c)
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment; d) the passing of sentence and the carrying out
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of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as Indispensable by civilized peoples". Article 4 was
concerned with the way civilians were to be treated, but "[t]he
practice of reprisals committed with the purpose of bombing-out
villages en masse has become only common-place in the latter years of
the [Algerian] war". 26
 The Algerians of course invariably seized upon
these violations and army excesses as strong evidence to justify their
demands for guarantees before committing themselves to a cease-fire.
The conduct of the French army in Algeria and its alignment with
the die-hard colons contributed greatly to France's malaise and the
current crisis was no exception. As The (London) Times observed, the
army, despite its claim of non-intervention, was in practice totally
behind the barricaders. Although there was not yet a "crisis of the
regime" in the same way this term had been used to describe the last
days of the Fourth Republic, as there was no breakdown in the
governmental machinery or collapse of the administrative apparatus, it
was feared that otherwise the crisis was hardly less acute. Offering
Its appraisal of de Gaulle's showdown with the extremist pieds noirs
and army officers, who had themselves been responsible for his return
to power two years earlier, and the high stakes involved for France,
the paper concluded that "[o]ne of them will have to prevail".27
The New York Times, also continuing to stress the theme of
crisis, held that what France was facing was a crisis of the whole
Western world, arguing that there was no alternative to de Gaulle and
his Algeria policies: either him and his plan, or there would be a
calamity in France 28
 The news media often tend to personify the news
in order to make it more interesting to the reader who generally wants
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to know about fellow human beings. 29 News involving human beings
attracts more readers especially when it is concerned with prominent
world personalities; "'big names' make big news". 3° Concordant with
this is also the idea of "elitism" which suggests that an "elite
person" - the top leader of a nation or a well-known international
organization - makes news and attracts more attention by the media to
attract more readers. 3 ' The New York Times made the news about the
French crisis almost exclusively centred around the character of
General de Gaulle. De Gaulle became, in its eyes, the central figure
of the crisis; his future almost equal in significance to the future
of France as a whole, and his personal difficulties equal in gravity
to the crisis of the country at large. Day after day it hammered at
colon disobedience. Day after day it expressed support for General de
Gaulle: although he might have underestimated their threats and by the
same token overestimated his personal authority, his recognition of
Algeria's right to self-determination was "the wisest and bravest act
of policy yet put forward".32
The Economist drew attention to the fact that the crisis had not
come as a surprise to those with fair knowledge about the Algerian
situation, since the army-colon conspiracy and dissidence had always
been manifestly visible. Its article "France Feels the Dead Hand",
stated the lesson: General de Gaulle was primarily to blame for the
crisis because of his failure to grab the opportunity offered to him
immediately after his advent to power in 1958, to curtail the
excessive powers of the army officers and to contain the wilder
pretensions of the die-hard pieds noirs. The result of his failure
was that the decline of the public power had come with "sickening
rapidity". The article concluded by warning that if de Gaulle could
not now exert his authority over the extremists; France would fall
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victim to the "dead hand of military rule at home" and would certainly
"be sucked down in the perpetuation of an impossible course in
Algeria"
Following a similar line of argument, The New York Times
intimated that failure to contain the colon dissidents and their
active supporters In the army would almost certainly result in a civil
war and would undermine France's international image and damage its
position within N.A.T.O.: the weakening of France at home would
Increase doubts about the "wisdom of relying too heavily on the Paris
Government as a key member of the alliance"; this would strengthen the
Soviet position in the forthcoming East-West summit and with the
emerging nations of the Third World. As for Algeria, France's failure
to assert its authority over the army and colon extremists would drive
the F.L.N. to "adopt a stiffer attitude towards negotiations with
Paris"
The New York Times did not cease to scorn the army-colon
alignment, pointing its editorial finger to the continuing grumblings
within the French army, which it referred to as a hopeless sense of
failure. To many French officers, the war in Algeria represented "the
last in a series of humiliating campaigns that began with defeat in
World War II and saw the French Army forced to abandon its position in
the Middle East, Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia". These ideas were
given force in Time magazine which, underlining the gravity of the
situation, went farther to deduce that the current army-colon outbreak
- which had been "successfully provoked" by the Algerian leaders - was
in the advantage of the Provisional Government: after the recent
reshuffle in the G.P.R.A., which seemed to smooth the path towards
Algerian-French pourparlers, the Algerians needed to know whether the
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French army was loyal enough to Paris to impose on the extremist pieds
noirs the free elections promised by de Gaulle.35
Defeat of the Barrlcaders
After one week of anti-de Gaulle protest colon enthusiasm began
to dwindle; their showdown with Paris finally collapsed with the
surrender of the barricaders. 36 The New York Times reaction was
predictable; It made a hero of General de Gaulle hailing his defeat of
the barricaders as a victory not only for France but for the Western
world as a whole: "Now that President de Gaulle and the forces of
democracy and enlightenment in France have won the battle, we, too,
can rejoice". 37 The (London) Times, also rejoicing at de Gaulle's
victory, editorialized that the extremist colons and army officers now
realized that "integration", as they understood it, could only be
implemented at the cost of rebellion, a price France was not prepared
to pay. It pointedly added, however, that danger still lay ahead
especially as the army loyalty to Paris could still not be trusted.38
This argument was carried further by C.L. Sulzberger in his "Foreign
Affairs" column, remarking that the failure of the recent outbreaks
did not by any means mean the end of the danger posed by the
traditional army-colon alignment: all basic factors that had combined
to produce the recent crisis still existed. If they could not be
remedied there was bound to be more trouble. Further trouble could be
averted only through an effective purge against "equivocators" and
"Fascist-minded plotters" both in the army and in de Gaulle's own
administration. 39 Sulzberger's comment was sustained by later events,
for the plotters remained unchecked and, through de Gaulle's
indecision, again had the opportunity to bring France to the brink of
anarchy and chaos.
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In this context, Ferhat Abbas addressed the co7on community,
asking for a joint effort to build a common country and to forget the
nineteenth-century illusion of false privileges. He insisted that
Algeria was the patrimony of all, and called for an "Algeria for the
Algerians, for all the Algerians whatever be their origin". Stating
that the independence of Algeria, like that of all the other ex-French
colonies, was inevitable as it was written in the march of history,
Abbas cautioned the colons that they could participate in the
construction of a new country only by adhering honestly and sincerely
to the principle of self-determination, for there is "... no army
which can assure your future in the colonial framework". "Only the
construction of an Algerian state can permit us to live together and
guarantee the future of our children". He again reaffirmed the
G.P.R.A.'s readiness to enter into talks with the French Government on
the basis of the de Gaulle offer of self-determination, but insisted
on sufficient guarantees for the free conduct of voting.40
The New York Times reaction to the recent G.P.R.A. declaration
was predictable. Claiming that it found it hard to "avoid a sense of
disappointment", It put the blame on the Algerian leaders for what it
saw as once again a missed opportunity for peace as had been the case
immediately after de Gaulle's offer on 16 September the previous year.
Taking vigorously the side of the French Government, an editorial
asserted that "President de Gaulle needs help from the rebel leaders,
but cannot accept terms made by them". 4' The Economist, which was
never openly hostile to the G.P.R.A. on the other hand, viewed the
Algerian demands for guarantees with much more impartiality,
portraying them as understandable and justifiable. It pointed out
that the "G.P.R.A.'s present guarantees are its army and its
organization", that it would be tactless to abandon them simply
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because of General de Gaulle's rhetorical promises and "reputation for
honesty", and that, in any case, many nationalist leaders questioned
that reputation. The nationalists emphasized the General's plan to
hold cantonal elections in Algeria without the participation of the
G.P.R.A. as a fair justification of their mistrust and reservations.
Unlike The New York Times which reproached the Algerians for not doing
enough to hasten the process of peace talks, The Economist urged the
French Government to make positive moves towards negotiations with the
G.P.R.A., advising de Gaulle that time now seemed ripe and safe to
make such moves in the wake of the collapse of the recent pied noir
insurrection: "If he waits two or three months, the unlikely alliance
of settlers and army could be renewed on fresh barricades".42
Hopes of a quick settlement after the defeat of the barricaders
were soon dashed during de Gaulle's visit to Algeria in March 1960.
To appease the army and colon extremists, he openly retreated from the
self-determination offer which he had promised a few months earlier.
TMThere will be no Dienbienphu in Algeria...", he declared. "The
Algerian problem will not be solved for a long time... Everything
hinges on final victory of the French army". 43
 This anticlimactic
rhetoric provoked angry replies from the G.P.R.A. which accused de
Gaulle of closing the door on negotiations and a peaceful settlement:
"It is clear that the French Government is afraid of a popular verdict
[in an Algerian referendum]. This is why the Government has voided
self-determination of its substance and is seeking to revive the
illusion of a military solution, [and] perpetuate colonialism.. •1,44
In this context, the Algerian leaders reaffirmed their commitment to
the armed struggle for "Colonialism leaves us no other way out".
Carrying this argument further, Ferhat Abbas stated that destroying
colonialism in Algeria did not only mean emancipating a people, but
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also enfranchising Africa and insuring the world's peace.45
Time magazine, offering its appraisal of the pessimistic mood now
reigning in Algeria as a result of de Gaulle's "somber message",
reasonably remarked that this might have cheered some colon and army
extremists but it pleased hardly anyone else. It vigorously attacked
de Gaulle's recent statements, and woefully observed that the peace
prospects that had opened following the barricades week now completely
vanished. 46 The New York Times pressed the same theme two weeks
later, stating that a settlement to the conflict seemed far away as
the positions of both sides were now farther apart than ever. Unlike
Time, however, it again blamed the Algerian leaders for not taking de
Gaulle's offer of self-determination which it generously painted as a
"fair one" despite the strings attached to it. 47 The paper clearly
believed in a settlement along the lines drawn by General de Gaulle:
an "independent" Algeria closely associated with France and N.A.T.O.
The American Government shared the same views. Remarking that the
recent difficulties had not enhanced the prospects of peace, Assistant
Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Francis 0. Wilcox,
asserted that the United States favoured direct negotiations between
48
the two sides.
unabated.
American support for France, however, continued
Searching farther afield for the international ramifications of
the Algerian-French conflict, The New York Times lost no opportunity
to underline its international scope especially its effects on the
Western alliance. 49 Arguing along a similar line, The Economist
predicted that more internationalization of the conflict was imminent
as the chances of a negotiated settlement now seemed to have vanished,
for the Algerian military leaders "must think in terms of military
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aid" and the politicians "must look for international backing". It
believed that the Algerians would have no problem gaining such
backing. Whereas the Soviets might hesitate to offer open support,
while they were still wooing France for other reasons, the Chinese
"would not have such scruples".50
Meanwhile, France continued to enjoy the unequivocal support of
N.A.T.O. This continued to anger the Algerians who resented such
backing for colonialism. In May 1960 Ferhat Abbas, in a telegram
addressed to the Foreign Ministers of the N.A.T.O. countries meeting
in Turkey, vehemently attacked the Organization for sustaining "French
imperialism" in Algeria, urging each member state to dissociate itself
from colonialism. 5 ' The Algerians particularly singled out the United
States' colossal military support for France without which, they
believed, the French military campaign would have come to an immediate
halt. The Algerian leaders were always anxious to trace and publicize
the flow of American equipment and personnel to the French army in
Algeria. A G.P.R.A. statement in May, for example, outlined the
recent American military delivery of military assistance to France:
"American factories have just delivered a new
shipment of helicopters to the French expeditionary
force.
In addition, the United States has completed an
initial delivery of bombers of the skyraider type to
replace the B-26. And T-28A assault planes have been
delivered and have gone into action.
American technicians in Algeria are responsie for
ground maintenance and repair of these planes".
The statement concluded by stating that the United States total
support for France's policies in Algeria would not allude the memory
of the Algerian people. Two weeks earlier the G.P.R.A.'s
representative at the United Nations had appealed to President
Eisenhower to stop supplying France with the most advanced military
hardware that would be used against Algerian civilians.53
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This and similar appeals did not fall on receptive ears as the
United States' main preoccupation continued to be what it saw as the
threat posed by International communism to Algeria and Africa. Ivan
B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, urged the
American Administration to back the efforts of the African peoples to
achieve independence, before they turned to the Soviet Union for help,
arguing that the continuation of the Algerian conflict, in particular,
would facilitate the Soviet efforts to gain influence in the area.54
But the American Government was not prepared to modify its pro-French
stance, and continued to favour a purely French solution to the
conflict.
The Algerian leaders, however, always insisted on a policy
independent of both the East and the West. 55 They adopted a
middle-of-the-road attitude in order to convince France's allies of
their neutralist intentions so as to dissuade the West from continuing
support for French colonial policies. Until the beginning of 1960,
the G.P.R.A. had limited its relations with the Communist world to
social and cultural cooperation, mainly to avert engulfing Algeria
Into Cold War rivalry. But when it became convinced that the West
would not change its stance towards Algeria's demands for
independence, the G.P.R.A. signed a significant agreement with China
whereby the Chinese Government pledged technical, financial and
military assistance. The Soviet Union, North Korea and North Vietnam
later pledged similar assistance. 56 In this context, commenting on
assertions in Western circles that the Algerian revolution had been
penetrated by international communism as a result of the recent
G.P.R.A. rapprochement with the East, Ferhat Abbas stated that the
Algerians would not choose to be killed by Western arms rather than
defend themselves with Eastern ones. He reiterated the view so
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frequently expressed by the G.P.R.A. that the Algerian people would
offer a hand of friendship to all peoples who supported the Algerian
cause.
Western support for France was seen by the Algerians as a
decisive factor that was prolonging the war and, therefore, prolonging
the suffering of civilians. Such suffering, as already explained,
took different shapes. According to The Economist people were, for
example, forced Into regroupment camps - 110 of them. They were cut
off from their neighbours by double fences which were electrified,
"lit by searchlight, targeted by artillery, with a 'prohibited area'
between them thickly patrolled by armoured cars and tanks". People
were under constant control and needed permits even to go to work.
This is in addition to the physical suffering inflicted upon them by
the police and paratroopers. As The Economist pointed out, hardly a
family had not had one or more killed in the fighting or in the
counter-actions arrested, imprisoned, deported and even tortured;
lawyers had long lists of relatives who had disappeared and never been
heard of again. 58 All this might have been of interest to The New
York Times readers had they been told about it, which they were not.
But, despite its use of such repressive methods, the French army
failed to isolate the local population from the F.L.N.
De Gaulle's Talk of an NAlgerian AlgeriaTM
On 14 June, after the failure of other means, General de Gaulle
made a significant overture towards peace talks with the G.P.R.A. and
spoke for the first time of an "Algerian Algeria", as opposed to the
previously dominant dogma of "French Algeria". 59 The G.P.R.A., in a
communique which The New York Times printed verbatim, welcomed his
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reaffirmation "in an explicit manner the right of the Algerian people
to self-determination", reiterating its conviction that if the
organization of the proposed referendum were "surrounded by all the
indispensable guarantees of sincerity" the choice of the Algerian
people would certainly be independence.60
The reaction of the press to these new developments was mixed.
The (London) Times at first got carried away by the glamorous picture
General de Gaulle had drawn of Algeria and filled its reportage with
heavy doses of French claims. It went even farther stating
editorially that by any standards it was hard to see how he could have
gone further. 6 ' it soon, however, became aware of the complications
that lay ahead, not least army-co7on opposition to any possible
progress towards a settlement. The paper praised both sides for
showing "great political courage". The Algerians' decision to
forthrightly accept the offer of direct talks could not have been an
easy one to make: they were now after six years "used to the
struggle", their confidence to achieve victory was running high and
international solidarity with their cause had transcended all
geographical boundaries. It went as far as painting these new
developments as the beginning of a new chapter that would transform
the international situation.62
The Economist's reaction was more cautious, for false hopes had
previously been aroused by similar offers and the French people, who
were anxious to see an end to the war that was draining their
resources, had by now become familiar with their "political version of
the Finnish sauna" - they were submitted alternately to the warm rays
of hope and the chilly impact of gloom. It particularly warned
against potential outbreaks by extremist army officers and die-hard
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pieds noirs, and reproached General de Gaulle for allowing them to
recover and reform their ranks after the failure of their coup a few
months earlier. Because of this, the French Government's position in
negotiating a settlement with the Algerian leaders seemed less
comfortable than in early February after the collapse of the colon
insurrection, when the army-colon conspirators were in almost total
disarray and despair.63
The New York Times warmly welcomed the G.P.R.A.'s prompt response
to the new proposals and its expressed readiness to send
representatives to Paris to open up talks with the French Government.
This attracted extensive coverage under prominent front-page
headlines, and editorial relief was expressed that at long last direct
talks were in the offing. Under the title "Hope for Algeria", it
believed that "[a] ray of sunshine has broken through the dark clouds
that hang over Algeria". Like The Economist, however, it cautioned
that no easy solution could be expected because no formula of solution
would be able to satisfy all sides especially the extremist colons and
army officers. A solution was badly needed not only by Algeria and
France but by the world at large, for "Algeria is one of those points
where East and West, Africa and Europe, nationalism and colonialism
clash head on".64
The same theme was reiterated - also with a note of increased
concern - in a long analytical piece in The Economist two days later.
It reasoned that as the Algerian negotiators were on their way to
Paris the difficult part began, and vigorously urged General de Gaulle
to avert any complications that might hinder the process of talks; for
if such talks broke down he would be the primary loser and his
extremist opponents, Soustelle and Bidault, theonly gainers. 65
 This
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view had been strongly articulated by Ferhat Abbas who had warned that
if the "colonialists of Paris and ultras of Algiers" were not
disarmed, they would not hesitate to try to sabotage the negotiations
and perpetuate the war. He had also urged the Algerians to be "more
than ever vigilant", arguing that under these circumstances the fact
of beginning the negotiations did not yet mean peace.66
In a "News Analysis" piece by Robert C. Doty from Paris, The New
York Times highlighted the significance of the current Franco-Algerian
talks and the "high stakes" involved, not only for France but for the
Western world as a whole. 67 An Algerian settlement would help the
Western powers to consolidate their position in Africa and Asia at a
time when Cold War rivalry was at its peak. Such position had been
badly shaken because of the considerable support France was getting
from its allies regarding its Algeria policies. "I cannot think of
any other factor that would do more to improve the whole Western
position in Asia and Africa", declared a Western statesman, "than a
peaceful settlement of the Algerian trouble". An Algerian settlement
would especially help to strengthen the Western defences by allowing
the cream of French combat strength now based in Algeria to
consolidate N.A.T.0.'s European shield.68
For France, Doty pointedly added, a settlement would allow the
$3,000,000,000 that was being spent every year to keep up with the
military requirements in Algeria, to be diverted to some badly needed
economic and social projects in France, and would help "heal current
ills of French political life". A failure to reach a settlement would
lead to a serious aggravation of those problems and in the event of a
breakdown of the current talks, the Algerian leaders might be forced
to move closer to the Communist world especiall' China. This would
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heighten competition between the East and West to draw the emerging
Afro-Asian countries to their side; consequently tempting France's
allies to try to dissociate themselves from its policies on Algeria in
order to "score points with the uncommitted nations". Making the
suggestive remark that neither side would want to be seen to be
responsible for the failure of negotiations once started, Doty
forecast that both the French Government and the Algerian leaders
would "go to great lengths of concession and conciliation in the peace
talks". In retrospect, however, it is reasonable to argue that this
was no more than wishful thinking, for the talks soon ended in
deadl ock.69
Such deadlock was a direct result of the inflexibility of the
attitude of the French delegation to the Melun preliminary talks, and
its rejection of all the Algerian demands for guarantees of the
freedom of the official G.P.R.A. delegation to speak and move without
restrictions whilst negotiating in Paris. 70 The Algerian delegates
wanted assurances that Ferhat Abbas and his delegation would be free
to have access to the international media, contact the detained
Algerian leaders and meet General de Gaulle. The French Government,
however, was far from prepared to offer such guarantees, but sought to
keep the G.P.R.A. negotiators virtually incommunicado.7'
The G.P.R.A. reacted to the breakdown of the Melun talks by
denouncing the French attempts to unilaterally set the conditions of
the negotiations. The Algerian delegates to the official talks would
be "deprived of every liberty and status of negotiators" if not
treated as "political prisoners": this French attitude reflected the
state of mind that in effect constituted a refusal to negotiate.
Carrying this argument further, the G.P.R.A. insisted that a meeting
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between the two delegations could be "fruitful" only when the
conditions and details of such meeting were not imposed but were the
result of an accord worked out by the two parties. It reaffirmed its
readiness to send another delegation to Paris, if the elementary
principle of bilateral accord on the conditions of talks were taken
into consideration by the French Government.72
The New York Times correspondent in Tunis, Thomas Brady, drew
some comfort from the "conciliatory" tone of the G.P.R.A.'s
commun1qu	 but averted criticism of the French Government's
undiplomatic attitude. 73
 Yet, its editorial "First Hurdle in Algeria"
accepted the Algerian argument that the G.P.R.A. chief negotiator "was
treated as a virtual prisoner" by the French who also wanted to "hold
the definitive negotiations with Premier Ferhat Abbas under the same
conditions". It concluded by cautioning that too much was at stake
for France, as well as Algeria, to permit the talks to collapse before
they hardly begun. 74 The United States Government, however, preferred
complete silence on Algeria during and after the Melun talks. This
angered some Congressmen like Senator Mansfield who criticized the
State Department for not lending enough support to France which, he
claimed, was doing all it could in a very difficult situation.78
The Economist, unlike The New York Times, was explicit in its
criticism of the way the French Government had approached the Melun
talks. It was intellectual enough to reason that the French ultimatum
to the Algerian negotiators would have made sense if the Algerian
revolution had been in a desperate military position and had no other
choice but to accept the terms the French had imposed. However, as
the weekly rightly observed, all signs pointed to the contrary and to
the fact that the Algerians "were not compelled; any more than were
206
the French, to accept any conditions whatever". The G.P.R.A. was
praised for Its "prompt and skillful" reply, especially for its
readiness to send another delegation to Paris for talks under normal
bilateral conditions. The Economist concluded by stating that if the
French were not able to impose a solution by force of arms, they would
not of course be able to have terms of negotiations of their own
choosing, for "[ w ] hat is true of war is true of diplomacy".76
Meanwhile, support for an independent Algeria was gaining
momentum in France where more and more voices were being raised in
protest against the continuation of the war and for an immediate
resumption of talks with the G.P.R.A. 77 French public opinion,
anxious to see a quick end to the war, rallied behind the slogan
"peace in Algeria"; desertions from the French army multiplied while
many young Frenchmen pursued their studies only to obtain a
deferment. 78 Trade unions, students and youth organizations made 28
July a day of action for peace in Algeria. France was undergoing a
"crisis of conscience" especially among the intellectual community,
whose opposition to the war was growing into active support for the
Algerian revolution as epitomized by the Jeanson trial.
Francis Jeanson, author of L'Alge'rie Hors La Lol (1955), was one
of the most effective champions of the Algerian revolution in France.
In 1957 he had set up an organized network of underground support for
the F.L.N. in France, involving as many as three thousand
volunteers. 79 Some of them were arrested on 24 February 1960 and went
on trial on 5 September. On the day of their trial as many as 121
prominent intellectuals, writers and artists signed a declaration in
Support of the Jeanson group and in support of the right of Frenchmen
to resist drafting in the Algerian war: "We respect and consider
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justified", the declaration said, "the refusal to take arms against
the Algerian people":
"We respect and deem justified the conduct of Frenchmen
who consider it their duty to give aid and protection
to the Algerians who are oppressed in the name of the
French people. The cause of the Algerian people, which
is contributing in a decisive way to the ruining 0of the
colonial system, is the cause of all free men".
In response, the French Government ordered the arrest of those
thought to have been behind the declaration. The French press,
fearing similar reprisals, generally ignored the declaration. When
Verite'-Liberte', L'Express and France-Observateur decided to publish
it, they were immediately seized by the authorities. The premises of
other publications like Les Temps Mondernes and Esprit were repeatedly
searched by the police. This, in fact, turned into a serious threat
both to the liberty of the press and to the freedom of speech in
France, giving some justification to the view that freedom of the
press in the West "is only an illusion". 81 Academics were dismissed
from their teaching posts, actors banned from public radio, television
and theatre, and civil servants suspended from their duties, as a
result of a large-scale Government clamp down on the supporters of the
decl arat ion.82
As The (London) Times observed, France was caught between two
wars: a physical war that was being fought in Algeria and a
psychological one that was being fought in France itself and both were
crucial to its future. 83 Branding the Government's measures as
"Draconian" and a "startling riposte", the paper argued that this
could only dismay those friends of France who looked upon it as a
nation among the leaders of the West. When this type of attrition
against the intellectual community had been waged in some Communist
countries, it was widely condemned in the West: "It must be condemned
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with even more vehemence when it happens in what is supposed to be the
free world". 84 The New York Times, on the other hand, preferred
silence on this issue.
Meanwhile, General de Gaulle continued speechifying throughout
France beating the drums of "grandeur", "strength" and
"determination", promising that "peace is at our door". 85
 He again
ridiculed the United Nations claiming that there were no lessons
France could learn from others. Whilst it was possible for him, as The
Economist pointed out, to blame the breakdown of the Melun talks on a
possible misunderstanding and therefore invite the Algerians for new
talks, he misguidedly assumed all responsibility for the conduct of
his envoys and, hence, for the collapse of the talks. To the
Algerians, this was further confirmation of the French Government's
intransigence. 86
The G.P.R.A. again accused the French authorities of putting an
abrupt end to hopes that a peaceful settlement could be negotiated and
approved by both sides. It reiterated its commitment to the principle
of self-determination on the basis of a referendum to be supervised by
the United Nations, guaranteeing the geographical and national unity
of Algeria without the Sahara being amputated from the rest of the
country. 87 The G.P.R.A. vehemently attacked the French Government's
intention to grant the army full control of the supposed referendum
and "to subordinate the free choice of a people to the 'good will' of
an army of occupation". 88 Self-determination presupposes a free
referendum declared Ferhat Abbas, and "this freedom would be illusory
if the French Army controlled and organized the plebiscite by
terrorizing the people". 89 The Algerian leaders had never been in a
stronger position, for it was now clear that the war would be brought
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to an end only with the consent of the G.P.R.A.; and despite the
all-out Challe offensive, the A.L.N. maintained its military momentum
and kept the French army under constant pressure.90
Faced with a strong Algerian determination to achieve
independence, a growing crisis at home, condemnation of French
policies abroad and wider international support for the Algerian
cause, General de Gaulle spoke for the first time of an "Algerian
republic". De Gaulle offered the Algerians three options:
Frenchification, autonomy in association with France or complete
independence. The New York Times, now putting the full weight of its
editorial commentary behind the offer of self-determination, intimated
that "it manifestly makes no sense for Algeria, far better
developed... [than any of the 15 newly independent African states] to
be denied self-determination". 9 ' Highlighting the mounting opposition
to Algeria's right to self-determination amongst extremist pieds noirs
and army officers, it made the suggestive proposition that with his
recent pronouncements de Gaulle had "crossed the Rubicon" and turning
back would be too dangerous. 92
 Meanwhile, the G.P.R.A. wanted to know
whether the results of the proposed referendum would apply to Algeria
as an entity or would each of the two communities, Algerian and colon,
choose its own solution, thus leading to partition; and how proper
supervision of the plebiscite would be guaranteed to avoid ballot
rigging and interference by the army in the voting process.
Meanwhile the "appalling figures" of casualties and losses
inflicted by the war on the Algerian population were emphasized by the
Afro-Asian delegates to the United Nations General Assembly. In this
context, The New York Times informed its readers that what the
Algerians and their natural supporters were hoping for from the
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Assembly's current debate on Algeria, was to secure a U.N. presence
that would guarantee a free conduct of the plebiscite and prevent the
French army from applying the coercive methods which had justified the
traditional euphemism e'lection	 L'Alge'rienne. Arguing that the
General Assembly would not be able to bring in force to bear on France
to change its policies The New York Times, still unable to conceal its
inclination towards the French point of view, reiterated its support
for the idea of a settlement outside the United Nations. It went even
farther to call for the termination of the current General Assembly
debate on Algeria in order to enable de Gaulle to carry out his
"courageous proposal": any attempt by the United Nations would
"undermine the French President's mission on which rests the hope for
peace"
With the benefit of hindsight, however, it is reasonable to argue
that the paper's claim was too shortsighted and its hailing of what it
called General de Gaulle's "courageous proposal" was too naive and
generous. The proposal, perfectly timed to coincide with the General
Assembly's debate on the Algerian question, was partially aimed at yet
again distracting the critical attention of the external world, at
luring the Assembly into believing that a settlement was just around
the corner and, therefore, buying France more time. Such "courageous
proposal", as explained later, did nothing at least in the short run
to bring about any change in the Algerian situation which would
deteriorate to a more alarming scale.
Against this background General de Gaulle made another visit to
Algeria in December 1960, amidst growing opposition to his policies
among the extremist colons and army officers. The New York Times lost
no opportunity to warn that both his own political fortunes and the
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future of France were at stake, blaming this on what it called the
"extremists on both sides". 94 To the Algerian nationalists this was
an inexcusable insult: the paper quite unreasonably put the Algerians
and the die-hard colons on the same footing and ignored the striking
differences between the two sides in every aspect. Whilst, for
example, the Algerians believed they were fighting for the
"liberation" of their country from foreign occupation, the extremist
pieds noirs, who most of them had been Petainists during the Second
World War, 95 were conducting a campaign of violence aimed at
preventing progress, and at preserving an anachronistic colonial
system. During the de Gaulle visit, the extremist colons, supported
by some army officers, held strikes and led demonstrations across
Algiers in protest against the offer of self-determination and in
support of L'Alge'rie Française. These led to sudden
counter-demonstrations by the Algerian population with the shouts of
,
"V/ ye L'Algerie independante", "V/ ye Le F.L.N." and "Abbas au
pouvoir", which came to overshadow the co7on protest. 96 The resort of
the French army and police to indiscriminate reprisals against
civilians typified France's hysteria and epitomized the boiling
situation in Algeria.
The New York Times had to react to this turning point in the
struggle. Perhaps confirming Gultung and Ruge's theory that the more
negative the news the bigger the headlines and the more prominent the
coverage, 97
 the paper reported the December demonstrations and their
aftermath at length under the front-page four-column headline:
61 DEAD IN ALGIERS RIOTS;
TROOPS FIRE ON MOSLEMS;
DE GAULLE REMAINS FIRM.
However, its usage of the term "riots" was rather inaccurate. Most
evidence points to the fact that the nationalist demonstrations,
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unlike those of the colons, were highly disciplined and intended to be
peaceful. Describing with evident indignation how "censorship was
clamped on press dispatches" from Algeria by the colonial authorities,
the paper informed its readers that the instructions to the censors
forbade any indication that the death toll might have been greater
than the official figure, any reference to the display of the Algerian
flag by the demonstrators, or any hint that the police and troops had
opened fire on the crowd. The paper, whose reportage of the event was
on the whole refreshing, concluded by revealing that any political
commentary had been blocked by the censors to save France from
worldwide embarrassment 98
The events of December and their aftermath were carefully
followed by the American State Department. Addressing the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on 6 January 1961, Secretary Herter
highlighted the serious nature of the Algerian situation and its
international ramifications. "In Algeria, we have a continuing
problem", he declared. "I say 'we' advisedly because it is a problem
the impact of which has repercussions through the whole of Africa,
through the whole of the Middle East into the Soviet bloc". In
reference to the forthcoming referendum and recognizing the French
army's unhealthy record of ballot rigging and voting frauds, he voiced
his doubts whether the proposed plebiscite would be honest, free and
fair. 98
The Economist went farther than The New York Times to emphasize
the significance of the Algerian demonstrations which had been
provoked by the pieds noirs: as the "great patient mass" of Algerians
took to the streets waving their national flags and crying for an
independent Algeria, the Algerian conflict entered a new phase.100
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Pursuing this theme in a leading article in the same issue entitled
"Algeria's Cry", the London weekly intimated that the demonstrators,
who had lost their lives under the brutality of the paratroopers, like
the scores of thousands who had died in the field during the past six
years of the conflict, had completely "destroyed the myth of L'Algé'rie
Française. Without that myth, or some form of it, the French position
in Algeria was untenable.
In the words of one French officer, those massive demonstrations
represented "a psychological Dien-Bien-Phu" for France.' 0' For the
G.P.R.A. this was a vote of confidence in its leadership and policies.
The demonstrators' discipline and organization to a large extent
epitomized the degree of maturity reached by the Algerian revolution.
Medical committees were immediately set up on the spot to supervise
and control the transfer of the wounded to improvised medical centres.
Press committees were established by the demonstrators to respond to
the questions of journalists who had come in large numbers from
different parts of the world.' 02
 The December events were, in short,
of massive significance for Algeria and its political future. The
myth of an Algeria led by the colons and an illusory third force was
completely dashed and negotiations with the G.P.R.A. once again proved
to be the only possible way out for France.' 03 They represented a
turning point in General de Gaulle's approach to Algeria for, while in
Algiers, he had been able to measure the "impetuous power of the
F.L.N." and the genuine desire of the Algerian population for
independence. The nationalist demonstrations persuaded him of the
necessity to talk more seriously and more profoundly with the G.P.R.A.
as the only spokesman for the Algerians.'04
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Time magazine, like The New York Times, gave considerable
attention to the Algerian demonstrations but concentrated more on the
brutality of the police and paratroopers who had reacted by "firing
sub-machine guns from the hip". It reflected the French army's
frustration and constant refusal to accept the reality that it was
only a matter of time before Algeria regained independence, and quoted
the colonel who had ordered the indiscriminate shootings: "My men have
been fighting the rebels in the Auras mountains. They are amazed to
come against the very same rebel flag in the heart of Algiers".
Impressed by the courage and determination of the demonstrators, it
wondered how the police and army brutal response had not deterred the
crowds and "still the green-and-white flags waved...". As a hope and
a plan L'Alge'rie Française was dead, the magazine observed, and summed
up the mood by quoting a typical cry from an Algerian woman shouting
at a group of paratroopers: "Cowards! you were thrown out of Tunisia,
you will be thrown out of Algeria. Here, all you can do is make war
on women and children".'05
The Algiers demonstrations and their aftermath had immense echoes
at the United Nations where the Algerian question was being discussed
by the General Assembly for the sixth year running. Meanwhile, Ferhat
Abbas sent messages to many world leaders - the U.N. General Secretary
Dag Hammarskjoeld, Nehru, Tito, Macmillan, Chou En Lai, Khrushchev as
well as to the International Committee of the Red Cross - informing
them of the high casualty toll among the Algerian demonstrators and
asking for their intervention to stop the bloodshed: "We send you this
appeal urging you to act so that this genocide against the Algerian
people ceases immediately".'06
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Addressing itself to the problem of colonialism, the General
Assembly, after two weeks of heated debate in December 1960, adopted a
significant resolution sponsored by the Afro-Asian countries, which
called for immediate steps to be taken towards a speedy and
unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.
The United States and many other Western powers failed to support the
resolution, and so aroused the anger and indignation of the emerging
nations. On 19 December the Assembly adopted a resolution by 63 votes
to 8 wIth 27 abstentions, recognizing the responsibility of the United
Nations to assist Algeria along the road to independence on the basis
of territorial and national integrity.'07
The United States again abstained. The American delegates to the
Assembly again argued that a settlement to the Algerian problem could
best be achieved by direct negotiations between the two parties
concerned outside the United Nations. 108
 What made the United States
abstain rather than vote against the resolution, as it had done
previously, was that it realized that Algeria's independence was now
only a matter of time and, thus, feared being identified with the
colonial powers that voted against the resolution. The American
Government believed that an outright opposition to the resolution
would portray the Soviet Union, which voted for it, as the champion of
Algeria's right to independence and thus, enhance the reputation of
the communist world amongst the emerging nations in Africa and Asia.
Yet, to the Algerians, the American abstention was not in any way more
credible or more moderate than its outright support for France in
previous U.N. sessions. The G.P.R.A. insisted that the United States
again failed to back up the right of the Algerian people to
independence, and also failed to live up to its traditional
anti-colonialist rhetoric.
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The Algerian cause was, however, championed by other delegates.
For example, the Saudi delegate vehemently reproached the N.A.T.O.
countries for their conspiracy with France in order to block any U.N.
resolution on Algeria. The Soviet delegate attacked what he called
the imperialists' exploitation of Algeria's natural riches, while
ignoring the Algerians' inalienable rights of ownership of their
natural resources, declaring that the Soviet Union saw the French talk
of a referendum as a subterfuge to keep the United Nations from
censoring France.'° 9 American support for France continued to spoil
United States' relations with the newly independent African states.
During the second All-African Conference, which had been held in Tunis
in January 1960, American assistance of French colonial policies in
Algeria had come under vehement attacks for having "serious
prejudicial efforts on the African peoples". The Conference had
declared that United States military, financial and diplomatic support
for France was primarily to blame for the retarding of a settlement to
the Algerian problem and urged the American Government to abandon its
partisan attitude in order to safeguard Afro-American friendship and
protect peace in Africa and in the world as a whole.°
The New York Times reaction to the United Nations handling of the
Algerian question was predictable. Acting as the guardian of Western
interests, it stoutly defended the stance taken by Western delegates
on the General Assembly's resolution on the issue of colonialism. It
blamed what it called the "sweeping form" on which the resolution had
been drafted which might leave it open to serious misinterpretations
and violations of the Charter. The paper was especially concerned
with the future of the Western island possessions like Puerto Rico
which would not be able to stand on their own feet. Using the
traditional East-West rivalry to make a political argument, it
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asserted that the West had been carrying out the principles adopted in
the recent resolution long before the U.N. debate, by freeing many
countries with a few hundred million people. It argued that it found
it more urgent to apply those principles to what it called the "new
colonial empires of Soviet Russia and Communist China, which have
subjugated half of Europe and Asia"." 1 By adopting this attitude, the
paper was reducing everything to Cold War ideological confrontation.
This perhaps confirmed the theory that an inherent "Western
loyalty-bias" usually affects the coverage of non-Western news by the
Western media, which will be addressed in much more detail later on in
this thesis.
The New York Times lost no opportunity to reiterate its
opposition to the United Nations discussion of the Algerian question.
It tried hard to make an analogy between the Algerian situation and
the Congo crisis and blamed the plight of that country on the
"premature independence" it was given by Belgium, arguing that Algeria
could suffer a similar fate.' 12 In so doing it saw parallels where few
existed. The Algerian problem and its circumstances were totally
different from those of the Congo: what was happening in the Congo was
the by-product of many intricate factors involving, amongst other
things, the usual ideological rivalry between the East and the West,
neo-colonialist expediency and internal struggle for political power.
Whilst the paper persisted in expressing unequivocal confidence in
General de Gaulle and his policies, the General continued to be
vehemently criticized by many Frenchmen for not moving fast enough to
end the Algerian-French conflict, because of his unwillingness to
antagonize the extremist pieds noirs who still wanted a French
Algeria. Among them was the former Premier Pierre Mendes-France, who
argued that de Gaulle wanted to be the "man ofeveryone, of unanimity,
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the man of those who are right and also of those who are wrong". This
was what was retarding a solution to the conflict and preventing
direct talks with the G.P.R.A., despite the fact that the sweeping
majority of the French people wanted negotiations with the Algerian
leadership and were convinced that France would never be able to
control Algerian nationalism or prevent Algeria from eventually
gaining independence. 113 The New York Times pointed to the strength of
such opinions whilst at the same time maintained its traditional
pro-de Gaulle posture. It was the General's reluctance that enabled
the extremist co7ons and their natural allies in the army to rebuild
their strength and prepare for yet another showdown with Paris.
French Referendum on Algeria
The much publicized referendum on General de Gaulle's policies on
Algeria finally took place in January 1961. In response to the
question: "Do you approve the bill submitted to the French people by
the President of the Republic both concerning the self-determination
of the Algerian populations and the organization of public authority
in Algeria before self determination?" 75.2 percent of the twenty
million voters in France voted "yes" and 24.7 percent voted "no".114
In Algeria, however, 42 percent of the Algerian voters followed the
G.P.R.A.'s instructions and boycotted the referendum, despite the
French army's pressure. 115 The Algerian leadership was opposed to the
new French proposals because they failed to recognize the G.P.R.A. as
the only spokesman for the Algerian people. The December
demonstrations and the outcome of the referendum represented a
significant victory for the F.L.N. and confirmed its popular appeal.
The Algerian leaders advised the local population to boycott the
provisional institutions and administrative apparatus that were to
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come out of the referendum, warning against taking part in the new
colonial scheme." 6 In this context, The Economist accurately
forecast that no Algerians would come forward to take part in a
governing political body other than the G.P.R.A. Emphasizing the
danger represented by the extremist colons, it vigorously warned that
if peace were not negotiated Within the next few months, chaos and
violence would engulf the country" 7 The New York Times, also
stressing the theme of danger, had a few days earlier remarked that
the chaos that might be brought about by the extremist colons would
make the disorders Belgium was encountering in the Congo "seem like an
amiable picnic".118
On 16 January the G.P.R.A. announced its readiness to begin
negotiations with the French Government on conditions of a "free
consultation of the Algerian people". This, unlike earlier votes,
would have to be a free referendum to decide effectively the political
future of Algeria." 9 Under the title "Hope for Algeria", The New
York Times warmly greeted the Algerian leaders' declaration, branding
it as "the most conciliatory and reasonable pronouncement they ever
niade".' 2° Ten days later, however, it again could not resist playing
the French Government's own game by applying Cold War politics to
Algeria, asserting that the ultimate success of the Franco-Algerian
negotiations would largely depend on whether President Kennedy and
Premier Khrushchev could relax East-West tensions and, thus,
discourage the Algerians from counting too much on Eastern aid.'2'
This view was later reiterated by The (London) Times which intoned
that the Congo crisis had been an additional warning to both S ides to
prevent at all costs an extension of the Cold War to Algeria.I?2
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In his inaugural address on 20 January President Kennedy promised
United States support for the aspirations of colonial peoples.123
This was perhaps in direct reaction to Khrushchev's reiteration, two
weeks earlier, of the Soviet Union's commitment to assist all "peoples
fighting for liberation".124 A few weeks later, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk made a different reference to Algeria and expressed American
sympathy for the Algerian people's demand for self-determination,
promising to keep Algeria away from East-West rivalry) 25
 Having by
now realized that it was only a matter of time before Algeria became
independent, The New York Times addressed itself to the question of
how such independence would be arranged, and when. It emphasized the
importance of direct Franco-Algerian talks and put its full editorial
weight behind the forthcoming talks, arguing hopefully for their
continuation without interruption.'26
The major points of difference between the G.P.R.A. and the
French Government by mid-1961 were the future of the Sahara oil
riches, the future position of the colons and the link between
military arrangements for a ceasefire and the process of political
talks.' 27
 Columnist C.L. Sulzberger, recognizing the difficulties
which might arise particularly from France's demand for a lease at the
naval base of Mers-el-Kebir and joint control of the Saharan oil,
pressed the suggestive view that the negotiations should be pursued to
their ultimate point: "It is hard to imagine total failure". The
risks would be too great for all sides - Algeria, France and the
Western world.'28
The next Franco-Algerian talks were due to take place in
Evian-sur-les .
-Bajns in France. But to guarantee their freedom of
movement and speech and access to the world media, the Algerian
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delegation chose to reside in Switzerland close to the French
border.' 29
 Yet, the French Government's intentions of negotiating
with the M.N.A.' 3° as an equal party with the G.P.R.A., provoked angry
protests and led to the G.P.R.A.'s decision to withdraw from the talks
before they had actually started.'3 ' But it reiterated its
willingness to open negotiations as soon as possible to achieve peace.
The breakdown of the talks had not been unpredicted. Ferhat Abbas had
warned that negotiations were not peace, and that the road was strewn
with snares and obstacles: the "greed and stubbornness" of French
imperialism could still make negotiations still-born.' 32 The New York
Times was quick to express hope that the suspension of the Evian talks
meant only a delay rather than a collapse of the process of direct
negotiations. 133
This hope was however quickly dashed by General de Gaulle's
tactless rhetoric, threatening that if the Algerians chose complete
independence as a solution to the conflict he would cut off economic
aid to Algeria, withdraw the pied noir community from Algeria and
expel Algerians living in France. Commenting on "De Gaulle's
Thunderbolt", The New York Times ventured so far towards criticizing
de Gaulle as to declare that his recent statements had come "with the
impact of an atomic bomb", reasoning that this attitude was
dramatically opposed to the wishes of millions in both Algeria and
France. It warned that this "impasse" could only benefit the
extremist co7ons. Yet, despite this temporary criticism, the paper
maintained its entente cordiale towards General de Gaulle and its
support for his Algerian policies remained more or less uniform. It
was quick to belittle the damaging impact of his recent statements on
the prospects of peace, asserting that they should not be taken with
too much literalism. 134 The (London) Times took a similar position,
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arguing that there had to be more than enough in common between the
aims of the G.P.R.A. and the French Government to make a start to
negotiate possible even if that would mean more work by intermediaries
"to oil the machinery"135
The French Army In
Still obsessed with the idea of a military victory over the
F.L.N., the French generals in Algeria led a short-lived putsch
against the French Government which collapsed on 25 April, four days
after its announcement.' 36 Once again army mutiny had brought France
to the brink of anarchy. This mutiny, which was led by Generals
Challe, Jouhaud, Zeller and Salan, gained the support of many
frustrated career officers in Algeria and of the die-hard pieds noirs,
who suddenly came to believe that a miracle might still take place and
Algeria remain Française.137
The New York Times reacted strongly, and vigorously took the side
of General de Gaulle, describing the putsch as "an odious and stupid
adventure" which came at a time when there was hope of an end to the
Algerian crisis.' 38
 Its attacks grew bolder, stating that the mutiny
was carried out by a tiny minority in Algeria at the very most one
million colons and half a million troops, as opposed to the nine
million people of Algeria and the forty-five million of France: "The
leaders of this wretched mutiny must know that they cannot possibly
succeed in Algeria without plunging their homeland into war and
misery". Recalling that their goal was, as in 1958, the imposition of
military rule in both Algeria and France, the paper drew comfort from
the fact that the French people had abominated the mutiny. The
strongest and most critical part of its far-reaching editorial was
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reserved for the end, with the warning that the days of the first and
second Napoleon, of Boulanger, even of Pe'tain, were over.' 39 The
(London) Times, arguing along a similar line, intimated that "the iron
logic of events" was against the mutineers; it combined vehement
attacks on the dissident generals and their pied noir supporters, with
urgent calls for a settlement to the Algerian-French conflict.'40
On 22 AprIl Ferhat Abbas appealed to the Algerian population to
remain calm and united under the new circumstances, but at the same
time "to organize in order to face up to provocations as you knew how
during the historical days of last December and January". 14 ' The
population took his advice, stayed away from trouble during the period
of the putsch, and did not interfere in the confrontation between
French and French.'42
In another strongly-worded editorial, filled with hostility and
scorn for the mutineers and headlined "The Treachery of Algiers", The
New York Times pursued its attack on the leaders of the putsch,
ridiculing their claim that their adventure was aimed at saving both
Algeria and France from international communism. It warned that, if
successful, their action would wreck Western unity, divide the French
people and bring devastation to France: "Living in a far-outdated
past, they have been inviting a civil war which they could never hope
to win". The direct repercussions of the mutiny, were it successful,
would threaten the survival of France as a free nation. Focusing on
the international ramifications of the mutiny, it highlighted the
potential effects those events might have on the position of France in
the Western alliance: "This treason to the French Republic is treason
to all of us".'43
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In this context and amidst accusations that the United States
Government and the C.I.A. had encouraged the putschist generals,
President Kennedy reassured General de Gaulle of the United States'
solidarity and support.' 44 Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary Bowles,
without referring specifically to Algeria, reiterated the traditional
American rhetoric of aid to the emerging nations of Africa and Asia to
gain independence and also to protect their freedom against potential
communist threats;' 45 but the substance of the United States position
remained military and technical aid to France.
Although there was strong evidence that the leaders of the putsch
had actually planned an invasion of metropolitan France, they insisted
that their only goal was "to save Algeria from the claws of rebellion
and give back to France a pacified Algeria".' 46 The (London) Times,
ridiculing their claim as deliberate deceit, asked scornfully: "If the
whole energies of France have, after seven years, been unable to crush
the rebellion, is it conceivable that the French Army in Algeria -
even if united, which it is not - would be able to do so quickly and
on its own?"'47
Time magazine went farther to provide a historical account of the
French army and its traditional obsession with victory: humiliated in
World War II, defeated again at Dien-Bien-Phu, France's career
soldiers were obsessed with proving that they could win a campaign in
the field. It greeted the collapse of the mutiny with evident relief,
and vigorously urged General de Gaulle to move as quickly as possible
in his purge of the army dissidents, on the one hand, to convince the
Algerian leaders that the French Government had enough authority to
negotiate with them a settlement to the conflict and, on the other, to
check the remnants of conspiracy within the army and amongst the
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colons, so preventing them from recuperating their energy to prepare
for another showdown. 148 The Economist also hailed de Gaulle's
victory over the mutineers in the hope that this would open the way to
direct talks with the G.P.R.A.: in this hour of triumph, the French
President, armed with full powers granted him by Parliament, could act
swiftly to reach a negotiated settlement in Algeria, while "the
defeated champions of L'Alge'rie Française can offer no resistance".'49
Time magazine for 5 May, taking comfort in the fact that the
mutineers had been defeated, branded the mutiny as the "last gasp of
empire", arguing that the mutineers' cause and battle cry, Alge'rie
Française, had been destroyed. The last obstacle before negotiations
between the French Government and the G.P.R.A. was cleared. Such
negotiations would indispensably end in Algeria's independence, and
the mutiny only made things worse for the colons. The matter was one
that France had been avoiding for years, and "it involved nothing less
than the end of empire". The issue of Time, which struck hard at the
mutineers, contained a strong warning that if the French in Algeria
would encounter difficulties living in an independent Algeria, the
four-day mutineers, and the co7ons who egged them on, would have their
own important share of blame.
The Economist, arguing in a similar fashion, pinpointed the four
"factors" or "factions" that were influencing events in Algeria.
Remarking that three of these factions - the army, the administration,
and the pieds noirs - were "helplessly and irreparably divided,
indisciplined and vancorous", it saw that only the Algerians were in
any way stable and their stability was born out of their trust in, and
loyalty to, their political leaders. To its credit, The Economist
never lost sight of the hardship of the Algerians and their economic
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disparity with the co7on community, which had traditionally been
inflicted upon them by the colonial system. It hailed the Algerian
population for remaining calm and for behaving "impeccably" under
stress, but also cautioned that this might change if "provocation by
French activists becomes unbearable": bearing in mind the numerous
precedents in army-colon disobedience, it was clear that the
forthcoming Evian negotiations would not be allowed to take their
natural course, "without another explosion of some kind or another in
Algiers". 150
The New York Times, on the other hand, was less cautious; it
ventured to label the failure of the generals' mutiny as the kiss of
death to all army dissidence and to pied noir activism. It asserted,
though without much accuracy in hindsight, that the defeated generals
and their colon allies would never be able to make more trouble, the
road to peace was now cleared. Whilst it cleared General de Gaulle of
any responsibility for the political immobilisme in the Algerian
situation, It launched a new attack on the G.P.R.A., believing that
France had done everything for peace and that there was no doubt that
the Algerians were being offered self-determination in good faith and
that all now depended on the "willingness and the ability of the rebel
spokesmen to negotiate". 151
 And that was it. Not a word about the
fact that the Algerian leaders had already accepted the principle of
self-determination as the ideal basis for a settlement to the
conflict, and that what they still insisted on were clarifications and
guarantees that the proposed referendum would be free and fair. In
retrospect, their insistence was justified.
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The Evlan Talks and Prospects for Peace
As the Franco-Algerlan negotiations were about to reopen, France
took a number of measures that were mainly designed to secure a
favourable reaction internationally, particularly among public
opinion. Hence, 6,000 Algerian political prisoners were freed, the
five F.L.N. leaders imprisoned at L'Ile d'Aix were transferred to a
more comfortable place at Chateau de Turquant and a month-long halt of
offensive operations was unilaterally announced by the army. 152 On 18
May a G.P.R.A. delegation led by Foreign Minister Krim Belkacem flew
to Geneva. Two days later the delegation arrived at Evian for its
first meeting with the French envoys.
In a "News of the Week in Review" comment, "Talks on Algeria",
The New York Times greeted warmly and with evident relief the opening
of direct negotiations after nearly seven years of warfare which
"killed tens of thousands, forced the resettlement of hundreds of
thousands and cost billions". Outlining the difficulties which still
had to be overcome by the negotiators, namely the future status of the
oil-rich Sahara and the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir and the future
economic links between France and Algeria, the writer held that the
outlook for a settlement was moderately promising, largely because the
alternatives to peace were grim. 153 Editorially, too, the paper
recognized that the Algerians had already largely won what they had
fought for, and virtually on their own terms, but lost no time in
urging them to accept close links with France after independence, in
the interest of arriving at peace with honour for both sides. The
concern to protect French pride was, as explained elsewhere, one of
the significant factors that, to a large extent, governed the attitude
of both The New York Times and the American Government towards
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Algeria; and this also reflected their concern to protect a perceived
American Interest best served by an Algeria closely tied to France
and, thus, under N.A.T.O. influence. Echoing General de Gaulle's
earlier threats, the editorial concluded with a highly partisan
criticism of the G.P.R.A. and vigorously argued in favour of the
French Government's proposals despite the fact that most Algerians
found them both devious and dubious.'54
The major stumbling block in the negotiations was the future of
the Sahara. The French delegation, under instructions from General de
Gaulle, insisted that the Sahara should remain under French
sovereignty but that Algeria would be associated in the exploitation
of its natural resources. The Algerian delegation categorically
rejected any attempt to partition the country, insisting on Algeria's
territorial integrity as proclaimed on 1 November 1954. It also
rejected any suggestion of preserving special privileges for the
colons including the proposal of double nationality. Under Algerian
citizenship, the Algerian delegates declared, all Algerians would be
guaranteed their fundamental rights regardless of their origin. Those
who preferred to maintain their French citizenship would be regarded
as foreigners but would be guaranteed safety for themselves and for
their property. On 13 June the French delegation broke off the Evian
talks for an indefinite "period of reflection", despite the opposition
of the Algerians who insisted that "only by pursuing the negotiations
can we find a constructive solution to the problem and restore
peace"
The New York Times reacted to the breakdown of the Evian talks in
a predictable fashion. Failing to appreciate the Algerians'
dedication to the process of direct negotiations and perhaps lacking
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the editorial courage to reproach the French Government for having
been responsible for the collapse of the talks, it at least implicitly
condoned the French decision to break off the negotiations
unilaterally, In a series of highly partisan editorials.' 56
 It put
all the blame on the Algerian leaders who, it asserted, had
"equivocated Inexcusably", accusing them of creating an "impasse" in
the country. By the same token, the paper openly S upported the French
argument: "President de Gaulle has amply demonstrated his eagerness to
reach an agreement. Let the F.L.N. now do the same".157
The Economist, whose analysis of the situation was more
realistic, blamed General de Gaulle, not the G.P.R.A., for the failure
of progress In the talks. It observed that the General had instructed
his delegates "to ask too much at too high a price and given them too
little to make concessions". The French sought to maintain control of
the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir and a dual citizenship for the colons
and refused to recognize Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara.
Remarking that the French Government's tactics during the recent Evian
talks were both ill-advised and counter-productive, it commented that
if General de Gaulle really supposed that the nationalist leaders
could concede all this, he was deceiving himself.' 58
 Yet, whilst The
(London) Times had taken a rather pessimistic View as a result of the
failure of the talks, intoning that the outlook for Algeria was now
gloomy,' 59 The Economist - although also concerned about this failure
- took the more optimistic position that there might still be a
Positive outcome from the Evian negotiations and that the outlook was
not wholly black.16°
The New York Times still failed to adopt a clear and
straightforward position about Algeria's political future. Its views
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seemed contradictory and on occasions marred by senseless speculation
and editorial confusion. It showed tacit approval of the concept of a
decolonized Algeria but was also favourable to the idea of continued
French control of the Sahara and the establishment of a
post-independence political structure based on ethnic origins.16'
Both views were diametrically opposed to the positions adopted by the
G.P.R.A. The paper made French Government's proposals appear more
interesting than they deserved. Conversely, it portrayed the G.P.R.A.
as less willing for a settlement and its efforts less worthwhile than
they actually were. This attitude provoked a sharp response from the
G.P.R.A.'s U.N. representative. In a letter to the editor, Abdelkader
Chanderli dismissed partition, which had been tacitly approved by The
New York Times as a possible solution to the conflict, as unthinkable:
"Algeria including the Sahara is one. The people of Algeria are one.
Each and every citizen, whatever his origin, shall be protected by a
constitution guaranteeing his fundamental rights".' 62 Chanderli's
response to the paper's questioning of the G.P.R.A.'s
representativeness of the Algerian people was to refer to the results
of the 5 July strike which had brought life in Algeria to a
standstill, despite the uncurbed pressure applied by the 800,000
troops on the striking population.
Chanderli reproached The New York Times for attacking the
Algerian negotiators simply because of their refusal to bargain away
"two basic democratic principles". He defined these as
self-determination that would have to apply to Algeria as one
geographic entity including the Sahara, and self-determination that
must apply to all Algerians as one nation regardless of their ethnic
or cultural origins. The letter argued that the firm attitude taken
by the Algerian delegates, which the French authorities and The New
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York Times had branded as "stubbornness", stemmed largely from their
desire to resist half-baked solutions that would in the long run
generate more trouble and from their commitment to the fundamental
principles behind their struggle which had to take precedence over the
country's hunger for peace. Defending the G.P.R.A.'s position as
"straightforward, logical and democratic", Chanderli reminded his
readers that the Algerians had suffered one million casualties and
more than two millions were still confined to regroupment camps. In
the light of the evident lack of balance and impartiality in the
paper's views on the breakdown of the Evian talks and on the question
of Algeria's future, the G.P.R.A.'s U.N. representative found reason
enough to call for "a full and complete reappraisal of The Times'
Algerian policy".'63
The United States Government remained by and large silent on the
Algerian position during and immediately after the Evian talks, but on
29 May, whilst not specifically referring to Algeria, Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, had defended the
Kennedy Administration's policy towards Africa and promised America's
"unequivocal.., dedication to freedom". 164
 The American Government,
wary of what it saw as the growing threat of international Communism
and eager to avoid upsetting France, spoke only in mild terms about
the Algerian situation, expressing its hope that that was only a
suspension and not a complete collapse of the negotiating process.165
Nevertheless, President Kennedy hinted at possible American
intervention in Algeria in case of a Chinese or Soviet attempt to
intervene directly in the Algerian-French conflict. Kennedy's victory
at the 1960 Presidential elections had sparkled the hopes of the
Algerians because of the positive stance he had taken as Senator
towards the Algerian problem. To their disappointment, however,
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President Kennedy immediately abandoned this stance and turned his
attention to the question of alleged Communist penetration of the
Algerian revolution, arguing that "the Soviets had invested several
billion dollars in military and economic aid to the developing
countries.., and more arms for the Algerian 'rebels'".166
In response to General de Gaulle's threats of partition, the
G.P.R.A. launched a worldwide campaign aimed at mobilizing
International public opinion against the idea of fragmenting Algeria
Into fabricated geographical segments. It concentrated its diplomatic
efforts particularly in Africa. In a memorandum to the independent
African states, it warned Algeria's southern neighbours against any
negotiations with France on the question of the Saharan boundaries.
Numerous delegations were sent to different countries to inform them
about the Sahara issue. July 5 was declared as a day of protest
against partition and a general strike was called out throughout
Algeria. Demonstrations broke out and the response of the French
police was as usual brutal, resulting in many casualties.' 66 "It is
impossible to separate northern Algeria from the Sahara", stated an El
Moudjahid editorial on 15 April: "French sovereignty over Algeria,
radically called into question by the Revolution since 1 November
1954, should give way to the sovereignty of the Algerian people,
within the administrative boundaries of Algeria of 1954, as described
by the documents, maps and manuals".'67
As already mentioned, The New York Times had previously approved
though only reluctantly, of the idea of partition as a possible
solution to the Algerian conflict. But columnist C.L. Sulzberger,
writing from Paris, vigorously argued against partition branding it as
an "insane" measure that nobody wanted: "Partition would certainly
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perpetuate and internatb0raze the Algerian war - everbody would lose
as a result".'68 The Economist, following a similar line of argument,
scorned partition as an unfulfilling short-term solution that would in
the long run fuel the war.' 69 The (London) Times made the analogy
with Ireland, Palestine and Cyprus and dismissed partition as "quite
impracticable" a solution.'7°
The G.P.R.A.'s Reshuffle at the Top
The disappointing outcome of the recent Evian negotiations led
the G.P.R.A. to adopt a tougher line, heralded by the replacement of
the "liberal" Ferhat Abbas with the "radical" Benyoussef Ben
Khedda. 171 Ben Khedda immediately became a reportorial whirlwind in
France and throughout the Western world, where he was portrayed as
"tough" and "leftist" and even as "pro-Communist". Many saw his
appointment as the signal of a more radical attitude, pointing to the
G.P.R.A.'s first declaration under the new Premier in which it called
for the "reinforcement of the activities of the National Liberation
Army, the mobilization of the Algerian masses and the elevation of the
standard of their struggle and discipline both socially and
politically".'72
The New York Times reacted to the G.P.R.A.'s reshuffle by once
again reflecting the views of the French Government and the French
press. Its hostility to the new Premier was voiced under prominent
front-page headlines like the one for 28 August:
Algerians Pick Anti-West Leftist
As Premier in Place of Abbas
Close Tie with Reds Seen
but Talks with France
Are Not Ruled Out.
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This was accompanied by a picture of Ben Khedda. Labelling him as an
"anti-Western... Left-wing extremist", it hastily asserted that the
nationalists would now move much closer to the communist world, and
forecast that they would be less supple in their bargaining than they
had been. Almost without exception, the Western media focused on the
alleged inclination of Ben Khedda towards China, basing their
judgement solely on his earlier trips to China and on his admiration
of China's successes. But, admiration does not necessarily presuppose
alignment. As one Swiss expert on Algeria observed, the new Premier's
admiration of China stemmed largely from that country's "success in
organizing millions of people"; Africans badly needed organization and
were impressed by the achievements of the Chinese in this respect.173
Carrying its criticism further, The New York Times regarded Ben
Khedda's appointment as the beginning of a "radically new phase" and
that it would have grave repercussions on a France facing renewed
"right-wing conspiracy" that was seriously threatening its
stability.' 74 Time magazine also cried against the reshuffle,
asserting that the F.L.N. as a result "abruptly turned left" and that
control of power would shift to the tough military leaders. Unlike
The New York Times, however, it strongly reproached General de Gaulle
for not having moved fast enough to reach a settlement with the more
moderate Ferhat Abbas, arguing that the French would perhaps regret
this considering what could be in store for them: "France's
stiff-necked President Charles de Gaulle may find that he blundered
badly in not having dealt with Abbas - while there was still time".'75
The Algerian Provisional Government and the new Premier
repeatedly called upon France to abandon the idea of French
sovereignty over the Sahara, leaving no doubt that the Algerians were
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categorically opposed to the concept of partition regardless of its
form. As France had already jettisoned the myth of Alge'rie Française
it would be unrealistic to cling to the idea of maintaining
colonialism in the Sahara. The question of the Sahara's future had
been one of the biggest obstacles to agreement on Algerian
independence and the sticking point in the last round of negotiations.
Yet, by the autumn of 1961 de Gaulle had realized that his insistence
on French sovereignty over the Sahara was not practical and would get
France nowhere. Hence, during his press conference of 5 September, he
officially recognized Algeria's sovereignty over the Sahara. "The
realities are that there is not one Algerian, I know this, who does
not believe that the Sahara should be part of Algeria". He argued
that as long as the French interests in the Sahara were secured,
France would not claim sovereignty over it.'76
The New York Times, shifting its position towards Algeria
according to the shift in the French Government's policies, lost no
opportunity to hail General de Gaulle's recognition of Algeria's
sovereignty over the Sahara as "practical realism", arguing that this
change In the French position would be enough as a concession to get
Franca-Algerian negotiations going again. France's need for a
settlement to the Algerian conflict had been made more urgent because
of de Gaulle's "stern attitude on Russia". This required as much
military strength as France could possibly acquire; all depended on
the termination of the heavy French military involvement in Algeria
where the cream of its armed forces were still tied up.' 77 Time
magazine, whilst welcoming the French decision to abandon the claim of
sovereignty over the Sahara, openly reproached General de Gaulle for
not having taken such a decision earlier, for this "would probably
have produced an armistice long ago... ,,177
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Meanwhile, the United States continued to be wary of the growing
influence of international communism in Africa. In an implicit
reference to Algeria after his African tour at the end of 1961,
Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams warned against the communist
success in gaining influence amongst the nationalist movements and the
new independent countries on the continent.' 79
 A few months earlier,
President Kennedy had hinted at possible American intervention in
Algeria if the Chinese or the Soviets did intervene. And in direct
reference to Algeria on 31 October, Mennen Williams stated that the
United States shared the same concern and conviction as the Africans
regarding Algeria, arguing that his government was in favour of a
democratic settlement to the conflict that would "fulfill the
aspirations of the Algerian people". Yet, he again put absolute faith
in the French Government and its policies.'80
In France itself the Algerian community was finding the stiff
restrictions imposed by the police, such as the 8 o'clock curfew,
increasingly unbearable. Many, as a result, took to the streets in
large demonstrations. Police reaction was once again brutal and, as
The Economist remarked, exceeded all imagination and "disgusted" even
policemen themselves.' 8' Many news media like The (London) Times
reported people being ferociously beaten up by the police and thrown
into the river Seine where they drowned' 82 The New York Times,
however, surprisingly ignored reports of such disturbing incidents and
spoke merely in general, vague terms about the situation which it
described as "ominous" and "alarming"l83
	 t was later revealed that
the French Police had been infiltrate,i
by fascist elements favourable
to the O.A.S.184
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The O.A.S. Campaign of Violence
After the failure of all attempts to overthrow the French
Government and establish a military regime through organized military
putsches, and as Algeria's independence became only a matter of time,
army-colon desperadoes resorted to a large-scale campaign of terrorism
aimed at preserving L'A7ge'rie Française. 185 The O.A.S. (Organisation
de L'Arme'e Secrete) was, to many observers, only a sinister instrument
of Indiscriminate bombing, shooting and burning and far from being a
"counter-revolutionary force" as It claimed.' 86 It failed to become a
political power in Algeria and in France, and remained essentially a
police problem.' 87 Its wave of violence resulted in an alarming
deterioration of the economic situation in Algeria, especially when
the promises of a speedy agricultural and industrial development in
Algeria outlined in the "Constantine Plan" had not been fulfilled.'88
The 0.A.S. succeeded only in increasing the alienation of the colons
and in making life in an independent Algeria seem to them quite
impossible.' 89
 As one observer remarked, many of their fears stemmed
from a feeling of guilt towards the Algerian population; they could
not believe that they would be generously treated in an independent
Algeria nor imagine that their excesses since 1830 could be forgiven
or forgotten.'9°
This campaign of violence that was being conducted against
civilians threatened to push the Algerian population beyond the
control of the G.P.R.A. into perhaps irreconcilable retaliation.
Algerians were, in the words of The (London) Times, either being
killed by colon "thugs" or systematically tortured by the police and
paratroopers.' 9 ' O.A.S. terrorism also spread to metropolitan France
where police security began to break down and fhe police force itself
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192became a prime suspect. In this context, the G.P.R.A. issued a
strong warning to the pieds noirs in Algeria, urging them to "refuse
to be the unconscious tools once again of colonialist and fascist
Interests condemned by history". 193 Reiterating their belief that
O.A.S. violence would not prevent Algeria from gaining independence,
the Algerian leaders expressed concern that such violence could
however irretrievably "compromise the future of the European community
in Algeria".'94
The O.A.S. and its terrorist campaign provoked anger and
condemnation in France. France-Soir, especially its editor Pierre
Lazaraff, spoke bitterly of this organization's attempts to silence
the French voices that were opposed to its conduct. Vehemently
condemning the killing of civilians and senseless destruction of
property, he urged the French Government to take effective
counter-action. Because of this unequivocal stance, the paper itself
fell victim to O.A.S. terrorism; its premises were seriously damaged
by a bomb and its reporters and their homes were repeatedly
attacked,' 95
 "What is the O.A.S. really concerned with?", wondered
one France_Sojr official, "It wants to prevent us from speaking the
truth, from drawing attention to its atrocities as blackmailers, and
murderers. The whole thing recalls the rise of the Nazi Party in
Germany" . 196
The phenomenon of O.A.S. violence drew scores of news
Correspondents and cameramen to Algiers. Fair reporting was, however,
made virtually impossible as news men were being constantly
intimidated and, in the case of some correspondents as explained in
the following chapter, kidnapped and forced to leave. But reporting
on Algeria had never been easy or free from intimidation before. As
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already pointed out, the French Government had since 1954 tightened
its grip on reporting from Algeria, vigorously warning correspondents
against reporting the activities of the F.L.N. or interviewing its
leaders. An Egyptian correspondent, for example, had been sentenced
to death by a French Court in Oran on the charge of visiting an F.L.N.
camp. He would have faced the gallows had he not been freed by an
F.L.N. commando unit.197
The O.A.S. violent conduct drew condonation and support only from
people like the former Governor General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle.
Soustelle's sympathetic stance vis--vis the question of colon
terrorism came with no surprise to those with a fair knowledge of
Algerian affairs. It was another confirmation of the complacency of
the previous French authorities with the extremist pieds noirs and
their interests, to the detriment of the Algerian majority. Such
complacency was, in effect, one of the decisive factors that had
brought about the Algerian revolution.'98
The Algerian Question Before the General Assembly for the Last Time
Meanwhile, at the United Nations, the General Assembly was to
debate the Algerian-French conflict for the seventh time. But, as The
New York Times predicted, it was clear that such debate would not be
the hard-pitched battle that it had been in previous sessions, as a
solution was now in the offing through bilateral Franco-Algerian
talks.' 99 A draft resolution sponsored by the Afro-Asian group urged
the immediate resumption of direct negotiations between the two
parties concerned, and supported Algeria's right to territorial
integrity and its sovereignty over the Sahara. This resolution was
eventually adopted by the Political Committee by 61 votes to none with
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34 abstentions, and was later adopted by the General Assembly by 62
votes to none with 38 abstentions. France, it should be recalled, had
since 1955 been boycotting the United Nations debates. Whilst the
United States abstained on this resolution during the voting of both
the Political Committee and the General Assembly, the Soviet Union
endorsed it on both occasions.20°
Yet, as the independence of Algeria was now on the horizon, the
United States became eager to gain the friendship of the Algerian
leaders so as to prevent an independent Algeria from moving closer
towards the East. The American Government had hitherto averted formal
contacts with the F.L.N., for fear of offending the United States
oldest ally, France. The first high-level meeting between an American
official and F.L.N. representatives took place in Tunis on 17 October
1961 between G. Mennen Williams and two G.P.R.A. ministers, Saad
Dahlab and M'hamed Yazid. 20 ' The United States' main preoccupation
regarding Algeria continued to be its fear of growing communist
influence in Africa. On 4 December 1961 the Director of U.S. Office
of Refugees and Migration Affairs, Richard R. Brown, underlined the
significance of American aid to the Algerian refugees in Tunisia,
especially in the context of American efforts to contain communism.202
At the United Nations, the Algerian delegation headed by M'hamed
Yazid had a formal meeting, the first of its kind, with the American
delegation led by Adlai Stevenson. Reporting the meeting, The New
York Times went as far as to brand it as "a political turning point"
for the Algerian leaders, because of United States previous deliberate
avoidance of direct contacts with the F.L.N. 203 With the benefit of
hindsight, however, it is clear that the meeting was not of any
special significance for the Algerians and, therefore, did not warrant
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such overenthusiasm. In Algerian eyes, on the contrary, the meeting
was a demonstration of United States political opportunism; the State
Department allowed formal contacts with the Algerian leaders only when
it became clear that France had tacitly conceded defeat in Algeria
and, thus, would not be offended by a gesture of this kind towards the
Algerians.
By the autumn of 1961 the gulf between the G.P.R.A. and the
French Government had substantially been narrowed. The stage was set
for the renewal of direct negotiations and new prospects for a
settlement were opened. General de Gaulle yielded ground on the future
of the Sahara and gave up the idea of French control. Instead of a
Franco-Algerian "association", he now talked of "France's cooperation
offered to the new Algeria for its life and development..
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G.P.R.A. continued to insist on complete independence but spoke of
"free cooperation" between Algeria and France, whilst reassuring the
colon community that Its "... security and legitimate rights would be
guaranteed in an independent Algeria".205
As 1961 drew to a close, therefore, and despite continued 0.A.S
terrorism, optimism grew about the possibility of a quick settlement.
For Algeria, this would mean the achievement of independence after 130
years of military occupation and after having paid a heavy price in
human life. For France, a settlement would mean a positive
transformation of the prospects of the Fifth Republic both
domestically and internationally. Under these hopeful signs, The New
York Times ended its 1961 Algeria coverage with a highly optimistic
note, forecasting the end of the Algerian-French conflict during the
course of the following year, despite all the uncertainties for 1962.
The paper concluded that neither France nor Algeria could go on for
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another whole year without an end to this "cruel drama". 206 With
hindsight, it Is reasonable to argue that its predictions this time
proved accurate, and its suggestive propositions were by and large
intellectually astute.
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CHAPTER VI
THE HARD ROAD TO PEACE. ALGERIA'S ADVENT TO
INDEPENDENCE AMIDST GROWING TENSION
"There are only two powers in the world.., the sword
and the spirit. In the long run, the sword is always
defeated by the spirit..." (Napoleon Bonaparte)
"Liberty is the fruit of struggle". (Tawfiq El Madani,
1923)
"Today we see the end of a struggle which can be truly
called the epic struggle and which will be remembered
for very long in the annals not only of Algeria and
Africa but in the world as a symbol of the people
struggling for their freedom despite all sufferings".
(Jawaharlal Nehru, July 1962)
As 1961 ended and the new year began, a settlement to the
Franco-Algerian conflict seemed once again in the offing, despite the
unabated continuation of the O.A.S.'s campaign of violence and
destruction in a desperate attempt to keep the myth of Alge'rie
Frangaise alive. But, so many times previously hopes had been raised
and then quickly dashed in the political labyrinth of the crisis.
Yet, the reasons behind the urge to bring the conflict to an end as
quickly as possible were becoming ever more pressing. Reflecting this
atmosphere, and expressing irritation and amazement at the
ruthlessness of the die-hard colons, The New York Times pointed its
editorial finger at the paramount importance of a swift conclusion of
an agreement between France and the G.P.R.A. before further tragedies
ensued.1
As the new year began, the extremist pieds noirs multiplied their
efforts and intensified their "programme of muder and bomb outrages",
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making Algerian civilians and passers-by their chief target. 2 In
this, they hoped to provoke the Algerian population into retaliation
that would bring the French army openly to their side, and thus wreck
any chances of rapprochement between Paris and the nationalist
leadership. 3
 Though the O.A.S. was to fail in its fundamental goals,
it still posed a serious threat to metropolitan France. The question
that was now being asked in different quarters was not whether the war
would end in 1962, but whether Republican France would be able to
survive the menace of the colon neo-fascist underground.4
Though in order to succeed, as Time magazine argued, Salan would
have to defeat the powerful F.L.N. and bring down de Gaulle and his
government - tasks that seemed beyond his powers - he could, even
while failing, endanger France; mutiny might still drag the country
into civil war. Carrying a front-cover picture of the O.A.S. leader
under the caption "TERRORIST SALAN", Time defined the "philosophy"
behind his organization as "a muddle of authoritarian, imperialist and
populist ideas"; its propaganda as the sort often found in "flights
from reality - orotund, florid, declamatory, and so ecstatic as to
approach hysteria..
The New York Times, which never shrank from condemning the
violence of the colons, also emphasized the danger that the O.A.S.
posed. It branded their campaign as a desperate move with no
legitimate ground, and highlighted the wider implications of pied noir
intransigence: "Algeria is a land of great variety and beauty..." - it
was not important, however, because of its size, its history, its
resources or its wealth. It was important because its crisis tested
the very nature of Western civilization. No longer was it possible to
maintain the control of a country of ten million people by a minority
of about one million. Yet, this was what the èolon extremists were
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fighting for. Not only did the conflict destroy the West's promises
and ideals in the eyes of emerging nations and weaken its defences
against the East, it "might even drag the world into a new war".6
The conflict had never had more serious repercussions on the
political life of France. 7 As C.L. Sulzberger remarked, not only was
the country left in a serious psychotic condition it was also almost
"schizoid, withdrawn from world reality" and as a nation "paranoically
suspicious and sensitive". 8 A few weeks later, carrying this theme
further, The New York Times reflected the mood of confusion and
uncertainty that was now reigning in France as a result of the
terrorist campaign, which made the 0.A.S. one of the "simulated hells
on earth today". It, nevertheless, expressed confidence that France's
central authority would eventually prevail: "We do not believe that a
few thousand terrorists, some of them frankly fascist, can overthrow
the Fifth Republic". 9 But, France would have to reach a settlement
with the G.P.R.A. to avoid further erosion of its stability. Arguing
along this line, The (London) Times, which labelled the 0.A.S. as a
"conspiratorial sect" rather than a political organization, urged both
the French and the Algerians to act swiftly and reach an accord:
"Unless the final bargain is struck without delay the consequences
could be disastrous for all".10
It was in this context that Franco-Algerian negotiations resumed
in Rousses near the Swiss border. The two delegations, headed by
Louis Joxe and Krim Belkacem, chose to meet in this remote village in
complete secrecy from 11 to 19 February to escape the growing
curiosity of world press. 1 ' After eight days of intensive discussion
an ad hoc agreement on a set of points was reached.' 2 But as a
settlement to the conflict became imminent fears were growing that the
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O.A.S. campaign of violence and wanton destruction might jeopardize
any chances of future co-existence between the two communities in
Algeria.' 3 Postmen, pharmacists, tram-workers, railwaymen, dockers,
gas and electricity employees, doctors, educationalists, flower
vendors, were cold-bloodedly murdered in an attempt to bring economic
life to a standstill. 14
 Yet, although the die-hards might be able to
destroy they would never be able to reverse the course of history.'5
With the opening of the final Franco-Algerian negotiations at
Evian-sur-les-Bains on 7 March, The New York Times, now throwing the
full weight of its editorial criticism against the extremist pieds
noirs, reproached the French Government for being too slow in its
attempts to contain the O.A.S. It pressed for more positive action by
the French army against the colon terrorists to eradicate the
"shocking impunity" with which they were operating. The fact that
Paris was not making a maximum effort to curtail such "savagery" and
"gory deeds", could give the Algerians and world opinion reason enough
to doubt France's ability to secure law and order during the period of
transition between a ceasefire and independence. Either the French
authorities were too weak to keep order, or they did not want to make
the effort.'6
Even newsmen did not escape the O.A.S.'s impunity. Italian
journalists in particular, who were accused of being "too critical" of
the extremist colons, became the chief target of ruthless gunmen.
Giovanni Giovannini of Turin's La Stampa and Bruno Romani of Rome's Ii
Messaggero were kidnapped at gunpoint and their cameras were
confiscated. The ten Italian journalists in Algeria were given
twenty-four hours to leave, otherwise they would be shot. As a result
of these events newsmen from different parts oF the world protested to
256
the French Government about the lack of adequate protection. In
response, the Government's Information Officer, Phillipe Mestre, tried
to play down the abduction of the two Italian journalists as a
"balloon incident". Nine of the ten Italian journalists immediately
left for Rome where they attacked the laxity of the French
authorities: "Chaos reigns in Algeria", wrote Ii Messaggero. never
before has freedom of the press received such a blow".'7
A press photographer working for an American news agency, was
asked whether he was a journalist and after replying yes, two armed
men held him at gunpoint and a third slashed his face with a razor:
"That's just a warning", they told him. 18 Bombs were detonated at the
homes of many newsmen such as the television commentator Michel Droit
and Hubert Beuve-Mery the owner of Le Monde; a blind journalist was
beaten to death and John Casserly of A.B.C. was given forty-eight
hours to get out of Algeria.19
Reacting to the O.A.S.'s repeated warnings to newsmen, The
(London) Times, in a leading article entitled "A Threat to
Information", warned that those terrorists - to whom indiscriminate
murder was a weapon and terror a policy - would have no scruples about
murdering foreign journalists. As no honest, fair-minded reporter
would contemplate depicting the O.A.S. in the illusive heroic role it
sought, it was likely that Algeria would be deprived of outside
observers unless they insisted on "their right and duty to go on
observing and reporting". Holding the French Government directly
responsible for the security of journalists, the paper combined its
defence of freedom of the press with attacks on the extremist pieds
noirs, abhorring their enmity to free reporting: "Such blackmail is
worse even than the record of the Nazis and Fascists towards the
257
20foreign press".
Ceasefire at Last
The Franco-Algerian negotiations in Evian-sur-les-Bains permitted
the two sides to reach a final accord which, among other things,
proclaimed 19 March as the date of the ceasefire. 2 ' This was seen by
many as an historic moment not only for Algeria and France but for the
world at large. 22 The news of the agreement was reported with evident
interest throughout the world. Radio programmes were interrupted by
the announcement and newspapers gave it voluminous coverage under
exceptionally prominent headlines.23
The New York Times greeted the agreement with enthusiasm, giving
a detailed account under the front-page banner headline:
ALGERIA TRUCE SIGNED, EFFECTIVE TODAY
DE GAULLE ASKS FRANCE TO RATIFY ACCORD
SALAN APPEALS TO SECRET ARMY TO RESIST.
Writing favourably about the accord, the paper devoted pages three,
four and five of its issue of 19 March entirely to the event,
stressing the heavy losses the war had inflicted on both sides. The
Algerian leadership was paid special tribute for its "composite
character", and the A.L.N. fighters were praised for being "well
disciplined and trained". The nationalist forces also won the praise
of the French army commander in Algeria, General Ailleret, who paid
tribute to their "courageous" endeavour. The next day's paper also
devoted the whole of pages two and three to the Franca-Algerian
accord.
After seven years, four months and eighteen days fighting had
stopped; The New York Times searched far afield for the implications
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behind the settlement. For the Algerians, the terms of the ceasefire
agreement were a "triumph", ending the war that had cost hundreds of
thousands of lives and billions of dollars and heralding an
independent republic. 24 Algeria was, in fact, destined to play a
leading role in the Maghreb, Africa, the Arab world and the
non-aligned movement. 25
 For France and the West, the agreement meant
that the "incubus" that had burdened them "bedevilling their policies
and conscience" had now been banished. 26 For France, the ceasefire
also meant not only the end of the Algerian war but also the end of
the long process of liquidation of its colonial empire which had begun
as early as 1946 with the outbreak of the war in Indochina.27
"... the Algerian Revolution has triumphed and has attained the
aims for which it fought", declared Ben Khedda. 28 The Evian Accords
meant that the Algerians had fulfilled all the goals they had set for
themselves at the Soummam Conference in 1956.29 The G.P.R.A. whilst
compromising on some secondary issues, was able to safeguard the key
positions and fundamental principles of the Revolution. 30
 The
agreement also pointed to the disturbing fact that had it not been for
de Gaulle's vain insistence on France's sovereignty over the Sahara, a
similar arrangement could have been reached during the very first
negotiations at Evian as early as May 1961, so possibly averting the
O.A.S.'s campaign of violence and destruction.3'
For The Economist, the enormous losses caused by the
seven-and-a-half year war, and the serious international repercussions
of the conflict, had, in this age of decolonization, made Algeria "the
most conspicuous example of a settler minority clinging to its
position by a policy of suppression". It was high time that the
conflict was solved, but now that it seemed it had ended, the cheers
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were muted. The reason for this was the O.A.S.'s desperate attempts
to sabotage the Franco-Algerian agreement.
It was the French Government, especially General de Gaulle, that
was to blame for giving the die-hard colons enough time to grow
strong. Immediately after the collapse of the general's putsch in
April 1961, de Gaulle could have concluded an agreement with the
G.P.R.A. without serious opposition from the O.A.S. which was "barely
hatched" and much weakened by the defeat of the mutineers. Instead,
he had insisted in vain on retaining French sovereignty over the
Sahara and, therefore, "wrecked the first Evian talks".32
Ceasefire did not mean complete peace. To the Algerians, this
period of transition from colonial rule to national independence was
perhaps the most critical of the revolution. 33 The O.A.S., which was
able to occupy the minds of the colons, intensified its attacks on
civilians and on the economic infrastructure of the country. Even
patients in hospitals did not escape its terrorism. 34 Sulzberger
pointed out that it was seeking to reverse the course of history, but
that this would not be possible even for these "Fascists" who leaned
to the right of Franco. 35 The extremist pieds noirs and their
terrorist underground, as The New York Times remarked, were "creatures
of a past age" and their "madness" would eventually pass; Algeria was
going to be independent and the die-hard colons were to be defeated.36
By its savagery, the O.A.S. was demonstrating the "bankruptcy of its
opposition". By their self-restraint in the face of such provocation,
the Algerians were demonstrating a high level of political maturity
and a capacity to govern the country. 37 A later analysis concluded
that the Algerians maintained an extraordinary discipline and
fortitude in the face of mounting provocation. 38 The nationalist
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cadres, which The Economist at the time described as "an impressive
group of mild-mannered young men", played a remarkable role in
restraining the population from reacting to the 0.A.S.'s "horrible
provocation" .
French Electorate Back the Evian Accords Amidst Large-Scale 0.A.S.
Violence
On 8 AprIl French voters went to the polls; 90.7 percent of them
voted yes for the peace agreement with the G.P.R.A. 4° The New York
Times, In an editorial entitled "France Backs de Gaulle", considered
the result of the referendum to be a "gain for the free world t' and a
serious setback for the colon extremists. It hoped that this would be
enough to convince those extremists that their cause was a lost one
and that continued murder for it would have to be stopped. 41 Neither
the overwhelming vote in support of the Evian Accords, however, nor
the repeated assurance of the Algerian leaders that the rights of the
pieds noirs would be guaranteed after independence, were enough to
persuade the O.A.S. to bring its destructive campaign to an end.42
Yet, each day brought new evidence that this underground terrorist
organization and its tactics were doomed. 43 The die-hards still did
not realize that French dominance in Algeria had gone; this fact had
still to be hammered into their nostalgic mind.44
Pursuing its attacks on the O.A.S. and its "futile" and "vicious"
campaign of "wanton destruction" from which Algeria was suffering to
no purpose, The New York Times reminded its readers how this
organization had come into being after the failure of the generals'
putsch in April 1961.	 Under the leadership of Generals Salan and
Jouhaud "gathered a motley collection of thugs, neo-Fascists, romantic
youths, deserters from the Foreign Legion...", whose aim was to block
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the process of peace in Algeria and perpetuate colonial rule. 46 But,
the O.A.S. was never able to achieve unity either in its leadership or
in its methods. It consisted of civilian desperadoes whose aim was to
save L'Alge'rie Française, and of disillusioned army officers intent on
removing de Gaulle from power at whatever cost, using Algeria as a
means as well as an end. In addition to the expected agony caused by
the process of decolonization, the French army suffered the agony of
not having won a war in twenty-three years of continued combat. This
cruel fact pushed many officers Into the hands of the O.A.S. which, in
the absence of military victory against "foreign" opponents, seemed to
"desire victory over France itself".47
The O.A.S., suffering from a fundamental strategic disadvantage
and representing a vastly outnumbered minority, was foredoomed. 48 As
C.L. Sulzberger has remarked, its operational strategy seemed to be
founded on a misapplication of the Vietminh doctrine of revolutionary
warfare. In his manual Mao Tse-tung advised: "Mislead the enemy, make
him negligent and then attack unexpectedly". Salan, on the other
hand, was doing the opposite, misleading his own followers who
themselves became negligent, capable only of carrying out random
killings or bombings. The manual exhorted: "Attack, destroy and
withdraw". The O.A.S., however, had nowhere to withdraw. Its members
could try to withdraw to France to continue their campaign, but their
cause was doomed. This handful of conspirators were seeking to halt
the course of history, but history had already passed them by.49
The O.A.S. was able to continue to operate only because the
French Government and army were not making enough effort to quell its
activities. If the French, as the G.P.R.A. insisted, had been willing
to seize a few thousand known colon activists in Algiers and Oran,
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this underground organization would have immediately collapsed. The
French, however, wanted only to "decapitate" it by arresting a handful
of its leaders. 5° This laxity only encouraged the O.A.S. to continue
its campaign of violence and random destruction. So far, the Algerian
leaders had managed to restrain the population from seeking
retaliatory action. Yet, if the O.A.S. continued to pile up
atrocities, a new storm would break, perhaps engulfing the country in
total chaos.51
Following a similar line of argument, The (London) Times advised
that the storm could be averted only if the French Government gave
enough evidence that it was using all the measures at its disposal to
crush pied noir terrorism. The sternest of actions would have to be
taken to leave the extremists in no doubt that they were doing wrong,
and thus put an end to the bloodshed that was "sickening world
opinion", and jeopardizing the future of the colon community in
Algeria. Indiscriminate destruction and killing on the scale
practised by the O.A.S. desperadoes "must eventually defeat its own
ends".52
In this context, the G.P.R.A. again warned of retaliation against
the unabated atrocities of the O.A.S., accusing the French army of
laxity against those trigger-happy gunmen and of "brutality" towards
Algerian civilians: 53
 "We warn the French authorities one last time of
the dangers of testing the patience of our fighters and our people so
cruelly"
In this context, The New York Times, reflecting the view that the
result of the forthcoming referendum would be the foregone conclusion
of a vote for national independence, again hailed the Algerians for
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their discipline and sense of responsibility. However, it also called
upon them to show a few more months of "patience and fortitude". 55
 A
lot now depended on the ability of the new Algerian security forces to
crush the pied noir underground, despite the failure of the French
army to do so. This had to be done if the Algerian masses were to be
persuaded of the need for continued patience and discipline during the
critical period of transition. 56 But, many observers were of the
opinion that the O.A.S. atrocities in themselves had strengthened the
determination of the Algerian population. For example, popular armed
patrols were set up to protect civilians; volunteers kept up the flow
of food and medical supplies; women sewed the Algerian flag in
preparation for Independence Day; improvised clinics were established
to treat the wounded. 57 Such collective efforts only further evidenced
the fact that what the Algerians had accomplished was not a rebellion,
as the French claimed, but a large-scale revolution which had already
brought about fundamental changes in the country.
Every sign now indicated that the die-hard colons had been
defeated, albeit they could still be able randomly to kill civilians
and destroy property. To The New York Times their acts were mad
gestures by killers who knew they were doomed, or by French army
officers, selling their lives for a cause and a doctrine that was both
wrong and hopeless. 58 The Economist also argued that nothing could now
prevent Algeria from becoming a republic or rob the National
Liberation Front of the prize of national independence. 59 A private
observer commented that "the French have lost all right to rule and
have abused the privilege so profoundly that the force of human right
is pushing them out".6°
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The depth of the hopelessness of those "representatives of the
European culture", as The New York Times ironically described them,
was shown in two acts: one was the destruction of the main University
Library in Algiers and the burning of at least half a million books;
the other was the wrecking of the School of Medicine. This was
"barbarism", concluded an editorial entitled "The Algerian Sickness",
and those barbarians would have to be exterminated, driven into hiding
or frightened Into quietness; It could not be imagined that an
"honorable peace" could ever be made with them. 61 Their campaign of
terre bru7le'e, which meant the total destruction of the economic and
administrative infrastructure of the country, could only be described
as "nihilistic madness of desperadoes run amuck".62
But as it became clear that they had failed in their major goals,
the co7on extremists began to show a turnabout in their attitude in an
attempt to strike some sort of deal with the Algerians. The latter,
who had displayed "incredible forebearance" in the face of the
savagery exhibited by the O.A.S., gave new evidence of their high
sense of responsibility by agreeing to measures aimed at
reconciliation between the two communities, including a general
amnesty. Yet, there was always enough reason to question the true
intentions of those desperadoes, who had shown "more kinship with
Attila than with the noble French heritage", and to doubt that they
would heed the directive to put an immediate end to their campaign of
terror. 63
Algeria's revolution, as The Economist remarked, was socialist as
well as nationalist and a socialist pattern of society was likely to
be aimed at. Responding to worries about the future stance of Algeria
towards France and the West, it prophesied that the election of a
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national assembly that was to follow the forthcoming referendum would
produce an Algerian government that would honour the Evian Accords and
ensure Franco-Algerian cooperation.64
A few weeks earlier, arguing along a similar line, The (London)
Times had branded the Algerian leaders as "enigmas", partly in
consequence of the experience they had acquired during the
seven-and-a-half-year-war. It cautioned that they still would have to
get to know each other and to function as a real team, and draw what
It saw as a parallel with the problems faced by some European
countries at the end of World War Two, as internal resistance leaders
met the emigre' leadership. Self-confidence and self-reliance were the
two main factors behind the Algerians' victory. Though the F.L.N. had
acquired help from different countries throughout the world, it had
"achieved its unique success through its own resources of manpower,
organization and morale". Hence, no country or ideological bloc could
find that it had much political capital amongst the Algerians upon
which it could draw. The Algerians, the paper predicted, would
approach the business of government in the same pragmatic spirit that
they had approached armed revolt.65
Responding to the question: "Do you want Algeria to become an
independent state cooperating with France under the terms defined by
the declarations of 13 March 1962?", 5,975,581, comprising 99.72
percent of those who cast their votes on 1 July and 91.23 percent of
the registered voters in Algeria, answered "yes", against only 16,537
who answered "no". 66 This vote formally brought to an end 132 years of
French colonial rule. At long last, Algeria had achieved independence.
This was officially recognized by General de Gaulle on 3 July.67
"French Algeria died badly", wrote John Cavins 	 "The whole episode
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constituted perhaps the most sordid and pathetic event in the long
twilight of colonialism".68
On Independence Day, jubilant Algerians took to the streets to
celebrate victory after their long and costly struggle. 69 It was on 1
November 1954 that a group of relatively young men convinced, as The
New York Times pointed out, that history was with them who had decided
to follow in the footsteps of their ancestors and to challenge
France's claim of sovereignty over Algeria. Immediately after the
outbreak of the revolution, many observers thought their chances of
shaking the vastly superior French military power were slim if not
completely nonexistant. But after seven and a half years of
revolutionary struggle, that combined armed revolt with the
organization and mobilization of the people and a world-wide
diplomatic campaign, the Algerians achieved the goal they had set out
to achieve: national independence.70
The New York Times reflected at length the tumultuous welcome
with which the G.P.R.A. leaders were greeted by the inhabitants of
Algiers after their return from Tunis. A prominently displayed
front-page headline in the issue of 4 July read:
NATIONALIST LEADERS GET
WILD WELCOME IN ALGIERS
AS FREEDOM IS GRANTED.
This was accompanied with a picture of their triumphant ride through
the capital. However, it cautioned against the discord that had
recently occurred within the nationalist leadership. 	 This had
occurred partly because of the amnesty promised to the O.A.S.
terrorists by the Transitional Executive Council, and partly because
of the personal rivalry between some individuals within the
leadership. 71 Nevertheless, as The New York Times editorially pointed
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out, all the leaders had the same goals for the new Algeria and all
sought social revolution. Their differences were not ideological but
lay in "the realms of pace and method". 72 The Economist extended this
argument: there was no quarrel over policy. Everybody was agreed
about what would have to be done.73
Remarking that Algeria was one of the most productive areas in
the world, The New York Times called for close cooperation with France
as the only country capable of providing the steady and effective aid
that the new republic needed. 74 Its concern with Algeria's political
and economic future stemmed largely from the growing preoccupation of
the United States and the West with the country's ideological
orientation after independence. The paper was one of many voices in
the United States that called for effective American assistance to
Algeria: "We cannot buy friends in such countries as Algeria. We can,
however, make their people realize that our interest in their
well-being is genuine".75
Convinced by the inevitability of Algeria's independence, the
American Government, as 1961 drew to a close, began to prepare
policies anticipating an independent Algeria. For example, during a
meeting with Saad Dahieb in December of that year, Bill Watman - an
African Bureau officer at the State Department - expressed the United
States' willingness to assist the new State. Commenting on the
Dahleb-Watman meeting and admitting that his country had hitherto been
handicapped by the Administration's "overriding concern for French
sensitivities", Mennen Williams remarked that the recent American
contacts with the Algerians represented "an advance in our effort to
gain the confidence and friendship of Algeria's future leadership".76
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Birth of the Al gerian Republic Amidst Growin g Socio-Economic Problems
Algeria's achievement of independence took place at a time of
exceptional tension. The pieds noirs were leaving the country en
masse: 225,000 had already arrived in France by the end of June; and
during the one week immediately following the referendum of 1 July
alone, as many as 30,943 left Algeria. 77 The administrative apparatus
of the country was on the verge of total disintegration and the
economy was almost at a standstill. 78 Reflecting the country's
mounting difficulties, a New York Times editorial entitled "Chaos in
Algeria" underlined the gravity of the economic problems caused by the
removal of essential technicians following the mass exodus of the
colons; unemployment soared, production sharply decreased and capital
resources declined. The task of building a strong and prosperous
Algeria was made more difficult. 79 Time and The Economist had
highlighted the serious problems faced by the new Algeria two weeks
earlier. 80
This new Algeria was also, for a while, threatened by problems of
a political nature as quarrels within the nationalist leadership
sharpened. These were, however, soon eradicated by the impressive
political maturity of the Algerian people who once again, lived up to
their reputation as the "true heroes of the Revolution". Being aware
of their responsibilities, and of the role they would have to play to
preserve the freedom they had just won at a high price, they took to
the streets to express their demands for the maintenance of national
unity and for the election of a strong and regular government to face
the gravity of the socio-economic situation. 8' It was, in fact, the
sacrifice of the people and their loyalty and complete backing of the
F.L.N. -A.L.N. that had made victory possible. 82 As already pointed
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out, what took place in Algeria between 1954 and 1962, was not only a
war of independence but a full-scale revolution of universal
implications, to which success the people of all walks of life had
contributed a great deal. Indeed, many Algerians considered their
revolution as a fight for humanity at large.83
The people's eagerness to get on with the job of laying the
foundations of the new State was demonstrated by their massive
turn-out at the polling stations on 20 September to elect the
constituent National Assembly. 84 The first Government was formed on 29
September, marking the formal beginning of the political life of the
Algerian Republic. 85 Hence, as The New York Times remarked, Algeria
was now, for the first time in 132 years, ruled by its own regularly
constituted Government and was enjoying an equal status among the free
nations of the world. 86 The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
became on 8 October the 109th member of the United Nations, whose
member states gave the Algerian delegation an enthusiastic welcome.87
The sort of foreign policy that Algeria would choose to adopt was
eagerly awaited by the international community, notably by the United
States and the West. This was evidently reflected in The New York
Times' editorial opinion which hailed the Algerian Government's
declaration of a "neutralist and non-aligned" attitude in its future
relations with the external world; and the reaffirmation of its
commitment to the Evian agreement and, therefore, to cooperation with
France 88
Writing from Algiers in the "News of the Week in Review" section,
Peter Braestrup - author of Big Story... - underlined the strategic
importance of Algeria to both the East and theWest: "Because of its
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hard won revolution against French rule it is now the energetic
virility symbol of Arab and African nationalism". 89
 This view had
been expressed a few months earlier by an English observer who,
immediately after the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement in March,
noted that both politically and militarily the Algerians seemed
equipped to give leadership to Africa and the Arab world.9°
Potentially the most powerful nation in the region, Algeria
became the focus of attention of both the East and West; each side was
anxious to see It kept free of the influence of the other. Meanwhile,
the country's economic problems reached an alarming scale: schools
closed because ninety-five percent of the teachers had left; two
million people - half the entire workforce - were unemployed; only
forty percent of the factories were still in operation; and industrial
production was down by thirty percent. 91 Algeria was in real need of
international economic assistance to help meet its "unbelievable
problem".92
Commenting on those economic difficulties, Braestrup argued that
the communist world was unlikely to be able to provide Algeria with
the aid that France and the West could give with fewer strings
attached. 93 This view was shared by both The Economist and Time. The
Economist argued that Eastern assistance tended to be too irregular
unless a country listed over and took the whole communist treatment;
the Algerians would not under any circumstances accept to lose their
freedom of choice. 94 Depicting the Algerians as "shrewd, pragmatic
people", whose friendship for the West had survived the bitterness of
the seven-and-a-half year war, Time asserted that they were aware of
the economic aid that the United States could offer their country.
Whatever the subject being discussed, Algerian often asked: "What is
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reality?"95
A few months earlier, addressing itself to the question of
whether an independent Algeria would go communist, Time had reminded
its readers that many things could have pushed the F.L.N. towards
Communism. The French army had been trying to crush their revolution
with American planes raining down American bombs on villages suspected
of helping the nationalist units. Weapons captured by their fighters
had American markings on them, including grenades, shells and wrecked
helicopters. The only aid the Algerians received came from Arab or
communist countries. Nevertheless, seven and a half years of fierce
fighting and intensive diplomatic manoeuvring had made "sophisticated
men of the F.L.N. political leaders..."; they were aware that the
interest of their country lay in following a neutral line and in
avoiding alignment with either ideological camp, without being
internationally passive.96
It was in this context that the Algerian Government reiterated
its intention to remain neutral in the Cold War, to seek the "broadest
possible cooperation" with other countries regardless of their
political system and to avoid foreign dominance under any guise.97
The New York Times, now concentrating on Algeria's future ideological
orientation, was full of praise for the Government's reaffirmed
commitment to the principles of balance and neutrality in its
relations with both the United States and the Soviet union. The
Algerians also sought balance in their domestic socio-economic
strategy. This meant a deliberate policy to reconcile both the public
and the private sectors, making Algerian socialism, as the paper
editorially remarked with some relief, evidently distinctive from that
of the Soviet Union.98
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CHAPTER VII
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES COVERAGE
OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION, 1956-1962
't Analysis of problems... is usually best carried out
with statistical tools..." [Richard W. Budd, 1967].
This study, as demonstrated at length in the thematic analysis
developed in Chapters II to VI, is quality oriented, using the
traditional historical approach based on cross-disciplinary knowledge,
media and extra-media data; it has explored what The New York Times
said about Algeria, how it said it and what it did not say.
Nevertheless, as this chapter will demonstrate, numerical methods have
been utilized in order to establish a quantitative model aimed at
examining statistically the paper's Algeria material and its display.1
The New York Times carried 58 items on Algeria during the whole
eight-year period 1945-1953. Its coverage, however, increased by
208.6 percent in quantitative terms in the two years preceding the
period of substantive analysis in this thesis, 1956-1962. This was a
direct result of the outbreak of the war and the serious turn the
North African situation henceforth took. Its Algeria reportage in
1954 and 1955 was also thematically more diverse and its level of
interest in the subject, measured by the three-point scale explained
earlier, was much higher, with a total attention score of 246 points
compared with only 70 points between 1945 and 1953.
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In qualitative terms, however, the paper's coverage in 1954 and
1955 remained as weak as in the previous eight-year period. Deluded
by French governmental sources, it helped to "black out" essential
information about the Algerian problem and its various facets. 2 Most
of its Algeria-related items seemed far away from the fundamental
journalistic principle of "impartiality", as they unequivocally
favoured the French Government point of view. Even in those scarce
instances where it seemed to try to be impartial by providing both
sides of each story, the choice of opinions and the way they were
displayed - without direct distortion - were still favourable to the
French authorities. Whereas, for example, it often quoted directly or
at least paraphrased statements of French officials, it reported the
statements of Algerian nationalists only indirectly.
Heavy dependence on "hot news" and the non-existence of in-depth
analysis, combined with a general lack of understanding of the
complexity of the post-War North African situation, resulted in hasty,
superficial and often misleading coverage. The New York Times
reporters and editors, failing to address themselves to the crux of
the Algerian problem, added to the reader's confusion by relying on
superficial, often over-simplistic second-hand reports. The New York
Times, like all American newspapers, firmly adhered to the
journalistic convention of complete separability of facts from opinion
and interpretation; these were limited only to the editorial page, the
Magazine or the Sunday section "News of the Week in Review". Only 23
items, comprising, 9.7 percent of the overall total Algeria material
between 1945 and 1955 could be considered to belong to the
analysis/interpretation category, including eleven editorials and
twelve commentaries; but only a fraction of these can be regarded as
really analytical or interpretive.
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The New York Times Algeria coverage between 1945 and 1955 lacked
the "breadth of analysis" and the "instinct for fact-finding" which is
usually believed to constitute an essential part of the craft of
journalism and, therefore, failed to provide the reader with the
"whys" and "hows" of events. Without analysis and interpretation of
news even sophisticated readers find it hard, if not impossible, to
understand the multifarious conditions that circumscribe political
situations. The paper tried to report the events in Algeria but
failed adequately to address itself to the different causes and
effects of the problem. Willy filly, it helped the French authorities
in their attempts to undermine the aspiration of a nation for the
right to self-determination.
The paper was preoccupied mainly with what was "dramatic" and
"novel". It focused on French "police" activities as the French
Government attempted to stamp out the Algerian nationalist movement,
and the lofty statements of French officials, to use its own slogan,
became the "news fit to print". This almost obsessive focus on what
was "dramatic" and "novel" resulted in considerable fluctuation in its
Algerian coverage during the period. Over two years, 1948 and 1949,
not a single Algerian story was deemed worthy of printing in its
columns. This undermined one of the primary duties of a newspaper,
which is to "make meanings out of events", by reducing the role of the
journalist to one similar to that of a fireman to be requested only
"on call" and then no longer required once the fire is over.3
The New York Times Algeria coverage between 1945 and 1955 was,
therefore, generally weak, misleading and error-prone. The paper,
widely regarded as the most prestigious daily publication in the
United States, only partly lived up to its tradition as a "news
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oriented" newspaper, and almost totally neglected essential
background, analytical and interpretive information. Its reliance on
French official sources made its reportage superficial, simplistic and
largely dominated by subliminal, speculative and one-sided views.
This thesis has explored the extent to which the newspaper, during the
period 1956-1962, overcame its earlier limitations. The thematic
analysis developed in Chapters II to VI is now given statistical
expression by applying a modification of the "attention score" system.
This chapter is divided into the four main sub-periods of the
substantive thematic analysis.
Frequency Degree of
Number	 Intensity
	
49	 2
	
22	 1
	
52	 2
	
97	 3
	
160	 3
	
78	 2
47	 2
36	 2
89	 3
23	 1
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Sub-Period I: 1956-1957
The New York Times Algeria-related coverage in 1956 and 1957 was
centred around ten major thematic categories. These are classified
here according to a three-point scale to determine their degree of
"intensity". As explained earlier, a thematic category is given one
point, two points or three points depending on its frequency number;
that is, according to the number of times it has occurred in the
paper's material in a given period. These categories are presented in
Table 1 with their frequency number (or thematic trajectory) and their
degree of intensity.
TABLE 1
Thematic Category
1. "Bad" character of the "rebels"
2. Algeria as an integral part of France
3. Foreign influence on F.L.N.
4. French attempts of socio-economic
reforms to win popular support and
isolate F.L.N.
5. Military situation: French efforts
to end the war by force
6. Socio-economic and political
repercussions of the war in France
7. The international implications of
the Algerian-French conflict; France
seeking N.A.T.O. assistance
8. The "Algerian Question" at the United
Nations
9. F.L.N.'s growing political and military
strength
10. Colon pressure and the French
Government retreat.
Because this study is concerned with the manner in which The New
York Times treated Algeria as well as the choice of themes, the
attempt is made to examine the frequency of occurrence and prominence
of display of the Algeria-related material. This helps to clarify the
paper's attitude towards the subject. Measurement of the material
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according to the "attention score" system has given the following
results: out of a total of 489 items devoted to the subject during
this sub-period (1956-1957), three items were assigned three point;4
251 Items were assigned two points; and 235 items were assigned one
pont. The total score of the attention given by the paper to Algeria
in 1956 and 1957 was 746 points.5
The New York Times focused on four major thematic categories; the
military situation, especially the French army's efforts to end the
war by weakening the F.L.N.; the French Government's efforts to
isolate the F.L.N. and win popular support through promises of
socio-economic "reforms"; the growing military and political strength
of the F.L.N.; and the heavy bearing of the war on France's political,
economic and social life. The most "salient", or most frequently
mentioned, categories are tabulated in Table 2 with their frequency
number.
TABLE 2
Thematic category	 Frequency
Number
1. Military situation: French efforts to end the
	
160
war by force.
2. French attempts of socio-economic " reforms " to	 97
win popular support and isolate F.L.N.
3. F.L.N.'s growing military and political strength	 89
4. Socio-economic and political repercussions of the
	
78
war in France.
The paper's degree of attention to the subject did not follow a
steady pattern but was subject to conspicuous fluctuation. The level
of interest in Algeria rose in the first five months of 1956 but fell
sharply in the last seven months. This is evidenced by the 44
front-page stories, eleven editorials and four commentaries the paper
devoted to the Algerian conflict between January and May, as opposed
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to only 15 front-page stories, two editorials and two commentaries
between June and December. It has already been observed that with the
competition for space, other events than the preoccupation of the
present thesis, can take over. In 1956, of course, the
Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Suez came to dominate the world
press. However, despite this a similar degree of fluctuation affected
its coverage in 1957. The degree of attention rose in the first six
months with 31 front-page stories, eight editorials and nine
commentaries, but fell sharply between July and September with only
six front-page stories, two editorials and four commentaries. It then
rose again between October and December with 15 front-page stories,
six editorials and six commentaries. The degree of attention given by
The New York Times to Algeria during this sub-period reached its
highest point or "peak" in May 1956, with 14 front-page stories, one
editorial and two commentaries, and also in June 1957 with nine
front-page stories, three editorials and two commentaries. This
fluctuation is presented in tabular form in Table 3:
TABLE 3
January to
May 1956
June to
December 1956
January to
June 1957
July to
September 1957
October to
December 1957
Front-page	 Editorials Commentaries Total attention
stories	 score
	
44
	
11	 4
	
119 points
	
15
	
2	 2
	
39 points
	
31
	
8	 9
	
95 points
	
6
	
2	 4
	
24 points
	
15
	
6	 6
	
54 points
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According to the "attention score" system relying as it does on a
three-point scale to gauge the degree of attention associated with
each item, editorials, front-page stories and commentaries are
assigned two points. But, front-page stories with headlines covering
more than half the number of columns on the same page are assigned
three points. 6 This study has detected three such stories in The New
York Times Algeria-related coverage in 1956 and 1957. Each has
therefore been assigned three points in the count of attention score
table.
Despite Its evident extensiveness, represented by the 489 items,
the paper's Algeria coverage in 1956 and 1957 was predominantly
favourable to the French point of view as demonstrated in Chapter III.
In valence terms, therefore, 379 items, out of a total of 489,
comprising 77.5 percent and with a total atention score of 552 points,
were favourable to France. This is compared with only 110 balanced or
neutral items comprising 22.5 percent of the total Algeria material
and with a total attention score of 194 points. This perhaps confirms
the view that by standards of professional competence in the reporting
and interpreting of events, especially those outside the United
States, The New York Times is denied the claim to "eminence" in
American journalism, despite its statistical supremacy. 7 It also
corresponds with the view that: "All the News That's Fit to Print" is
a "great slogan" but is also a "fraud"; no newspaper or network
station has the space or the time to cover the actions and words of a
single city like Washington let alone the world: "... the process of
selecting what the reader reads involves not just objective facts but
subjective judgments, personal values and, yes, prejudices".8
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In addition to misrepresenting and misreporting events, The New
York Times, whether deliberately or not, helped the French authorities
to "black out" important news about different aspects within the
overall area. The fact that most of its material was favourable to
the French official view was a direct consequence of its heavy
reliance on government sources for its raw information. This is
especially true of the 175 news stories which had originated in France
and the 141 stories which had originated in Algeria; these were
overwhelmingly favourable to the Government's position. Up to 316
news stories out of a total of 418, comprising 75.5 percent of the
total Algeria-related news reportorial material, were based on
information from official sources. Concordant with this, is the fact
that 66 items out of an overall total of 110 balanced or neutral items
during this sub-period, had originated outside France and Algeria,
mainly in Tunis, Rabat or at the United Nations or simply in the
paper's own feature departments.
The fact that the paper depended on French governmental sources
corresponds with the theory that news is elite centred both in terms
of people and in terms of nations. As Johan Galtung and Marl H. Ruge
have argued, in an elite-centred news communication system "ordinary
people are not given the chance of representing themselves. Mutatis
rnutandis, the same should apply to nations". 9 Such dependence also
perhaps finds explanation in the fact that Europe has traditionally
dominated the United States foreign news coverage. For example, 51
percent of all American foreign correspondents stationed abroad in
1975 were in Europe.'° It also corresponds with the theory that there
is an inherent "Loyalty bias" which often affects the quality of the
coverage of non-Western news by the Western media. This point will be
developed in greater detail later on in this cIapter.
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The weakness of The New York Times Algeria coverage also stems
from the fact that it relied heavily on "hot news" at the expense of
analytical and Interpretive material. Only 54 items, comprising 11
percent of the total Algeria-related material, can be considered to
belong to the analysis/interpretation category; they included 29
editorials and 25 commentaries. Even these, arguably enough, were not
analytical enough. This perhaps gives credence to the argument that
the paper's editorial page was "unpersuasive" and lacked "vitality"
and "punch". On the other hand, as many as 418 items, comprising 85.4
percent of all the Algeria material, fell under the "hot news", or
straight news-reporting, category. Most of the reports, as already
explained, originated in the information services of the French
Government. The information conveyed by those services was generally
relayed uncritically by the paper whose Algeria coverage, during this
sub-period, was generally superficial and error-prone.12
Analytical coverage, it is argued, has never been part of the
training of The New York Times correspondents: "If there is no
'crisis'..., they feel there is nothing to report". The paper's
foreign coverage has even been described as generally "miserable",
because of its lack of interpretive, analytical materials and its
heavy dependence on "hot news". Its claim to "authority" in American
journalism is often based on its "mastery of the factual material" or
its possession of raw information.' 3 Editors of American newspapers
including The New York Times traditionally objected to mixing news
with opinion and insisted upon giving facts without context, arguing
that the reporter's duty is to give the reader enough facts as simple
and as clear as possible. 14	Since the function of a newspaper is to
"explain the world to the people who live in it", the theory of
absolute separability of fact from opinion hasbeen viewed by many
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critics as "unreasonable". The newspaper's duty, as Benjamin Demott
has argued, is not only to describe events but to measure their
significance and their impact on the people. Hence, the newspaper
should not only be an instrument which simply reacts to experience but
should also "seek to act upon it, creating the central issues of the
time in comprehensible language, aiming beyond accuracy at meaning".
The newspaper should, in a nutshell, accept its obligation to
"educate", and should not encourage the theory that "simple opinions
are adequate opinions" whereby the reader may believe that whatever
catchword he can invent will be enough to enable him to understand and
interpret complicated matters, like wars and international crises.15
Concordant with the fact that The New York Times relied heavily
on "hot news" at the expense of in-depth analysis and interpretation,
Is the argument that the Algeria-related events were generally
presented to the reader devoid of their soclo-economic, cultural and
historical background. It is essential for the lay reader and the
expert alike, one supposes, to perceive facts in their relevant
contexts in order to understand their causes, consequences and
implications. One of the shortcomings of the paper's reportage of the
Algerian-French conflict was the tendency to overplay the consequences
of events to the detriment of analysis of their causes and diverse
contextual circumstances. In fact, not all the 51 items which have
been classified herein under the analytical/interpretation category
were analytical enough. Only seven of these, comprising a mere 1.4
percent of the total Algeria material, really attempted to analyse the
conflict in all its aspects; only seven items were unclouded by the
simplistic and highly subliminal views that largely dominated the
paper's Algeria coverage in 1956 and J957•16
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A general rule in journalism is that the news should be presented
to the reader in a manner that can be easily understood.
"Simplification" does not become a negative factor influencing news
coverage if it is intended as "clarification", but, it becomes a
negative factor that influences the quality of news coverage when it
is intended as "making less complex". If a particular event has some
sort of complexity and "what happened" is reported as less complex,
"more simple" than It actually was, then simplification becomes a
serious journalistic error.17
The (London) Times Algeria coverage, like that of The New York
Times, was mostly simplistic and superficial. This was again partly
the result of its almost exclusive reliance on French official sources
for Its news material: all the reports came from Paris; none came from
Algeria, simply because the paper had no resident correspondent there.
It was also partly a consequence of its heavy dependence on "hot news"
at the expense of analytical, interpretive material. Although the
paper devoted 22 editorials to the Algerian-French conflict during
this sub-period, only three could be considered analytical or
interpretive. 18
 The rest did not differ much from news stories as they
were generally superficial and highly descriptive. 19 The weeklies
(The Economist and Time), on the other hand, because of their nature
as synthesizers of, and commentators on, news media information,
provided more analytical material and more background information to
the Algerian problem than did the dailies, despite the fact that the
news magazines are limited by space and frequency of publication.20
The New York Times heavy reliance on French official sources, and
the subsequent limitation of the amount of balanced or neutral Algeria
news material, resulted in some serious reportlng flaws and consquent
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bias against the F.L.N. Therefore, whether deliberately or not, the
posture of the newspaper was favourable to the French Government.
Some of these flaws are related to sources of information which are
technically known as "questionable"; others are related to the
phraseology used and in this sub-period include three categories:
"loaded words", "opportunistic reporting" and "pollyanna reporting".21
1. QuestIonable sources of Information: These are the sources of
news stories which are of "dubious validity and reliability". This
study has detected that when the reporting was "inexact" in source of
information It was often unfavourable to the F.L.N. and, by the same
token, favourable to France. A story appearing on 30 July 1956
typified the paper's description of the military situation: "French
forces killed sixty-six insurgents in week-end clashes in eastern
Algeria, reports reaching here said tonight". 22 A similar story read:
"Unofficial estimates today said the rebels had lost 15,000 men in the
last two months. Only seventy French soldiers were reported killed in
the same period". 23
 Also typifying the paper's reportage were phrases
like "In view of diplomatic sources here...", "Observers here
assumed..." which generally left the sources ambiguous and
unidentified. 24
 Moreover, some of the paper's sources of information
were unreliable and of dubious validity because they had relied on
accounts given by only one of the two belligerent sides, viz the
French authorities: "Tonight's news bulletins from military
headquarters have reported 132 rebels killed.. in the last twenty-four
hours"; "French forces said today forty nationalist rebels had been
killed in military operations in rebel-torn Algeria".25
2. Loaded Words: This type of reporting error refers to words or
phrases with "high overtones". Although such words or phrases
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sometimes make reporting livelier and more appealing, their usage by
The New York Times was, like the questionable sources of information
explained earlier, favourable to the French position and, therefore,
anti-F.L.N. Typical examples of this flaw are: "The rebels... had
preyed on civilians; "The rebel methods are savage..."; "... rebel...
vandalism and sabotage". 26 Concordant with this, is the paper's
general tone which was overwhelmingly favourable to France. Reporting
on a French-A.L.N. military clash, for example, it carried the
following dispatch: "French authorities say they killed 200
nationalist rebels over the week-end in Algeria. They reported that
nineteen French soldiers had lost their lives in the operations".27
3. Opportunistic reporting: This is defined as "news which is
reported primarily for its timeliness rather than for its intrinsic
news value". The New York Times sometimes used opportune news items
to supplement certain subliminal views and pre-established ideas which
were generally stereotypes of the French army's creation. To
supplement the view of the viciousness of the F.L.N. fighters the
paper reported at some length incidents where they were alleged to
have killed civilians: "A French farm manager and his 23-year-old
daughter were shot and killed in Birmandreis... by terrorists". 28
 To
support the idea of rivalry between the F.L.N. and other Algerian
organizations the paper reported the arrest by the French of five men
who belonged to Messali's M.N.A. for attempting to kill an F.L.N.
leader, Krim Belkacem, under the conspicuous headline:
FRENCH JAIL FIVE REBELS
Seize Group Trying to2ill
Leader of Rival Band.
To supplement the claim that the F.L.N. was not enjoying the support
of the local population and that most Algerians were distant from its
cause, the paper opportunely reported: "Two native hamlets in the
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Soummam Valley... put themselves under the protection of the French
Army". 3° Another story had earlier read: "The rebels killed
twenty-three Moslems at various places because of their sympathies for
the French". 3 ' And to supplement the claim that the French army was
regaining control of the situation, it repeatedly highlighted F.L.N.
losses through opportune news items. Typical samples of these
include: "... sixty-five rebels had been killed and forty wounded in
clash five miles west of Nedroma.. ;32 "Sixteen rebels, eleven of
them in uniform, were killed by French paratroopers in an engagement
near Honainie;" 33 "French forces killed sixty-six insurgents in
week-end clashes in eastern Algeria. 	 The paper, on the other
hand, often minimized the French losses or ignored them altogether.
4. Pollyanna reporting: This refers to "news which is reported in
Its most cheerful light, news reported in terms of wishful thinking".
For example, referring to what it called the French army's "successes"
against the F.L.N., the paper commented in a pollyanna way that this
would "lead to a modification of the rebel attitude", which to-date
had still made recognition of Algeria's right to independence a
prerequisite for any negotiations with the French Government. 35 This
study, however, has not detected in this sub-period any instance of
the other equally serious reporting errors such as "unwarranted
headlines" and "climactic reporting" which developed later on.
Table 4 summarizes the manner in which The New York Times covered
the Algerian-French conflict in 1956 and 1957.
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TABLE 4
Origin of Algeria-
related news
stories
Sources of news
stories
News stories as
played in the paper
Nature of Algeria-
rel ated materi al
Attention score of
Al geri a-rel ated
items
Valence of Algeria-
related items
From France: 175; From Algeria: 141; Other: 102
Total: 418
French sources: 316; Non-French sources: 102;
Total: 418
Inside pages: 307 stories; Page One: 111
stories;	 Total: 418
News stories: 418; Editorials: 29;
Commentaries: 25; Letters to the editor: 17
Total: 489
235 Items: 1 point; 251 items: 2 points;
3 items: 3 points	 Total: 746 points
Pro-French: 379 items; Balanced or neutral: 110
items;	 Total: 489
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Sub-Period II: 1958-1959
The New York Times Algeria-related material in 1958 and 1959
included thirteen major thematic categories which are tabulated below
with their frequency number and their degree of intensity:
TABLE 5
Thematic Category
	
Frequency Degree of
Number	 Intensity
1. Economic and "psychological" importance
	
18	 1
of Algeria to France.
2. Military situation: the Challe offensive
	
68	 2
3. French attempts of socio-economic
	
37	 1
"reforms" to win popular support and
isolate F.L.N.
4. F.L.N.'s growing political and military
	
68	 2
strength
5. Heavy bearing of the war on both Algeria
	
76	 2
and France
6. International repercussions of the conflict;
	
109	 3
the impact of the war on neighbouring
countries
7. France's enduring political crisis and the
	
77	 2
collapse of the Fourth Republic
8. De Gaulle's return to power and his attempts
	
152	 3
to keep Algeria tied to France.
9. Algerian reaction to de Gaulle's
	
27	 1
integrationist policies.
10. France's acceptance of Algeria's right to
	
72	 2
self-determination.
11. Colon-Army Opposition to de Gaulle's plan
	
55	 2
and threat of insurrection.
12. The West, the United States and the Algerian
	
65	 2
conflict.
13. The United Nations and the "Algerian
	
29	 1
Question".
Applying the "attention score" system36
 to measure the degree of
prominence of the Algeria-related material and, thus, the level of the
paper's interest in the subject, this study has detected that out of a
total of 616 items devoted to Algeria, seven items were assigned three
points, 37 425 items were assigned two points and 184 items were
assigned one point. The total score of the attention the paper gave
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to Algeria In 1958 and 1959 was 1055 points.38
The New York Times, in covering the Algerian-French conflict
during this sub-period focused on four major themes: de Gaulle's
return to power and his immediate policy on Algiera; the international
repercussions of the conflict, notably its impact on the neighbouring
countries; France's enduring political crisis resulting in the
collapse of the Fourth republic; and the heavy bearing of the war on
both Algeria and France. These most salient themes are presented in
Table 6 with their frequency number or thematic trajectory.
TABLE 6
Thematic Category
	
Frequency
Number
1. De Gaulle's return to power and his attempts to keep	 152
Algeria tied to France.
2. International repercussions of the conflict; the 	 109
impact of the war on the neighbouring countries.
3. France's enduring political crisis and the collapse 	 77
of the Fourth Republic.
4. Heavy bearing of the war on both Algeria and France. 	 76
This study has detected considerable fluctuation in the degree of
attention given by The New York Times to the subject during this
sub-period. Such attention rose in the first six months of 1958 with
as many as 118 front-page stories, 43 editorials and 15 "News of the
Week in Review" commentaries. It, however, fell sharply between July
and December with only 15 front-page stories, 13 editorials and seven
commentaries. This fluctuation is perhaps partly determined by the
fact that the first half of 1958 saw some important and highly "news
worthy" events taking place in France itself, namely the 13 May coup,
the downfall of the Fourth Republic and de Gaulle's return to power.39
In the second half of the year, however, these events lost their
novelty and therefore the paper's level of interest decreased. This
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perhaps confirms a general criticism of The New York Times, and the
press as a whole, that It only gives adequate attention to
developments when they are new or "novel". This also corresponds with
the theory that sensational happenings always make better "story".
Conflict, hardcore news, controversy, crisis and disaster have always
outplayed soft news in the media. The distinguished columnist James
Reston once defined news as "a chronicle of conflict and change". En
1959, on the other hand, the paper's degree of attention to the
subject followed a relatively steady pattern although without a very
high cumulative score. This is evidenced by the 35 front-page
stories, nine editorials and four commentaries devoted to the
Algerian-French conflict between January and June, and the 35
front-page stories, nine editorials and eleven commentaries between
July and December.
The New York Times level of interest in Algeria in 1958 and 1959
had reached its highest point or "peak" in May 1958, with 36 page-one
stories, 16 editorials and three commentaries when the French
political crisis reached its climax with the 13 May coup and also, to
some extent, in June when the Fourth Republic finally collapsed and de
Gaulle was brought back to power. 4° Its interest in the subject
reached its lowest point or "valley" in April 1959 with only three
page-one stories, one commentary and zero editorials. The paper's
degree of attention to Algeria during this sub-period, measured by the
number of front-page, editorial and commentary items is presented in
Table 7.
43
13
5
10
112
15
35
35
January to
June 1958
July to
December 1958
January to
June 1959
July to
December 1959
	
15	 361 points
	
9	 70 points
	
6	 88 points
13	 110 points
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TABLE 7
F 0nt_page Editorials Commentaries Total attention
stories	 score
1958 and 1959 also saw an evident rise in the amount of balanced
Algeria material in the newspaper, in addition to the overall
quantitative rise in the coverage. In statistical "valence" terms,
207 items out of a total of 616, comprising 33.6 percent of the
Algeria-related material with a total attention score of 401 points,
were neutral or balanced, compared with only 22.5 percent and a total
attention score of 194 points in 1956 and 1957. On the other hand 296
items, comprising 48 percent of the total coverage and with a total
attention score of 507 points, were favourable to the French
Government. 113 items, comprising 18.3 percent of the overall
coverage and with a total attention score of 147 points, were
unfavourable to the colon extremists. As explained in Chapter III,
after the French political crisis of 1958 and the 13 May coup which
precipitated the downfall of the Fourth Republic, the paper began to
take a firm and more explicit stance against the colon extremists and
their allies within the army.
This increase in the amount of balanced or neutral material was a
direct result of the decrease in The New York Times reliance on French
official sources for information. In the profession of journalism
correspondents are customarily expected to diversify their sources of
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information and avoid relying on a single source. The quality and
direction of the news finally presented to the reader is by and large
"dependent on what is available at the gathering end of the line".41
In 1958 and 1959 The New York Times appeared to be more conscious of
its public duty. Of the 484 news stories the paper devoted to Algeria
during this sub-period, 192 stories, comprising 39.6 percent of the
overall news reportage, came from independent sources, compared with
only 24.4 percent in 1956 and 1957. 250 stories, comprising 51.6
percent of the total number of news stories as opposed to 75.5 percent
in 1956 and 1957, still relied on French official sources. This study
has detected that the paper increased its direct quotations of
governmental sources and also its source references. This is an
indication of its attempt to dissociate itself from both the source
and the message as opposed to the previous two-year period which was
dominated by paraphrasing and was, therefore, inevitably favourable to
the French point of view. As L. Erwin Atwood has argued, "the
communicator who is to relay the source's message may wish,
consciously or not, to use these means to make it clear that the views
expressed are not his own". 42 It is interesting to note that 42 news
stories, comprising 8.6 percent of the total Algeria news reportage as
opposed to zero percentage in 1956 and 1957, came from Algerian
sources. It is widely accepted that the duty of the foreign news
correspondent is to "tell the story of the people in the nation to
which he is assigned, not merely the official acts of the government
and the announcements of the press attachs".43
Congruent with the idea that The New York Times improved the
quality of its Algeria coverage in 1958 and 1959, is the fact that it
increased the amount of its analytical and interpretive material. Out
of an overall total of 616 Algeria-related items, 114 items,
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comprising 18.5 percent of the total coverage as opposed to only 11
percent in 1956 and 1957, fell under the analysis/interpretation
category. They include 71 editorials and 61 commentaries. The
(London) Times also quantitatively improved its Algeria-related
analytical and interpretive material, evidenced by the 38 editorials
it devoted to the subject during this sub-period compared with only 22
in 1956 and 1957. Once again, however, it was the weeklies, name'y
The Economist and Time - by their nature as synthesizers of news media
information - which provided better analytical coverage and more
background material to the Algerian-French conflict.44
Although The New York Times diversified its sources of
information and increased its usage of independent sources, its
reportage in 1958 and 1959 was affected by a number of journalistic
errors which were related to the source and are technically known as
"questionable" sources of information; sources which are of "dubious
validity and reliability". 45
 As in 1956 and 1957, such errors were by
and large unfavourable to the Algerian point of view and were, by the
same token, pro-French. Typifying these errors are the following
samples: "Experienced observers reported today that..."; "... it was
learned today from unimpeachable diplomatic sources..."; "Unofficial
reports said..."; "observers noted that.
Table 8 shows in brief how The New York Times covered the
Algerian-French conflict in 1958 and 1959.
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TABLE 8
Origin of Algeria-
related news
stories
Sources of news
stories
From France: 192; From other places excluding
Algeria: 166; From Algeria: 126 	 Total: 484
French sources: 250; Independent sources: 192;
Algerian sources: 42	 Total: 484
News stories as	 Inside pages: 287 stories; Page One: 197 stories:
played in the paper	 Total: 484
Nature of Algeria-
rel ated mater I al
Attention score of
Al geri a-rel ated
items
New stories: 484; Editorials: 71; Commentaries:
43; Letters to the editor: 18 	 Total: 616
184 items: 1 point; 425 items: 2 points; 7 items:
3 points	 Total: 1055
Valence of Algeria- Pro-French Government: 296 items; Balanced or
related items
	
neutral: 207 items; Anti-colon: 113 items;
Total: 616
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Sub-Period III: 1960-1961
The New York Times Algeria material in 1960 and 1961 comprised
ten major thematic categories which are classified in Table 9 with
their frequency number, and with their degree of intensity measured on
the three-point scale to denote their degree of intensity.47
TABLE 9
Thematic Category
	
Frequency Degree of
Number	 Intensity
1. De Gaulle and the Fifth Republic under
	
132	 3
Army-co7on threats
2. Growing Algerian popular support for the
	
58	 2
F.L.N.
3. De Gaulle's attempts to end the war through
	
69	 2
a solution short of independence and to keep
Algeria tied to France.
4. France's aggravated socio-economic and
	
110	 3
political problems because of the continu-
ation of the war.
5. The Challe offensive and the F.L.N. 	 44	 1
6. French public opinion's growing opposition
	
34	 1
to the continuation of the war.
7. The French-Algerian conflict and the West:
	
49	 1
N.A.T.O. and the U.S.
8. Mounting international support for Algeria's
	
46	 1
right to independence.
9. The "Algerian Question" at the U.N.	 33	 1
10. Algerian-French negotiations and prospects
	
163	 3
for a settlement.
Applying the attention score system to denote the degree of
prominence and frequency of occurrence of the Algeria-related material
has given the following results: out of a total of 463 items devoted
to the subject during this sub-period, six items were assigned three
points, 48 344 items were assigned two points and 113 items were
assigned one point. The total score of the paper's attention to
Algeria was 819 points.49
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The New York Times Algeria coverage in 1960 and 1961 focused on
three major thematic categories: Algerian-French negotiations and the
prospects for a settlement; threats of the army and colon extremists
to de Gaulle and his republic; French aggravated internal crisis
because of the continuation of the war. These most salient categories
in the overall Algeria-related material during this sub-period are
tabulated below according to their frequency number:
TABLE 10
Thematic cateogry 	 Frequency
Number
1. Algerian-French negotiations and prospects for a 	 163
settlement.
2. De Gaulle and the Fifth Republic under Army- 	 132
colon threats.
3. France's aggravated socio-economic and political 	 110
problems because of the continuation of the war.
The paper's level of interest during this sub-period also
fluctuated considerably. Its attention to Algeria went up
substantially in the first two months of 1960, fell sharply between
March and October, but rose again considerably in the last two months.
It devoted as many as twelve editorials, 28 front-page stories and
five commentaries to Algerian matters in January and February and a
further twelve editorials, 39 front-page stories and five commentaries
in November and December. In the intervening eight-month period it
published only fifteen editorials, 35 front-page stories and eleven
commentaries. In 1961, however, the paper's degree of attention to
the French-Algerian conflict followed almost a steady pattern, with 14
editorials, 66 front-page stories and eight commentaries between
January and June, and with eleven editorials, 64 front-page stories
and three commentaries in the following six months.
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The New York Times attention to Algeria in 1960 reached its
highest points or "peaks" in January with fifteen front-page stories,
seven editorials and two commentaries, and in December with 26
front-page stories, seven editorials and two commentaries. These peaks
in the level of Interest were a direct result of two major events
which took place in Algeria: the serious disturbances caused by the
colons, better known as "barricades week", in January; the Algerian
nationalist demonstrations in December, and the iron-fist response by
the police. These events attracted the most prominent headlines with a
maximum three-point attention score and a considerable amount of
front-page editorial and commentary material.50
The paper's level of interest in Algeria in 1961 reached its
"peak" in January, when the much publicized French referendum on
Algeria was held, with fifteen front-page stories, three editorials
and three commentaries. Its degree of attention to the subject, on
the other hand, reached its lowest point or "valley" in September 1960
with zero page-one stories, one editorial and one commentary. The New
York Times level of interest in Algeria in 1960 and 1961, measured by
the number of front-page, editorial and commentary items, is tabulated
below according to the three-point score system.
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TABLE 11
January to
February 1960
March to
October 1960
November to
December 1960
January to
June 1961
July to
December 1961
Front-page Editorials Commentaries Total Attention
stories	 Score
28	 12	 5	 92 points
15	 11
	
124 points
12
	
3
	
110 points
14
	
8
	
177 points
11
	
5
	
160 points
35
39
66
64
1960 and 1961 saw a quantitative fall in The New York Times
Algeria coverage by 24.8 percent compared with 1958 and 1959. More
importantly, however, only 123 items comprising 26.5 percent of the
overall Algeria material with a total attention score of just 311
points compared with 33.6 percent and a total attention score of 401
points in 1958 and 1959, were either neutral or balanced. On the
other hand 244 items, comprising 52.6 percent of the total Algeria
material with a total attention score of 346 points, were favourable
to the French Government, compared with 48 percent and a total
attention score of 507 points in 1958 and 1959.
The increase in the paper's Algeria balanced material in 1958 and
1959 had been partly the result of the changes that took place in
France after the 13 May coup, the downfall of the Fourth Republic and
the return of de Gaulle to power. With the change in French policy
especially the acceptance of Algeria's right to self-determination,
The New York Times adopted a more balanced stance: it hailed General
de Gaulle for his new proposals; and became more receptive to the
Algerian point of view and more detached from the traditional French
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argument that Algeria was an integral part of France. 5 ' But, the
G.P.R.A.'s adoption of a cautious attitude towards the new proposals
seemed to have angered the paper which put almost absolute faith in
General de Gaulle and his policies, criticizing what it painted as the
G.P.R.A.'s unwillingness to move fast enough towards a settlement.
Hence, it veered back towards an evident pro-French and less balanced
stance, as has statistically been illustrated in this section. It is
noteworthy that the G.P.R.A.'s cautious attitude towards the proposals
propounded by General de Gaulle stemmed largely from a desire to
achieve a workable agreement and secure practical guarantees for a
free implementation of the self-determination offer.52
The paper's pro-French, anti-G.P.R.A. stance on the issue of
Algeria's future perhaps confirms the view that the news often tends
to "reinforce the status quo and to exaggerate the importance of
individual action by big power leaders", like General de Gaulle,
because of some inherent political and "identification" biases:
France's importance to N.A.T.O. and to the United States
self-interest. Indeed, as Sande has argued, the foreign news story in
the American press seems to be "a reflection either of American
interests or of American stereotypes". 53 This also corresponds with
the theory that there is an inherent "loyalty bias" in the coverage of
non-Western news by the Western media. 54 Yet, The New York Times took
a sharper stance against the army-colon extremists: 96 items out of an
overall total of 463 Algeria-related items, comprising 20.7 percent of
the total Algeria coverage with a total attention score of 162 items,
were unfavourable to the French army and the extremist pieds noirs.
This was due to the campaign of violence and destruction conducted by
the colon desperadoes and their allies in the army, in an attempt to
hamper the process of negotiations and prevent-Algeria's
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independence.
The argument that The New York Times Algeria coverage in 1960 and
1961 was mostly favourable to the French Government is congruent with
the fact that it relied heavily on French official sources for
information. As many as 220 news stories, comprising 60.6 percent of
the total Algeria-related news reportage compared with 51.6 percent in
1958 and 1959, came from French governmental sources. Only 80 news
stories, comprising 22 percent of the total news reportage compared
with 39.6 percent in 1958 and 1959, came from independent sources.
This corresponds with the argument that the news is elite-centred with
regard to people and also to nations. The views of those in power are
always considered by the media as more "news worthy" than the views of
the people without political power. 56 Yet, 63 news stories comprising
17.3 percent of the total news reportage, compared with only 8.6
percent in the previous sub-period, used Algerian sources. This
increase was due mainly to the growing involvement of the G.P.R.A. in
the news making process, at least from the paper's stand-point, by
being directly involved in the diplomatic manoeuvres so widely
reported during this sub-period. 57 Correspondents have always been
encouraged to diversify their sources of information; the quality of
news reportage depends on the quality of the source. The more access
correspondents have to different sources of information the more
accurately they can report events. 58 Foreign news correspondents have
to report both the people and the governing power in the nation to
which they are assigned: "... almost any people is likeable; but
governments seldom are", wrote R.W. Desmond about half a century
ago.
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The Algeria-related analytical and interpretive material dropped
by 15.7 percent compared with 1958-1959. It consisted of 96 items
comprising 64 editorials and 32 commentaries. The paper still relied
heavily on straightforward factual reporting at the expense of
analytical, interpretive and background material. American newspaper
editors, as already explained, have traditionally regarded the role of
the newspaper as to "inform" by giving the reader "enough facts" as
clearly and as straightforwardly as possible, and have, therefore,
always insisted on the separability of facts from opinion. But, we
saw at an earlier stage of this chapter that separability often tends
to oversimplify the news by making events seem less complex than they
really are. This often leads to distortion of truth. 6° Yet,
straightforward news reports can be more effective in influencing
public opinion than the interpretive items, especially if repeated
regularly. An idea or suggestion can implant itself in the reader's
mind and even become a "fact" in his eyes through "constant hammering,
or gentle but repeated suggestion". 61
 To know the impact of The New
York Times reporting of the Algerian-French conflict on American
public opinion falls beyond the scope of this study, and can be
discovered only through a survey of readers' opinion. But Bernard
Berelson's argument that the reportorial content of the media can
influence public opinion more than the interpretive content is very
suggestive: "... events tend to solidify opinion changes produced by
words, changes which otherwise would be shortlived; and the fait
accompli event crystallizes opinion in favour of the event even though
words had not been able to do so". 62
 News reportorial content, as
already pointed out, formed by far the bulk of The New York Times
Algeria coverage.
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The (London) Times Algeria-related material dropped even more
substantially than that of The New York Times. It fell by 39.4
percent, from 38 editorials (or leading articles) in 1958 and 1959 to
only 23 in 1960 and 1961. The weeklies, on the other hand, by their
nature as synthesizers of news media information, again provided
better analytical, interpretive and background information on the
Algerian-French conflict. This is especially true of The Economist
and Time.63
The increase in The New York Times usage of French governmental
sources as evidenced earlier, and the subsequent decrease of its
Algeria balanced or neutral content compared with 1958 and 1959,
resulted in an evident rise in the number of reporting flaws which
include "questionable sources of information", "loaded words" and
"opportunistic reporting". 64 These flaws also include "climactic
reporting" and "unwarranted headlines" which have not been detected in
the previous sub-periods, and which are explained and illustrated
below.65
1. QuestIonable sources of information: Typical examples of these
Include phrases like: "Authoritative quarters... said", "... according
to well-placed sources...", "Competent sources...[said]. ,,66
2. Loaded words: As already pointed out, these words or phrases
are generally used to make reporting, and writing in general, livelier
and more appealing. But their usage by The New York Times in
reference to Algeria was, like that of the questionable sources of
information, unfavourable to the F.L.N. and to the Algerian point of
view. After the failure of the first Evian talks in June 1961, for
example, the paper put all the blame on the Algerian leaders
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commenting editorially that the "... rebel National Liberation Front
has equivocated inexcusab7y". 67 Another editorial had earlier accused
them of creating an "impasse in Algeria".68
3. OpportunIstic reporting: After the pied flair disturbances in
January 1960, for example, the paper used the G.P.R.A.'s reiteration
of commitment to Algeria's right to comp7ete independence as an
opportune news item to supplement the view that the Algerian leaders
were not doing enough to hasten the process of peace talks and that
they were missing the opportunity to reach a settlement with the
French Government. In the same context, to supplement the claim that
General de Gaulle was doing everything for peace in Algeria, it
asserted in an opportune manner that "President de Gaulle needs help
from rebel leaders [against Army-co7on extremists], but cannot accept
terms made by them". 69 Referring to the idea of a possible Sino-Soviet
support for the F.L.N., it made a highly opportunistic generalization
making a settlement to the Algerian-French conflict totally dependent
on the prospects of East-West relations: ".. the ultimate success of
(Algerian-French] negotiations... will largely depend on whether
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev can relax East-West...
tensions". 70
 And to supplement the view that the United States
Government was actively involved in the search for a settlement to the
Algerian problem, the paper used the marginal meetings of the American
Ambassadors to Tunis and Paris with some Algerian and French officials
to support the claim of "... efforts of the United States.., to bring
the two sides together..
4. Climactic reporting: This refers to the usage of news items
which imply that a particular event is decisive in the Algerian-French
conflict. The New York Times seemed preoccupied with the idea of a
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possible rapprochement between the G.P.R.A. on the one hand, and China
and the Soviet Union on the other, emphasizing the Chinese and Soviet
promises of assistance to the Algerians. Hence, the replacement of
Ferhat Abbas with Ben Khedda as Premier of the G.P.R.A. was reported
by the paper as crucial and decisive in the conduct of the Algerian
revolution and to the prospects of a settlement, simply because of Ben
Khedda's alleged inclination towards communism. His appointment, it
commented, marked a "... radically new phase in the long struggle in
Algeria..	 72
5. Unwarranted headlines: These are headlines whose length does
not draw justification from the story which follows. For example,
reporting the appointment of Ben Khedda to the Premiership of the
G.P.R.A., and echoing the highly speculative view about his
inclination towards communist China, the paper ran the following
unwarranted multi-column headline on 28 August 1961:
Algerians Pick Anti-West Leftist
As Premier in Place of Abbas
The only reporting flaw this study could not detect in The New York
Times Algeria coverage in 1960 and 1961 was "Pollyanna reporting".73
Table 12 below presents a brief summary of the way the paper
reported and treated the Algerian-French conflict in 1960 and 1961.
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TABLE 12
Origins of Algeria
related news
stories
Sources of news
stories
News stories as
played in the
paper
From France: 166; From Algeria: 99; From Tunis:
63; Other: 35	 Total: 363
French sources: 220; Independent sources: 80;
Algerian sources: 63	 Total: 363
Page One: 232 stories; Inside pages: 131 stories;
Total: 363
Nature of Algeria-	 News stories: 363; Editorials: 64; Commentaries:
Related items
	
32; Letters to the Editor: 4	 Total: 463
Attention score	 113 items: 1 point; 344 items: 2 points; 6 items:
of Algeria-related	 3 points	 Total: 819
items
Valence of Algeria- Pro-French: 244 items; Balanced or neutral:
related items
	
123 items; Anti-colon: 96 items Total: 463
Frequency Degree of
Number	 Intensity
	
118	 3
	
38	 1
	
32	 1
	
45	 1
	
51	 2
	
107	 3
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Sub-Period IV: 1962
The New York Times Algeria content in 1962 embraced six major
thematic categories which are tabulated below with their frequency
number and their degree of intensity.
TABLE 13
Thematic Category
1. The O.A.S.'s continuing campaign of
terror i sm
2. The Algerian populations discipline and
self-restraint in face of O.A.S.
provocations
3. The international repercussions of the
conflict
4. The long process of negotiations and the
conclusion of a settlement.
5. Algeria's foreign policy immediately after
independence, especially its stance towards
the super powers.
6. The multi-faceted difficulties facing the
new Algeria.
Measurement of the degree of prominence of the Algeria-related
material according to the "attention score" system has given the
following results: out of a total of 242 items devoted to Algeria
during this sub-period, three were assigned three points, 74 ' 195 were
assigned two points and 41 were assigned one point. The total
attention score was 443 points.75
The paper's Algeria coverage in 1962 focused on two major
thematic categories: the continuation of the O.A.S.'s campaign of
violence and destruction; and the different problems facing Algeria
after independence. These two most salient or most frequently
mentioned categories are presented in Table 14 according to their
frequency number.
Frequency
Number
118
107
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TABLE 14
Thematic Category
1. The 0.A.S.'s continuing campaign of violence.
2. The different problems facing the new Algeria
An evident degree of fluctuation, similar to that detected in
previous sub-periods, characterized The New York Times level of
interest in Algeria in 1962. The paper's degree of attention to the
subject rose considerably during the first four months with a
substantial amount of Algeria-related front-page, editorial and
commentary material. This was due to the important events that
dominated the Algerian scene, namely the final stages of the Evian
talks and the conclusion of the long-awaited ceasefire agreement. The
level of interest In Algeria evidently fell in May but rose sharply
again in July before beginning to decrease until it reached its lowest
point in November and December. The paper's degree of attention to
the subject reached its highest point or "peak" in March with 17
front-page stories, including one eight-column banner headline, seven
editorials and five commentaries; and also in July with 15 front-page
stories, four editorials and three commentaries. This rise in the
level of interest was due to two major events which took place during
these two months: the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement between
the G.P.R.A. and the French Government in March, and Algeria's formal
independence in July. 76 The paper's degree of attention reached its
lowest point or "valley" during the last two months which represented
the denouement of the Algerian crisis when little was happening in
terms of "news". The New York Times level of interest in Algeria in
1962, measured by the number of front-page, editorial and commentary
items, is presented below in tabular form with the total attention
score of each month according to the three-point scale explained
2
3
5
2
3
3
3
1
1
0
1
0
13
10
17
11
8
11
15
10
8
6
3
2
3
6
7
5
2
6
4
4
3
2
0
1
January
February
Marc"
April*
May
June
July*
August
September
October
November
December
36 points
38 points
59 points
37 points
26 points
40 points
45 points
30 points
24 points
16 points
8 points
6 points
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earlier.
TABLE 15
Page One
Stories
Editorials Commentaries Total Attention
Score
* The months of March, April and July contained the most prominent
news items The New York Times devoted to Algeria in 1962, each
with a three-point attention score. For a thematic analysis of
what took place during each month, see supra, pp.255-262;
266-272.
The New York Times Algeria material went up by 16.3 percent in
quantitative terms compared with 1961. The amount of its balanced or
neutral material went up by 68 percent: 168 items comprising 69.4
percent of the total Algeria coverage in 1962 and with a total
attention score of 308 points as opposed to only 48 percent and 159
points respectively in 1961. The pro-French Government material
decreased by 79.7 percent with only 15 items and a total attention
score of 27 points as opposed to 74 items and a total attention score
of 125 points a year earlier. This was due mainly to the current
Algerian-French rapprochement and the growing prospects of a peaceful
settlement. As explained earlier, the news generally tends to
reinforce the status quo due to political or ideological bias or to
some identification factors. 77
 It was in 1962 - the final year of the
Algerian-French conflict - that The New York Times really left aside
all the prejudices, stereotypes and wishful thinking that had hitherto
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characterized its Algeria coverage and which were mainly borne out of
sympathy for France as an ally of the United States. 78 And it began
to accept the possibility of an independent Algeria perhaps totally
detached from France and the West. The paper's anti-colon material
went up by 47.5 percent with 59 items and a total attention score of
107 points compared with 40 items and 74 points in 1961. This was a
reaction to the intensification of the terrorist campaign of the
O.A.S. extremists which has been explained in detail and from
different angles in Chapter VI.
Concordant with the argument that The New York Times considerably
improved the quality of its Algerian coverage in 1962, is the fact
that it increased the usage of independent sources at the expense of
French official sources. 101 news reports out of a total of 178,
comprising 56.7 percent of the total Algeria reportage in 1962, came
from independent sources. This compared with 25 percent a year
earlier. Only 21 stories, comprising 11.7 percent of the total news
reportage as opposed to 72.6 percent in 1961, originated from French
governmental sources. It has already been demonstrated that the
nature of the source of information is crucially important to the
quality of the news coverage: the quality and direction of the news
the reader finally gets depends on what is available at the "gathering
end of the line". The paper's usage of Algerian sources rose by 51.3
percent in 1962 to reach 56 items. This was partly the result of an
intensification of diplomatic manoeuvring, and the subsequent increase
in the number of public statements, proposals and counterproposals put
forward by the Algerian leaders, which the paper had to report. But,
the main reason behind the increase in usage of Algerian sources was
Algeria's advent to independence and the consequent transfer of
political power to the G.P.R.A. which, therefore, became the major
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source of information in the country. This is perhaps another
confirmation of the theory that the news media tend to regard the
views of those in power as "more newsworthy" than the views of those
without political power.
The New York Times Algeria-related analytical and interpretive
content went up to 64 items, comprising 26.4 percent of the total
Algeria coverage, as compared with 21.6 percent in 1961. Those items
which could be considered analytical or interpretive comprise 43
editorials and 21 commentaries. It was in 1962 that The New York
Times told its reader about the different dimensions of the Algerian
conflict and its multifarious contextual circumstances, left behind
prejudices and wishful thinking, and took an unequivocal stand on the
questions of Algeria's future and colon-army intransigence. 79 Without
rehearsing the functions and duties of newspapers, which have been
discussed earlier, it is perhaps appropriate to note that a good
newspaper should "speak the truth, adequately cover the interests of
its greater community, take tough stands on issues that are of
importance whether local, national or international". 80 A newspaper
should not only aim at factual accuracy but also at meaning , by
helping the readers to understand the complexity of the world in which
they live. 8' Calling for more reportorial commitment on the part of
the news reporter by investigating the news, analysing and
interpreting the raw information, Walter Lippmann once argued that it
is only through the reporter that people understand their realities
and reach "opinions about what their governors want them to consent
to" 82
The (London) Times Algeria-related analytical and interpretive
material, unlike that of The New York Times, fell by 38.4 percent
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compared with 1961 with only eight editorials (or leading articles).
The Economist and Time, on the other hand, maintained a high level of
analytical, interpretive and background content on Algeria.83
The evident decrease in The New York Times dependence on French
official sources for information and the subsequent increase in the
amount of balanced or neutral Algeria content resulted in a sharp drop
in the number of reporting flaws. The only reporting errors detected
in this sub-period were those which are technically known as
"questionable sources of information". Most of these errors occurred
during the first four months of 1962 at a time of intensive diplomatic
manoeuvring, which resulted in the ceasefire agreement in March and
the period of uncertainty which reigned in Algeria and France
immediately after as a result of the O.A.S. campaign of terre brulee.
Typifying such errors are the following samples: "A qualified source
said here today..."; "Quarters close to the Government... said...";
"Informed sources said... ,,84 This study has not, however, detected
any instance of the more dangerous reporting flaws which are related
either to the phraseology or to the headline of the types noted at
some earlier stages of this chapter.85
Table 16 shows in brief how The New York Times covered and
treated the Algerian-French conflict in 1962.
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TABLE 16
Origin of Algeria-
related news
stories
Sources of news
stories
News stories as
played in the
paper
From Algeria: 111; From France: 34; From Tunis:
14; Other: 19	 Total: 178
Independent sources: 101; Algerian sources: 56;
French sources: 21	 Total: 178
Page One: 114 stories; Inside pages: 64 stories;
Total: 178
Nature of Algeria- News stories: 178; Editorials: 43; Commentaries:
related items	 21;	 Total: 242
Attention score
of Algeria-
related items
Valence of
Al geri a-rel ated
items
44 items: 1 point; 195 items: 2 points; 3 items:
3 points;	 Total: 443
Balanced or neutral: 168 items; Anti-colon
(O.A.S.): 59 items; Pro-French Government: 15
items;	 Total: 242
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CONCLUSION
Historians have access to materials that are not available to
contemporary commentators, and therefore the full story of past events
has usually to wait for the passage of time. But the ways in which
contemporaries report happenings are not thereby made valueless.
Immediate reportlngs and perceptions sometimes tell a great deal about
policy implications and the multifarious conditions that circumscribe
events. The way in which international news is reported and presented
plays an important role in shaping the picture of the world in
people's minds, and in shaping the images nations hold of each other.
Yet, the news media are often criticized for giving "a picture of the
world" which differs from "what really happened". This has been
particularly true of the different ways in which revolutions and wars
of independence have been presented by various newspapers to their
readers. This thesis has concerned itself with the way in which The
New York Times reported and presented the Algerian revolution - what
it said about it and how, and what it did not say - using other media
and extra-media data to establish a cross-check control of its news
coverage.
This analysis has revealed that, at least in quantitative terms,
The New York Times Algeria coverage was commensurate with its widely
acclaimed resources, as evidenced by the 1810 items it directly
devoted to the Algerian-French conflict over the period 1956-1962.
Although comparison with other world events falls beyond the scope of
this study, the findings have shown that the paper's overall level of
interest in Algeria was high; this is evidencedby the total attention
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score of 3063 points over the period of research. This high level of
interest stemmed largely from the fact that the subject was both
culturally and politically "meaningful", "relevant" or "consonant" to
the American reader, especially because of the
French-American-N.A.T.O. connection. Since news is audience-oriented,
the reader should not only be presented with the news that he can
understand, but also with the news that catches his attention and
interest. It is widely accepted that "the greater the possibilities
of Identification with the news, the greater will be the news flow".1
A news medium is, above all, a commercial enterprise and, for it to
survive In a highly competitive market, it has to continue to attract
a sufficiently high audience and maintain its appeal to its
constituency. The New York Times' high degree of attention to the
Algerian-French conflict was due to the belief that the American
reader was able to identify himself with it because of cultural (or
politico-ideological) "proximity" with France, that embraced French
involvement in N.A.T.O. and its relevance to United States interest
and security.
But a "good" news coverage should not be judged according to
statistics or printing image, but primarily according to its quality
and depth. Although the paper's Algeria coverage was quantitatively
plentiful it was qualitatively weak, generally superficial and lacking
in depth. In most cases information on the causes, socio-cultural and
economic contexts of events was either missing or rare and sporadic.
Sole reliance on The New York Times would not have led to accurate
understanding of the problem as the paper, with some notable
exceptions, generally failed to go beyond routine reporting which was
overwhelmingly based on French official sources, to the detriment of
in-depth analytical, interpretive and background material.
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The analysis suggests that the picture drawn by the paper about
the Algerian revolution was heavily based on news stories about
current incidents and events, whereas commentaries, analyses and
background features played almost no role in shaping that picture.
This was the main reason behind the fact that the degree of attention
to Algeria tended to rise, and the Algeria-related items to be
displayed with more prominence, at the beginning of a new development
but tended to decrease sharply once the situation was no longer novel.
Although the focus In the paper's attention varied from one sub-period
to another, the military theme - namely reports of clashes, casualties
and attacks - was displayed with significant prominence throughout
most of the period of research.
Whilst this thesis has made no attempt to investigate the
possible influence of The New York Times Algeria coverage on public
opinion in the United States, it is worth reiterating that the
reportorial element and the way it is presented to the reader is
generally more influential than the interpretive content. The paper's
predominant reliance on "hot news" stemmed from a traditional belief
within American journalism that a newspaper's duty is to give the
reader " facts " not opinions. Opinions were restricted to the
editorial page, the Magazine or the Sunday section "News of the Week
in Review". But, this study has shown that in addition to conveying
and circulating factual information, a newspaper's duty should be to
investigate the "hidden facts" and to "educate" the reader.
Complicated matters like international conflicts and wars of
independence need to be reported within their contexts to enable the
reader to understand their meaning, and avoid simplification as a
negative factor influencing the quality of news coverage; that is,
when events are portrayed as "less complex" or "more simple" than they
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really are.
The New York Times' heavy reliance on routine reporting, which
was mainly based on information from French official sources,
portrayed the Algerian-French conflict, especially in its early years,
in an over-simplistic manner. It had at least until 1958 portrayed
Algeria as an integral part of France and what was happening there as
a "rebellion" or a "secession" similar to that of the South during the
American Civil War. This negative simplification was not alleviated
by the editorialists because, in the absence of an expert on
Algerian-French affairs in the Editorial Department, the editorialists
relied only on the information the news stories provided. Editorial
topics were determined by the daily news reportage: the subjects of
the 207 editorials The New York Times devoted to Algeria during the
period 1956-1962 comprising 11.4 percent of the overall coverage were
all inspired by the daily reports. Editorial policy can influence
both the intensity and direction of the daily news reporting when, as
Martin Kriesberg has suggested, "unwarranted headlines" and
"questionable sources" of information of the types noted in Chapter
VII, are used to back an editorial remark or argument. This study,
however, has not detected any instance where the policy of the
editorial page influenced or determined the paper's daily news
reporting on Algeria. The editorials and the news reports were
generally in harmony and no obvious contradiction has been detected.
The analysis has shown that with some exceptions the editorials were
by and large weak, consolidating the view that The New York Times
editorial page traditionally lacked vitality and punch.
The paper's Algeria coverage, heavily reliant on French official
sources, generally leaned towards the French pofnt of view. It failed
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to balance facts and supposition and draw the line between subliminal,
predisposed views and what really happened. This has been established
here by the use of other media and extra-media data. This thesis has
shown that The New York Times was by and large preoccupied with what
the French authorities said and did, confirming the theory that the
news media tend to consider the views of those in power as more "news
worthy" than the views of the "people without political powers". The
quality of the news coverage depends on the quality of the sources,
and the more diversified the sources of information the more accurate
the news will be. The duty of the newspaper should therefore be to
tell the entire story not merely the acts of those in power and their
official statements.
In accordance with this analysis, the reader of The New York
Times, throughout most of the period of research apart from the final
year of the war where it took a detached stance, would have found that
its news coverage was generally favourable to the French point of
view. The paper's stance tended to change according to the change in
French policy and attitude towards the problem. For example, it
became receptive to Algeria's right to self-determination only after
this had already been technically conceded by France in the aftermath
of the 13 May coup, the downfall of the Fourth Republic and the return
of General de Gaulle to power. It was only in 1962, when Algeria's
independence became inevitable, that it finally set aside all the
prejudices, stereotypes and wishful thinking which had by and large
characterized its Algeria coverage. It began to adopt a balanced and
detached stance, accepting the possibility of an Algeria totally
independent of France. The paper's Algeria-related material had a
negative effect on France's image only when it was associated with the
colon extremists and their use of indiscriminate violence to prevent
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Algeria from gaining independence. Conversely, its perception and
presentation of the F.L.N. image was consistently unfavourable. In
this context, analysis has detected that in all those instances when
The New York Times Algeria-related coverage was "pollyanna",
"climactic", "opportunistic", or affected by "loaded" words,
"questionable" sources of information or "unwarranted headlines", the
content tended to be unfavourable to the F.L.N. and favourable to the
French Government. In thematic valence terms, the coverage of the
Algerian-French conflict generally leaned towards France. It is
divided into a pro-French anti-F.L.N. sub-period, 1956-1957; a much
improved but still pro-French sub-period, 1958-1959; a pro-French
Government but anti-Army-colon sub-period 1960-1961; anti-O.A.S.,
balanced sub-period, 1962.
The New York Times pro-French, anti-F.L.N. stance stemmed from
its political (ideological) leaning towards France, particularly
conditioned by its N.A.T.O. link with the United States. Like the
American Government, it viewed the Algerian-French conflict mainly in
accordance with the notion of American and Western interests, perhaps
confirming the theory that there is an inherent "Western loyalty bias"
in the reporting of non-Western news by the Wetern media. The paper
made Algeria a top Cold-War issue and persistently cautioned against
its possible effects on Western security, giving credence to France's
almost hysterical warnings against an alleged Communist threat to the
region and to the N.A.T.O. defence system, especially its southern
shield. This corresponds with a remark once made by an African
statesman that "... news coming out of Africa was often related to the
already biased and prejudiced mind that keeps asking such questions
as: 'is this pro-East or pro-West?' but nobody asked: 'is this
pro-African?'". 2
 The journalist should leave aside all prejudices and
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wishful thinking and avoid letting his reports be dictated by his
emotions. He should, in the words of R.W. Desniond, "analyse his own
prejudices, ruthlessly, so that he could discount them and thus come
nearer impartiality".3
Table 17 below presents a brief summary of the way in which The
New York Times covered and presented the Algerian revolution during
the period 1956-1962:
TABLE 17:
Origin of Algeria-
related news
stories
Sources of
news stories
News stories as
played in the paper
Nature of
Al geri a-rel ated
material
Attention score
of Algeria-
related items
Valence of
Al geri a-rel ated
items
From France: 567 From Algeria: 477 Other: 399
Total 1443
French sources: 807; Independent sources: 475;
Algerian sources: 161	 Total 1443
Inside pages: 789; Page One: 654 	 Total: 1443
News stories: 1443; Editorials: 207;
Commentaries: 121; Letters to editor: 39
Total: 1810
576 items: 1 point; 1215 items: 2 points; 19
items: 3 points	 Total: 3063
Pro-French: 934; Balanced or neutral: 608;
Anti-co7on: 268	 Total: 1810
Yet, using other media and extra-media data, this study has shown
that the greatest flaw of The New York Times coverage of the Algerian
revolution was that of "omission". It failed to investigate and
expose the "hidden facts" and their historical, socio-economic and
cultural contexts, and also failed accurately to reflect the reality
of the war especially from the viewpoint of the people who were
experiencing it. This stemmed partly from an evident lack of
competence to investigate, analyse and interpret the truths that
determined and circumscribed events. And partly, it was the result of
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an inherent media preoccupation with the official versions of events,
in accordance with the journalistic euphemism "big names make big
news". This corresponds with the theory that the news is
"elite-oriented" and that "the news media tend to reinforce the status
quo" especially when national interest, even in its distant forms, is
involved. It also confirms the theory that the news media tend to
exaggerate the importance of statements and actions by big power
leaders, at the expense of second opinions and independent
substantiation which are essential for accuracy.
It is widely argued that daily newspapers have an "agenda
setting" or "impression setting" influence on, and act as "leaders"
to, the weekly publications. But, this analysis has not detected any
significant influence, either in terms of themes, valence or
intensity, by the daily newspaper on the news magazines. It has, on
the contrary, shown that the weeklies, by their nature as synthesizers
of, and often commentators on, news media information and despite
their limitation by space and frequency of publication, provided
qualitatively better coverage of the Algerian revolution. They
presented the reader with more analytical background information on,
and took a more detached stance towards, the Algerian-French conflict.
It is the editorial officers who set the values and determine the
criteria according to which it is decided which news should be
selected and in what way it should be presented. The quality and
direction of a newspaper's coverage of a particular event, to a large
extent, depends on the competence, perception and political views of
those individuals who handle the news, from the correspondent on the
scene to the top editorialist in New York. As Walter Lipprnann wrote
in Public Opinion in 1927, there is only "a small body of exact
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knowledge" and almost no fixed standards of ability and training in
the craft of news reporting; but a lot depends on the "journalist's
own discretion", and on what Justice Holmes once labelled the
correspondent's "inarticulate major premises" which inevitably colour
his news dispatches. Yet, there are some general basic guidelines
with which a journalist should always remind himself in order to
achieve adequate news coverage and which are worth reiterating. He
should -
1. remember that simple or Immediate solutions for all national and
International problems are not possible,
2. be level-headed and always keep in mind that prejudice and
wishful thinking breed distortion of news; and yielding to
personal temptations and emotions makes him a prey to the
deliberate deception of those in the news and turns him into a
sensationalist,
3. be "half diplomat, half detective" and make a good effort to
report the people of the nation to which he is assigned as well
as the governing power,
4. know that there is always a second opinion and another side to
each story - "the best and worst give way under closer scrutiny"
5. make sure that the direct and practical always prevails over the
generalized and abstract,
6. widen the scope of his knowledge especially by learning the
language of the people on whom the reporting is done, and by
having a clear idea about their history and culture,
7. double-check each story, report or statement and always ask: "Is
it a fair reflection of the various opinions and views I have
heard?" "Have I given all sides?"
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The New York Times, despite its high reputation, failed to measure up
fully to these criteria in its treatment of the Algerian crisis.
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Notes
1. E. Ostgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", Journal of
Peace Research, op.cit., p.46.
2. Quoted in J. Galtung and M.H. Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign
News", Journal of Peace Research, op.cit., p.84.
3. R.W. Desmond, The Press and World Affairs, op.cit., pp.44-45.
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